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Introduction  	
The development of vehicle automation systems has reached high levels and is 
projected, due to technological evolution, towards ever faster progress. The 
technologies currently used in road traffic include Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS) and vehicles with an increasing level of automation and artificial 
intelligence. 
Autonomous vehicles aim to improve the driver’s comfort and minimize human 
error. This implies, on the one hand, less driver involvement in driving tasks and, 
on the other hand, a likely improvement in road safety. 
The introduction of autonomous vehicles on the market entails considerable 
advantages, but the production of such cars with high technology leads to wonder if 
the current civil liability rules are still adequate when a driverless car is involved. 
As a matter of fact, the existing liability rules do not directly address the problem 
of liability in the event of car collisions involving an autonomous vehicle. Even if 
the road traffic regulations provide some cases that can be applied to autonomous 
vehicles, there is not a complete legislation that allows to fully identify the 
tortfeasor in this new scenario. Driverless cars could imply the overcoming of the 
key subject for imputation of liability in road accidents, that has always been 
covered by the driver and this entails the need to revise the system of civil liability 
from road traffic, assuming new ways for the risk allocation. 
Starting from this point of view, this work is focused on the new profiles of 
civil liability that can be configured in the event of a traffic accident between two 
vehicles, at least one of which is self-drive. In this scenario, it will see if the 
traditional road traffic legislation, which held liable the driver and/or the owner of 
the vehicle responsible, can be applied, or new subjects which can bears the risk of 
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the damage can be introduced: the producer, the internet service provider and other 
third parties (e.g hackers, who illegaly access the driving software of the vehicle). 
In this way, an analysis of the allocation of risk between the different parties 
involved in the automotive sector must be carried out and, consequently, also an 
evaluation of the insurance law principles that could guarantee a high level of 
protection in the ‘autonomous’ traffic flow. 
In the identification of the tortfeasor, the research, first of all, takes the 
perspective of the Italian law and concerns the identification of the principle and 
function of Italian tort law. The solutions that can be envisaged under Italian law, 
then, will be compared with those in force in the French, German, English and 
American legal systems, taking into account not only the legislation but also the 
case-law and the literature. Then, the comparison between Italian legislation and 
those of European and non-European countries considered, will be extended to the 
European Union regulation, with particular regard to those on civil liability, 
product liability (as an alternative to road traffic liability) and the recent soft-law 
on the issue of robotics and artificial intelligence. 
Starting from a critical analysis of the state of the art, it will try to achieve two 
aims. First of all, it will evaluate whether there is a civil liability regulation which 
is functional to the protection of the injured person, even in the event of a traffic 
accident due to a self-driving car. Then, it will verify whether this legislation is 
sufficient for a complete and systematic regulation of autonomous vehicles, or if it 
is necessary to modify the existing regulation or to introduce an ad hoc framework 
of rules for self-driving cars. 	  
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CHAPTER I – SELF-DRIVING CARS AND LIABILITY 
RULES 		
Summary: 1. The traffic accident brought about by self-driving car. 1.1. Main 
self-driving car crashes: the borders of the research. 1.2. The problem of 
identifying liability rules for autonomous vehicles: the Italian Law such as 
paradigm and starting point 2. Types of motor vehicle accidents involving self-
driving cars. 2.1. The classification criteria of motor vehicle accidents. 2.2. The 
role of the Private International Law. 2.3. New actors involved in the traditional 
civil liability regimes. 	e	
1. The traffic accident brought about by self-driving car. 	
1.1. Main self-driving car crashes: the borders of the research. 	
The spread of new technologies requires a rereading of the traditional legal 
categories of civil law, among which the role of civil liability plays an important 
role. In fact, the regimes of civil liability recognized by a legal system endure deep 
changes and the principles underlying these schemes appear radically altered.1 
Among the protagonists of this ever-changing scenario, there are undoubtedly 
the driverless cars, which imply the overcoming of the key subjects for the 
imputation of liability for road accidents that has always been covered by the 
driver. As will be seen in the second chapter, when is the vehicle that drives, the 
																																																								
1 Irti N, ‘Diritto Civile’, Digesto sez. civ., VI (4th edn, UTET 1990) 150, underlines that the flexibility 
of principles and protections, which involves the construction of new civil law institutions, 
accompanies the meeting between civil law and the technological society. 
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role of the common driver2 fails, being replaced at most by that of the user or users 
on-board. Furthermore, together with the disappearance of the driver, the gradual 
overcoming of the owner system for vehicles is unavoidable. Then, with the full 
automation (or at least with the high automation of the vehicle) perhaps the liability 
could not even be held by the owner of the vehicle, but to the producer. This entails 
the need to revise the system of civil liability from road traffic, assuming new ways 
of distributing road traffic risks. 
Autonomous vehicles are a hybrid between car and computers, as they are 
managed by a complex information system, consisting of cameras, sensors and 
GPS software as well as a wide range of other technologies, which allows the 
vehicle to be driven without human intervention, or with minimal human 
intervention. In this context, there is a risk of accidents caused by defects in on-
board technology, that is, resulting from viruses, network failures and 
programming errors that can commonly afflict IT devices. 
Currently, several class actions3 have already taken place against various car 
companies, which would seem destined to increase considerably with autonomous 
vehicles. Just think of the two known Tesla incidents. In the first one, which 
happened in Williston (Florida) in 2016, a man on-board the Tesla Model S, who 
was traveling in Autopilot mode, lost his life when the car crashed into a truck; the 
Tesla then ran off the road, hitting a fence and a power pole before coming to a 
stop. Instead, in the second incident, two years later, a Tesla Model X in autopilot 																																																								
2 Vienna Convention of 8 November 1968 on road traffic [1968], art 1, lett V: «‘Driver’ means any 
person who drives a motor vehicle or other vehicle (including a cycle) […]». It means that if the 
vehicle is driven by a computer the user can no be longer considered as a driver.	
3 An example is the class action against the car company Toyota on suspicion of fraud claiming that 
Toyota had hidden for years the problems to the accelerator of its cars Lexus and Scion and an 
investigation of the American government was opened against the same automobile company due to a 
problem with the ABS braking system of the latest Prius model. In this sense ‘Toyota, accordo in 
class action Usa con esborso 1,1 mld dlr’ [2012] www.reuters.com; see also ‘Toyota, scatta la class 
action per frode’ [2010] www.corriere.it. 
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mode crashed into a highway barrier in Mountain View (California) and the driver 
died after being taken to the hospital.4 
Finally, this year a woman, while was walking her bicycle outside the crosswalk 
on a four-lane road in the Phoenix suburb of Tempe (Texas), was hit by a Uber car 
(model Volvo XC90 SUV). The car was traveling in autonomous mode, even 
though a driver was behind the wheel.5 
Since under the current law it is not possible to find rules to fully discipline the 
new profiles of civil liability, it remains to be established: «how will legal liability 
be assessed when autonomous cars collide with other vehicle, pedestrians, or 
property?»6 
Given the multitude of configurable scenarios in the event of accidents caused 
by autonomous vehicles, the field of investigation of this work should be defined 
immediately. The research activity is focused on the new profiles of civil liability 
that can be configured in the event of a traffic accident between two vehicles, at 
least one of which is self-drive. By road accident7 we refer to an event in which 																																																								
4 The characteristic of Tesla vehicles (both Model S and Model X) is to be equipped with both 
human-drive and autonomous (so-called autopilot) driving modes. Only by turning on the autopilot 
mode the car reaches an automation level corresponding to level 3 of the SAE J3016 standard, which 
classifies the automation levels and which will be discussed in chapter II. For further information on 
Tesla cases see A Singhvi, K Russell, ‘Inside the Self-Driving Tesla Fatal Accident’ [2016] The New 
York Times; M Matousek, ‘The Tesla Model X that crashed into a barrier while in Autopilot sped up 
right before the accident, new NTSB report shows’ [2018] Business Insider. 
5 For more details see F Siddiqui, M Laris, ‘Self-driving Uber vehicle strikes and kills pedestrian’ 
[2018] Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com; T Bellon, ‘Liability and Legal Questions Follow 
Uber Autonomous Car Fatal Accident’ [2018] Insurance Journal. 
6 SH Duffy, JP Hopkins, ‘Sit, Stay, Drive. The Future of Autonomous Car Liability’ (2013) 16 SMU 
Science & Technology Law Review 101. 
7 Vienna Convention of 1968 does not give a specific definition of a traffic accident. Anyway, it is 
undisputed that in road traffic any wilful or negligent act is defined as an accident, in which persons, 
vehicles, and others may be involved. Commonly, many different terms are used to describe a traffic 
accident. The World Health Organization uses the term ‘road traffic injury’, while the U.S. Census 
Bureau uses the term ‘motor vehicle accidents’ (MVA), and Transport Canada uses the term ‘motor 
vehicle traffic collision’ (MVTC). Other common terms include car accident, car crash, motor vehicle 
collision (MVC), personal injury collision (PIC), road accident, road traffic accident (RTA), road 
traffic collision (RTC), and road traffic incident (RTI). In this sense see Peden M, Scurfield R, Sleet 
D and others, ‘World report on road traffic injury prevention’ [2004] World Healt Organization 
(WHO) report, 1 ff.; ‘Motor Vehicle Accidents – Number and Deaths: 1980 to 2008’ [2012] United 
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vehicles, human beings or animals (stationary or moving) are involved and from 
which they derive injury to things, animals, or people8. Therefore, the cases of 
damage caused by a self-driving vehicle without involving another vehicle are also 
investigated. This hypothesis concerns both cases in which the self-driving vehicle 
produces damage to property (other than other vehicles) or animals, and cases of 
personal injury to the same driver or to third parties transported 9  or not 
transported.10  
At the same time, however, the field of investigation will be limited to the 
claims where the owner of the vehicle, the driver and the insured coincide. In these 
cases, in front of the injured party, on the one hand, there is the owner of the 
vehicle, who is also the driver (if the vehicle is not totally autonomous) as well as 
the insured person and, on the other, there is the insurer. Only one of them is 
obligated to compensate the damage for the principle that compensation must not 
result in the enrichment of the injured person. On the contrary, the rental cases and, 																																																																																																																																													
States Census Bureau (USCB) statistical abstract, section 23 on Transportation 693; ‘Canadian Motor 
Vehicle Traffic Collision Statistics: 2016’ [2017] Transport Canada Statistics. However, some 
organizations have begun to avoid the term ‘accident’, preferring the terms ‘collision’, ‘crash’ or 
‘incident’. This is because the term ‘accident’ implies that there is no-one to blame, whereas most 
traffic collisions are due to the driver behaviour. See Badger E, ‘When a car 'crash' isn't an 'accident' - 
and why the difference matters’ 2015] The Washington Post; Richtel M, ‘It's No Accident: Advocates 
Want to Speak of Car 'Crashes' Instead’ [2016] The New York Times. 
8 As a matter of fact, the accident may result in damage to property (eg. slight or severe damage to 
one or more vehicles, structures and things outside the roadway, etc.) to people (physical injury of 
minor or serious injury, death), and animals. The damage generates a right of the claimant to be 
compensated, usually by the defendant, but other forms of protection or assistance are configurable. 
The term ‘road’ not only determines the context of the damaging event, otherwise it would fall into 
the category of traffic collision incidents such as street attacks or the illness of a pedestrian. On the 
contrary, with the term ‘road’ we refer to a causation link between the road and the circulation of 
vehicles, also including the damaging event that occurs to the driver of a vehicle, which does not 
depends by collision with another vehicle. See G Buffone (ed.), Responsabilità civile automobilistica 
(Cedam 2016) 3 ff.. 
9 It is sufficient to think about the case in which the on-board computer is short-circuited and leads 
the vehicle into a ravine, causing damage to the driver or to third parties transported or even causing 
death. 
10 This is the case, for example, of a woman who is on the other side of the roadway, maybe going 
ahead for the green light on the pedestrian crossing, and who have been hit by a driverless car that 
chose to invest her in order to do not invest a young mother who was suddenly crossing the road with 
the red light and outside the crosswalks. 
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more generally, all those in which the owner and the driver do not coincide are 
excluded from this work. 
 
 
1.2. The problem of identifying liability rules for autonomous 
vehicles: the Italian Law such as paradigm and starting point. 	
As will be seen in the second chapter, the introduction of autonomous vehicles 
on the market entails considerable advantages, but the production of such cars with 
high technology requires bring to ask if the current civil liability rules are still 
adequate when driverless car are involved. In fact, the existing rules do not directly 
address the problem of liability in the event of car collisions involving an 
autonomous vehicle. Even if the road traffic regulations provide some cases that 
can be applied to autonomous vehicles (in whole or in part), there is no complete 
body of law in the state that allows to fully identify the related responsibilities and 
the subject liable.11 
In this way, a revision process is triggered that can affect the allocation of 
liability between the different parties in the automotive sector and, consequently, 
also on the characteristics of the insurance system. 
In the identification of the liable, the research takes, first of all, the perspective 
of Italian law and concerns the identification of the principle and function of Italian 
law in force that could be applied in court in a situation such as that identified in 
the previous subsection. 
																																																								
11 JK Gurney, ‘Sue My Car Not Me. Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous 
Vehicles’ (2013) 2 Journal of Law Tech. & Pol. 247 ff., as it will see, try to answer the question about 
who is liable when an accident is caused in autonomous mode.  
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The solutions that can be envisaged under Italian law, than, will be compared 
with those configurable in the French, German, English and American legal 
systems, taking into account not only the rules currently in force in these countries 
but also Court and literature guidelines disseminated (see chapter III, section 1 and 
2). It will see how the legislation normally considers the driver and/or the owner of 
the autonomous vehicle responsible while Authors12 introduces new subjects on 
which the risk could weigh: producer, internet service provider and other third 
parties (e.g hackers who tamper with vehicle on-board software). 
The comparison between Italian legislation and those of European and non-
European countries considered, will be extended to the comparison between the 
rules of Italian law and those proposed by the European Union with particular 
regard to those on civil liability and the recent soft-law on the issue of robotics13 
(see chapter III, section 2, subsection 2.3, and  chapter IV, section 1).  
Having assumed the perspective of Italian law as a benchmark for the 
development of a broader and more comprehensive vision of the phenomenon, 
which extends to the European and international levels, it appear necessary the 																																																								
12 See A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications 
and Liability Rules’ (2013) 5 (2) LIT 214-247. E Palmerini and others, ‘Guidelines on Regulating 
Robotics’ [2014] Project deliverable; MC Gaeta, ‘Automazione e responsabilità civile 
automobilistica’ (2016) 5 Resp. civ. e prev. 1718 – 1750; A Davola, R Pardolesi, ‘In viaggio col 
robot: verso nuovi orizzonti della r.c. auto (“driverless”)?’(2017) 5 Danno e resp. 616 - 629. 
13 The European initiatives for introducing a regulatory framework on Robotics are numerous. 
Recently, with the Resolution of 16 February 2017, the European Parliament recommend to the 
European Commission to submit a bill on Civil Law rules on Robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and non-legislative acts (such as guidelines and codes of ethical conduct). The purpose of the 
European Parliament resolution is to address the main issues foreseeable in the next 10 - 15 years, 
taking into account the Charter on Robotics attached to the Resolution. In addition, the European 
Parliament considers that the automotive sector is in most urgent need of efficient European Union 
and global rules, in order to ensure the cross-border development of self-driving cars, the exploitation 
of their economic potential and the benefits from the technology. See European Parliament resolution 
of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2103(INL)). Also in the Declaration of Amsterdam of 14 and 15 April 2016 on Cooperation in 
the field of connected and automated driving, the need to develop and maintain a joint program with 
other European countries has been underlined to support these goals, and to remedy the problems 
arising from the development of this new type of driving. See Declaration of Amsterdam of 14 and 15 
April 2016 on Cooperation in the field of connected and automated driving [2016]. 
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reconstruction of the regulatory framework of Italian tort law in road traffic. 
However, before arriving at the analysis of the Italian legislation on road traffic 
liability, it is necessary to distinguish the main types of road accidents and the law 
applicable to them (see section 2 below). 
 
 
2. Types of motor vehicle accidents involving self-driving 
cars. 	
2.1. The classification criteria of motor vehicle accidents. 	
Before moving on to deepening the non-contractual liability from road traffic in 
order to identify who is responsible for accidents caused by an autonomous 
vehicle, it is necessary to list the types of motor vehicle accidents involving self-
driving cars, setting out the classification criteria of motor vehicle accident, in 
order to divide it in domestic (occurred in Italy) and foreign (occurred abroad). 
Traffic collisions can be also classified by collision types. They include: head-
on, road departure, rear-end, side collisions, and rollovers. However, this work will 
focus on the distinction of collisions in Italian and foreign in order to identify the 
applicable law to settle the dispute in judicial or extrajudicial phase. Indeed, the 
purpose of this work is to identify the rules applicable to new road accident 
scenarios, identifying the person liable for the damage. 
The Italian motor vehicle accidents are distinguished in: a) claims in which only 
Italian vehicles are involved; b) claims between Italian vehicles and foreign 
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vehicles; c) claims between exclusively foreign vehicles. Each of these 
subcategories has its peculiarities that involve different disciplinary specificities.14 
Instead, the foreign vehicle accidents are that which occurred in a Country other 
than Italy but in which at least one Italian vehicle is involved (usually insured in 
Italy) or on which drivers and possibly Italian passengers travel. In turn, it is 
divided into numerous sub-categories.15 
																																																								
14 Italian motor vehicle accidents are collisions occurred in Italy. To avoid the configuration of 
excessive hypotheses we will consider that Italian vehicles are insured in Italy and on the same travel 
driver and possibly Italian passengers, and foreign vehicles are insured abroad and conducted by a 
foreign driver and on which foreigners subject transported will travel. 
(a) Therefore, Italian collision can occur between Italian vehicles, insured in Italy, on which Italian 
citizens travel and in this case will be governed by Italian law (Civil Code and Code of Private 
Insurance, with particular regard to the direct compensation established by article 149 of the Code of 
Private Insurance which will be discussed in chapter III). If, instead, the accident occurred in Italy 
between Italian vehicles, insured there, on which Italian citizens travel, and foreign vehicles, insured 
abroad, on which foreign citizens travel, pursuant to art. 62, L n 218/1995 the Italian law will be 
applicable because the incident occurred in Italy, but the person transported will not be able to claim 
compensation directly from the insurance company of the vehicle on which he or she was transported; 
furthermore, pursuant to art. 141 of the Code of Private Insurance, the damaged driver will not be 
able to resort to the direct compensation procedure under art 149 of Code of Private Insurance. 
Finally, if the crash always occurred in Italian territory, but between foreign vehicles, insured abroad, 
with drivers and foreign passengers, Italian or foreign law may be applied according to the criteria set 
out in art. 62 L n . 218/1995.  
(b) On the contrary, car accidents are foreign when they occurred in a country other than Italy but 
involve at least one Italian vehicle (insured in Italy) with Italian citizens and a foreign vehicle 
(insured abroad) on which foreign citizens travel. 
Starting from 1 January 2006, the articles 151-155, 296-301 of the Code of Private Insurance, Italian 
law implementing European source of law about foreign collisions and which aim to facilitate the 
exercise of the right to compensation for damage suffered by the injured party. In any case, if for the 
criteria referred to in L n 218/1995 foreign law is applicable, Article 141 of the Code of Private 
Insurance will not be applicable, as is explicitly stated in art 34, par 1, Direct compensation 
agreement (DCO or, in Italian CARD), which reduces the application of the CARD only to car 
accidents occurring in Italy. The art. 149 of the Code of Private Insurance will not be applicable as is 
explicitly stated by the same art 149, par 2, as well as by art. 4 of the D.P.R. 254/2006. See L Gatt, IA 
Caggiano, MC Gaeta, ‘Italian Tort Law and Self-Driving Cars: State of the Art and Open Issues’, 
(forthcoming) 17 ff.. 
15 There are authors who have identified six, but there are probably other scenarios: 1) Motor vehicle 
accident occurring in a Green Card system with a vehicle registered and insured in another State 
belonging to the European Economic Area; 2) Motor vehicle accident occurring in a Country of the 
Green Card system with a vehicle not registered in a Country of the European economic area; 3) 
Motor vehicle accident occurring in a Country of the European Economic Area (EEA) with a vehicle 
whose identification is impossible; 4) Motor vehicle accident occurring in a Country of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) with a vehicle which show impossible, within 2 months from the accident, 
identify the insurance company; 5) Motor vehicle accident occurring in a Country of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) party to the Convention 6/11/08 (Convention signed by 19 States: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia) with vehicles 
bearing the registration number of the Country where the collision occurred, insured with the 
insurance company in liquidation; 6) Motor vehicle accident occurring in a foreign Country not part 
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First of all, it is essential to understand, with respect to the type of car accident 
occurring, which of the actions can actually be proposed by the injured party, 
before which competent Authority and towards which subjects. Therefore, the 
classification of road traffic injury in national and foreign is instrumental to the 
identification of the rules applicable to the main question object of the present 
work, that is the identification of the liable if it changes in case of a motor vehicle 
accident caused by a driverless car.16 
It is believed that the classification of accidents into national and foreign also 
applies in the case of accidents involving at least one self-driving car. In fact, there 
are no reasons for impeding this extensive interpretation, since it is in any case 
vehicles, even if they have a certain level of autonomy. These criteria for the 
aforementioned classification of accidents are generally valid and do not affect the 
type (autonomous or non-autonomous) of the vehicle involved. 
The classification of road accidents set out above shows, first of all, the need to 
work on three different regulatory plans: the national one that is articulated in 
general rules of civil liability, contained in the Italian Civil Code,17 and special 
rules of civil liability contained in the Italian Code of Private Insurance.18 To this 
bipartite plan is joined, then, the plan of the Private International Law that 
intervenes when the road accident presents elements of internationality that will be 
better described in the following subsection and that can lead to the application of a 
foreign law instead of the Italian one (see this chapter, subsection 2.2). 																																																																																																																																													
of the Green Card system, caused by an identified vehicle. See R. Savoia, ‘I sinistri avvenuti 
all’estero che vedono coinvolti veicoli di soggetti residenti in Italia’ (2010) 9 Il civilista 1 ff.. 
16 L Gatt, IA Caggiano, MC Gaeta, ‘Italian Tort Law and Self-Driving Cars: State of the Art and 
Open Issues’ (n 14) 15 ff. 
17 Italian Civil Code, R.D. 16 March 1942, n. 262, OJ 79, with particular regard to articles 2014, 2054 
and 2055. 
18 Italian Code of Private Insurance, d.lgs. 7 September 2005, n. 209, OJ 239, and in particular articles 
122, 125-126; 141-144-145-148; 149-150; 151-155; 296-301. 
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2.2. The role of the Private International Law. 	
According to article 62, L n 218/1995,19 to identify the applicable law the 
criteria to be followed is, first of all, the  so-called ‘lex loci commissi delicti’, 
which is the law of the State where the damage occurred; however, the injured 
party may request the application of the law of the State in which the damaging 
fact was committed.20 In a residual way, then, if the damaging fact involves 
subjects resident in the same State, the law of that State will be applicable. 
Instead, under article 4, Regulation (EC) n. 864/2007, so-called Rome II 
Regulation, 21 the law to be applied is: 1) that of the Member State in which the 
damage occurred; 2) that of the Member State in which both parties habitually 
resided; 3) where the case is more closely related to the law of another Member 
State, the law of that country. The Rome II Regulation is applicable to all Member 
State of the European Union, while L n 215/1995, which is a source of Italian 
national law, is applicable to accidents occurring even outside the European Union. 
Anyway, in case of conflict between national legislation (L 218/1995) and 
European law (Rome II Regulation) the second prevails.22 																																																								
19 Reform of the Italian system of private international law, l. 31 May 1995, n 218 , OJ 128. 
20 In fact it is possible that the place of the damaging event (car accident), and the place of the fact 
that caused the accident, differs. However, since it is a traffic accident, it is very difficult to think that 
the place of the damage differs from the place of the damaging fact. 
21 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 864/2007/EC of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L 199/40. Note that there are also 
specific rules for some non-contractual obligations, such as product liability and intellectual property.	
22 The Rome II regulation contains two provisions relating to coordination with other sources of law 
with which it is likely to come into conflict by opting for the so-called specialty criteria. Indeed, 
article 27 states that the other provisions of European Union law governing conflicts of laws 
concerning non-contractual obligations are not affected by Rome II Regulation, while article 28 
provides that the Regulation does not preclude the application of international conventions which one 
or more Member States are parties and which regulate legislative conflicts regarding non-contractual 
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To this legal framework, which is not simple in itself, there is also the Hague 
Convention of 1971,23 which regulates the applicable law precisely in the event of 
road accidents. However, Italy has not signed the Hague Convention and, for this 
reason, we will not dwell on this source of international law.  
Finally, other international rules, such as the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA), which provides for the free movement of persons, goods, 
services, and capital within the European Single Market, including the freedom to 
choose a residence in any country within this area.24 Than there is also the so-
called International Motor Insurance Card System, which is an arrangement 
between authorities and insurance organizations of European and no-European 
States to ensure that victims of road traffic accidents do not suffer from the fact 
that injuries or damage sustained by them were caused by a visiting driver rather 
than a driver resident and insured in the same country.25 
Therefore, it should be noted that when the damage has international elements 
can be applied rules of legal systems different from those of the injured subject, 
with all the negative consequences on the compensation level. This generates a 
problem of uniform regulation of road accidents in Europe which is related to the 																																																																																																																																													
obligations, even if the Regulation prevails in the event of a conflict with national implementation 
law. See Bonaiuti Marongiu F, Le obbligazioni non contrattuali nel diritto internazionale privato 
(Giuffré 2013) 185 f.. 
23 Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents [1971]. 
24 The EEA was established on 1 January 1994 upon entry into force of the EEA Agreement 
(Agreement of 3 January 1994 on the European Economic Area [1994] OJ l 1/3) The contracting 
parties are the European Union, its Member States, and the member states of the European Free Trade 
Association. The EEA currently includes 31 countries, which are three of the four member countries 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, 
without Switzerland, and the 28 member countries of the European Union. See Decision of the 
Council and of the Commission 94/1/EC of 13 December 1993 on the conclusion of the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member States and the 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation [1994] 
OJ L 1/1. 
25 There are multiple motor insurance systems around the world, established on regional basis. The 
first one was the Green Card system established in 1949 in Europe, but later other regions followed 
suit. 
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road accident between human-driven vehicles but appears to be extended also to 
autonomous vehicles. 
 
 
2.3. New actors involved in the traditional civil liability regimes. 	
In the road accidents, both domestic and foreign, the dialectic between two 
groups of subjects is always alive and difficult to solve. On the one hand we find 
the owner of the vehicle, which in this work will always coincide with the driver (if 
the vehicle is completely autonomous otherwise the role of the driver is not really 
conceivable but there will be only passengers or users on-board), as well as the 
insured person, understood as the person covered by the car insurance in case of a 
road accident (i.e. the owner and the driver). On the other hand, however, there is 
the insurance company that ensures the vehicle. The dialectic between these 
subjects is fundamental for the identification of the law applicable to the concrete 
case and the subject required to compensate the damage to the injured party. 
 In Italian legal system, the dialectic is based on the two bodies of law, which 
are the Civil Code (applicable to the owner and the driver of the vehicle) and the 
Code of Private Insurance (applicable to the insured and the insurer of the vehicle); 
them provide for different protections between which must be chosen. Among 
other things, the overview of the sources of law is further complicated when the 
driver, the owner and the insured do not coincide, multiplying the possible 
solutions according to the law chosen. For example, which law should be applied if 
the accident is caused by a vehicle owned by a subject, but conducted by a 
different person, and possibly a foreigner? And if the vehicle is autonomous, other 
applicable law could be envisaged, such as the one on product liability? 
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It is wonder, therefore, whether the involvement of the self-driving car in the 
accident can further increase the level of difficulty in identifying the subject 
required to pay damages. In fact, while in the accidents between human-driven 
vehicles, following the general and special rules mentioned, we focus respectively 
on the role of the owner/driver/insured and on that of the insurer, in case of 
involvement of the autonomous vehicle other parties could be involved. As a 
matter of fact, as the level of automation increases, the possible parties involved 
increase proportionally. In particular, it would be possible to provide joint or 
exclusively liability for the vehicle producer, the ADAS producer, the software 
programmer and so on. Finally, with the achievement of total automation it would 
no longer be appropriate to talk about drivers, since in fact there is not a driver of 
the vehicle but the car is driven autonomously and all those who are in the vehicle 
are passengers (or users on-board). In this latter case, therefore, besides the 
traditional figures and the kind of producers already mentioned, additional subjects 
can be found, such as the Internet service provider, who provide services for 
accessing, using, or participating in the Internet, connecting the vehicle with the 
infrastructures.26 Other possible subjects could be, for instance, public companies 
or private companies, that manage such road infrastructures 27  (i.e. roads, or 
motorways and all the tools contained therein, such as traffic lights, cameras and so 
on), or communication infrastructure (i.e. internet). With the internet connection of 
the vehicles, in addition to road traffic liability, there are also issues related to data 																																																								
26  To in-depth the liability of the ISP regarding the online information, see C Reed, ‘Liability of On-
line Information Providers: Towards a Global Solution’ (2003) 17(3) International Review of Law, 
Computing & Technology 255 ff.. 
27 Roads infrastructure are included in the macro category of transport infrastructure distinguished in: 
road infrastructures, which include the motorway, big roads, regional and municipal roads and their 
systems; railway infrastructures, composed of national railway, local railways and metropolitan 
railway; airport infrastructure for air transport; port infrastructure for maritime transport; waterways 
for river transport. See Grimaldi A, ‘Infrastruttura’, Treccani G. (ed.) Enciclopedia Giuridica (online 
edn, 2017) (accessed 3rd September 2018). 
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breach of those data exchanged between vehicles, infrastructures or other smart 
things (see chapter II, section 1, subsection 1.2.) 
This leads to wondering if the current dialectic between the traditional actors of 
the civil liability regimes remain unchanged or if this dialectic is broken and 
increases the number of subjects potentially liable for the accident caused by an 
autonomous vehicle, with the consequent increase of the applicable rules. 
If this is the problem, the rules of private international law are not decisive for 
the solution of the cases. Perhaps, it could help an analysis of the ‘ratio’ of the tort 
law and compulsory insurance in Italy as in other European countries, identifying 
similarities and differences. In this way, it could be easier to answer the question of 
whether the involvement of an autonomous vehicle in a traffic accident (national or 
foreign) generates or not the need for new rules, as proposed by the European 
Parliament, 28  or requires the amendment of existing ones, as happened in 
Germany.29 To this is added also the possibility of the extensively application of 
the already existing law, as all the others European countries would like to do, in 
which a special law contemplating the hypothesis of a road accident involving an 
autonomous vehicle has not been elaborated30 (see chapter IV). 
In an attempt to answer the questions posed in this work, we will try to outline 
in Chapter II the main characteristics of self-driving cars and of the artificial 
intelligence embodied in them, in order to highlight the different levels of 
automation and the consequences of this on the identification of the applicable 
liability rules if a road accident due to a driverless car occurs. 																																																								
28 See note n 13 on European Parliament resolution of 2017.	
29  On march 30, 2017 Germany approved the draft of the German Federal Government on 
autonomous driving, of 20 February 2017, n 18/11300, amending the German Road Traffic Act of 3 
May 1909 30	L Gatt, IA Caggiano, MC Gaeta, ‘Italian Tort Law and Self-Driving Cars: State of the Art and 
Open Issues’(n 14) 23.	
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3. Methods of investigation 	
At this point a parenthesis on the method of investigation seems necessary, 
given that the results achieved may change according to the research method used. 
The objective of this work is to analyse the legislation on civil liability arising 
from vehicle accident, with particular regard to the case where is an autonomous 
vehicle to leads the accident. More precisely, it will in depth the Italian legislation, 
comparing it to that of other legal systems, such as France, Germany, United 
Kingdom and the United States of America. Furthermore, the civil liability will be 
studied at European level, with particular regard to product liability and the impact 
of robotics on it. 
Starting from a critical analysis of the state of the art (legislation, case law, 
literature and contract document), it will try to achieve two aims: (1) first of all, it 
will evaluate whether current civil liability regulation is functional (efficient and 
effective) to the protection of the injured person, even in the event of a traffic 
accident due to a self-driving car; (2) secondly, it will verify whether the existing 
legislation is sufficient for a complete and systematic regulation of autonomous 
vehicles (extensively interpreted or applicable by analogy), or whether it is 
necessary to modify the existing regulation or introduce an ad hoc regulation. 
In order to conduct an analysis of this type, the interpretation of the law in force 
according to the criteria codified in article 12 of the preliminary provision to the 
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Italian civil code 31  and this interpretative activity will take place from a 
comparative perspective. In particular, the function of civil liability will be 
examined by analysing the rules not only of the Italian legal system but also of the 
other legal systems already mentioned. In fact, this work aims to find a regulation 
applicable at European and later at international level, since issues related to 
autonomous vehicles can not be contained in national borders due to the current 
high level of mobility. 
To investigate the function of civil liability, especially in the light of the new 
scenarios that are set up with the introduction of autonomous vehicles on the 
market, it will be essential to verify the protection of the interests of the parties 
involved, i.e. the material and moral purposes that are objectively pursued by 
society and which constitute the unifying element of law. Indeed, Courts and legal 
scholars in general should avoid a logical-deductive elaboration of legal consent in 
favor of a more policy-based approach that would take in consideration the actual 
needs of the current community as in the so-called interessenjurisprudenz , or 
jurisprudence of interests). This orientation exceeds that of so-called jurisprudence 
																																																								
31 Pursuant to art 12 of the preliminary provision to the Italian civil code, the first form of 
interpretation to be implemented is the so-called literal interpretation (also called vox iuris), aimed at 
attributing to the law the meaning that is immediately apparent from the words used. This form of 
interpretation is accompanied by the so-called logical interpretation that, overcoming the literal 
meaning of the provision, aims to establish its true content, i.e. the purpose that the legislator intended 
to achieve by issuing it. However, the legislator expressly contemplates the possibility that there are 
cases not foreseen or resolved by legal norms. In fact, he foresees the existence of normative lacunae 
which must be filled by the judge who can not refuse to solve a practical case, citing the lack of rules. 
Therefore, if a dispute can not be decided according to a specific provision, it will be referred to the 
so-called. analogia legis, admissible only if based on the following assumptions: a) the case in 
question should not be provided for by any law; b) there must be similarities between the case 
governed by the law and that not provided for; c) the relationship of similarity must relate to the 
elements of the case in which the justification of the discipline dictated by the legislator is recognized 
(so-called eadem ratio). In the hypothesis in which the case still remains doubts, it will resort to the 
so-called analogia iuris, understood as the recourse to the general principles of the legal system. See 
F Bocchini, E Quadri, Diritto privato (7ª edn, Giappichelli 2018); CM Bianca, M Bianca, Istituzioni 
di diritto privato (2nd edn, Giuffrè 2018). 
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of concepts (in German Begriffsjurisprudenz)32, traditional dogmatic from which, 
however, no one can disregard in order to analyse the principles underlying civil 
liability. 
Then, it is essential to resort to the behavioural sciences, as well as to practical 
cases and technical simulations. For this reason, the research method adopted is 
mixed, using not only the traditional material related to the legal area, but also 
behavioural studies and empirical analysis (so-called empirical legal studies or, in 
abbreviated for ELS) of an interdisciplinary nature.33	In the 21st century, especially 
where we are concerned with areas of law in which technology has had a strong 
impact, even legal studies can no longer be tackled according to a purely traditional 
methodological approach. As a matter of fact,	this would limit us to analyse, more 
or less critically, legislation, case law and existing literature. The traditional 
method, indeed, tends to produce a circular methodological trend and the scientific 
works risks losing all utility, sometimes reducing itself to a mere repetition of what 																																																								
32 Juridical science, developed between the 19th and 20th centuries, especially in Germany and Italy, 
and now out-dated, which proceeded to the elaboration of general and abstract concepts on the basis 
of norms valid only because existing and having as such the nature of dogmas . It is a method of 
interpretation of the rules based on the incorporation of laws into general concepts, to which the 
interpreter had to refer rigidly regardless of the consideration of any heteronomous element to the 
right coming from the society (ethics, economics, psychology, etc.). From this derives one of the most 
characteristic theses of legal positivism, the completeness of the order, that is the impossibility in it of 
lacunae, since the law integrates from the inside, through a logical procedure of its own, which does 
not need contributions from the outside - such as the use of natural law - and regardless of its ethical 
and social content. Cf. F Belvisi, Dalla giurisprudenza dei concetti alla giursprudenza degli interessi 
(Giappichelli 2010). The author describes the story of the change in the way of understanding the law 
that has occurred in the passage from the conception of the historical school and the pandettistics’ 
school of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Georg Friedrich Puchta and Bernhard Windscheid to the 
jurisprudence of the interests of Philipp Heck and Hermann Kantorowicz . The jurist who best 
embodies this change from the formal study of the law to the substantial and teleological was Rudolf 
von Jhering. 
33 For some time now, a part of the literature has found that in a given context, characterized by the 
involvement of different disciplinary sectors of science and not only by law, scientific research can 
not be conducted using a merely theoretical perspective. On the contrary, it is more appropriate to 
resort to empirical analyses and be based on case studies. See A Mantelero, ‘Data protection, e-
tracking and intelligent systems for public transport’ (2015) 5 (4) International Data Privacy Law, 
310; A Wood, DR O’Brien, U Gasser, ‘Privacy and Open Data’, (2016) Networked Policy Series, 
Berkman Klein Center, 4. For a more in-depth study of the practical nature of empirical studies, see 
Empirical Research Services della Harvard Law School, in http://hls.harvard.edu/library/empirical-
research-services/.  
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has already been said. On the contrary, research should be linear, with a starting 
point and a goal to be achieved, to really contribute to the advancement of the state 
of the art.34 
Regarding the behavioural sciences, to investigate the behaviour of the user 
who is involved in a traffic accident caused by a driverless car, it is extremely 
important to start from the human-robot interaction (HRI) analysis35 and then 
check the effectiveness of the existing legislation.36 This is a behavioural analysis 
based on cognitive psychology of the relationship between man and the robot (the 
autonomous vehicle in the case of this work). The results obtained by HRI analysis 
will then have to be deepened from a legal point of view to evaluate the 																																																								
34  L Gatt, R Montanari, IA Caggiano, ‘Consenso al trattamento dei dati personali e analisi 
giuridicocomportamentale. Spunti di riflessione sull’effettività della tutela dei dati personali’ (2017) 2 
Politica del diritto 337 ff.. 
35 The HRI, sub-category of the human machine interface (HMI), is fundamental both for the 
identification of different levels of automation and for vehicle connection levels, since these are 
directly proportional to the increase in automation. On the basis of these behavioural studies it is 
possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation and the adequacy of the protections it contains, 
drawing the necessary conclusions. For a more in-depth study of HMI see D Sidobre and 
others,‘Human-Robot Interaction’, Siciliano B. (ed.), Advanced Bimanual Manipulation, in Springer 
Tracts in Advanced Robotics, LXXX (Springer 2012), 123 ff.. On cognitive law in general and on 
behavioural study in general see L Arnaudo, ‘Diritto cognitivo. Prolegomeni a una ricerca’ (2010) 1 
Politica del diritto 101 ff.; B Lurger, ‘Empiricism and Private Law: Behavioral Research as Part of a 
Legal-Empirical Governance Analysis and Form of New Legal Realism’ [2014] Aust Law Jour. 19 
ff.. 
36 In this regard, in terms of data protection, it should be noted that in 2016 the Living Lab Utopia of 
the Suor Orsola Benincasa University of Naples, on the commission of an important technological 
partner, conducted a behavioural analysis experiment with a legal evaluation of the results in order to 
consider the effectiveness of the current European legislation on the processing of personal data (and 
in particular on consent), leading the project ‘Privacy and Internet of Things: a behavioral and legal 
approach’, directed by Professor Lucilla Gatt and vice-directed by Professor Ilaria Amelia Caggiano. 
The experiment was carried out on a sample of 97 users who were asked to interact with a given 
operating system (install the system, download an application, surf the internet, etc.). The users’ 
awareness and their knowledge of the processing of personal data was analysed, through 
questionnaires and behaviour measurement technologies during the performance of the tasks and, in 
particular, during the granting of consent (to verify the power of self-determination of the single). In 
particular, in order to quantify the level of awareness and knowledge of data protection of the user, he 
was asked to submit mixed and open-ended questionnaires. About the behavioural analysis: to 
measure the attention, it was used the heatmap graphical representations; to calculate the execution 
time of the tasks it has timed the execution timing; to analyse the reading order within the individual 
screens were used gaze plots; to evaluate usability, finally, the reading order in the screens and the 
execution times of the tasks were taken into consideration. See L Gatt, R Montanari, IA Caggiano, 
‘Consenso al trattamento dei dati personali e analisi giuridicocomportamentale. Spunti di riflessione 
sull’effettività della tutela dei dati personali’ (n 14) 338 ff.; IA Caggiano, ‘A quest for efficacy in data 
protec- tion: a legal and behavioural analysis’, Working Paper n.10/2017, 11 ff.. 
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effectiveness of the existing legislation on civil liability37 or the possible need to 
modify it or introduce a specific one, from a de iure condendo perspective. 
It should be noted that technology is not just a subject of study. It is also a tool 
used for the analysis of human behaviour, conducted in multiple studies38 thanks to 
the use of various technological tools (eye tracker, gaze plot, heat-map, etc.), as 
well as the foundation of the technological regulation that intervenes in aid of 
normative regulation to protect users (as in the case of the so-called data protection 
by design in terms of privacy)39. 
Finally, with regard to the citations, it should be noted that the Oxford 
University Standards for Citation of Legal Authorities (so-called OSCOLA) have 
been followed in the footnotes and in the bibliography. In fact, this work is written 
in English as a result of a period of research spent in London at Queen Mary 
University and at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Indeed, this citation 
criteria are followed at these educational institutions. 
  																																																								
37  L Gatt, R Montanari, IA Caggiano, ‘Consenso al trattamento dei dati personali e analisi 
giuridicocomportamentale. Spunti di riflessione sull’effettività della tutela dei dati personali’ (n 14) 
342.  
38 Among the many studies on human behaviour carried out with the support of technologies, see the 
already mentioned project Privacy and Internet of Things: a behavioural and legal approach (n 16); 
NuTonomy, a Cambridge-based start-up company, thank to a high level of technology is building an 
autonomous vehicle software (NuCore) that performs as similar as possible to man in driving 
behaviour and that can interact with it in the best way possible. NuCore can be integrated with a wide 
range of vehicle types and has been successfully deployed across different continents. For further 
information, see www.nutonomy.com. 
39  M Eriksson, ‘The normativity of automated driving: a case study of embedding norms in 
technology’ (2017) 26 (2) Information & Communications Technology Law 46 ff.. In this sense also 
G Pascuzzi, Il diritto dell'era digitale (3ª edn, Il Mulino 2010) 92-93, who believes that the advent of 
the digital age entails a number of changes, including the change in the technology itself of the task of 
ensuring compliance with the law. Frosini TE, ‘Rappresentanza e legislazione nell’età della 
globalizzazione’, Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi, VIII (ESI 2017) 296 ff., focuses 
on changing the characteristics and function of the law with the advent of globalization. The author 
believes that the law has entered a phase of fading since in the modern era it was a rigid law, while 
the post-modern law is much more flexible. As a consequence, the use of the law, currently subject to 
continuous interpretation, has changed. 	
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CHAPTER II – POSSIBILITIES AND RISKS FOR 
AUTONOMOUS AND CONNECTED VEHICLE 
 
 
Summary: 1. An introduction on driverless car. 1.1. Definition of autonomous 
vehicle and automation levels in order to identify the liable in case of ‘autonomous 
vehicle accident’. 1.2. The connected vehicle in the Internet of Things, with 
particular regard to the new parties involved. 2. Artificial Intelligence such as key 
to achieve the highest automation levels. 2.1. The concept of artificial intelligence 
and its regulation. 2.2. Artificial Intelligence embodied in robotics: self-driving car 
as artificial intelligent robot. 
 
 
1. An introduction on driverless car. 
 
1.1. Definition of autonomous vehicle and automation levels in 
order to identify the liable in case of ‘autonomous vehicle 
accident’. 	
Advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) are defined as those technologies 
that collect data on the performance of the car and on the space-time context of its 
circulation, informing the driver and reaching up to make suggestions to the driver 
or, even, to take the partial or total control of the vehicle.40 
According to estimates by the McKinsey Global Institute,41 the spread of these 
technologies (especially the more advanced ones based on artificial intelligence) 
could avoid from 30.000 to 150.000 road victims every year. Moreover, thanks to 
																																																								
40 In this sense ‘Human Factors Evaluation of Level 2 And Level 3 Automated Driving Concepts’ 
[2014] U.S. Department of Transportation of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration study, 
30 f.. To indepth ADAS with particular regard to safety aspect ‘Advanced Driver Assistance System’ 
[2016] European commission study 3 ff.. 
41 J Manyika, M Chui, J Bughin, ‘Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life, 
business, and the global economy’ [2013] McKinsey Global Institute report. 
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the most efficient driving modes resulting from the use of autonomous systems, it 
could reduce the emission of carbon dioxide (up to 300,000 tons per year), limiting 
environmental pollution. From an economic point of view, then, savings of 
between 200 and 1.900 billion dollars per year are expected by 2025.42 
In recent years, ADAS has rapidly developed. The main reason of this 
development is the progressive improvement of road safety, which, as has been 
considered,43 more than 90% of accidents are attributable to human error (tiredness, 
inattention or sleepiness). The increase in vehicle on-board technology and, even 
more, the production of completely autonomous vehicles, therefore, lead to belive 
that they will significantly reduce the rate of road accidents.44 However, there are 
authors who point out that currently there is little data available to really 
demonstrate that autonomous vehicles will reduce the number of accidents and at 
the moment only deductions can be made in this field.45 																																																								
42 L Dello Iacovo, ‘Stampanti 3D, auto che si guidano da sole, intelligenza artificiale: ecco le 12 
tecnologie che cambieranno il mondo’ [2014] Il Sole 24 Ore online. 
43 ‘La sicurezza stradale di uomo e tecnologia. Strategie politiche di prevenzione’ [2011] DEKRA 
Study. In the same sanse see also KA Brookhuis, D de Waard, WH Janssen, ‘Behavioural impacts of 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems-an overview’ (2001) 1 (3) EJTIR 245 ff.: «Safety is primarily a 
“human factors” case. Driver impairment is the first cause of accidents on (European) motorways. 
Based on a literature survey, Smiley and Brookhuis (1987) stated that about 90% of all traffic 
accidents are to be attributed to human failure, for instance, through fatigue, inattention or drowsiness 
at the wheel. According to Vallet (1991) it is generally a loss of alertness, which is the principal cause 
of fatal accidents (34%). While some suggest that alcohol is in at least 20% of all accidents the 
“prime causative factor”, at least during the weekend, fatigue as “single factor” is estimated to be 
responsible for 7-10% of all accidents (Tunbridge et al., 2000). The costs of road traffic accidents for 
society are enormous in terms of both human suffering and economic loss. In Europe alone around 
50.000 people are killed in traffic accidents each year, while more than 1.500.000 are injured. Traffic 
congestion, i.e. the regular ones and following traffic accidents, is a daily nuisance, predominantly 
present in the economically most sensitive places. At least 70 Billion Euro’s are spent each year on 
medical treatment of injured people, the cost of congestion is many times that amount, and many 
thousands of person-years of work are lost».  
44 ‘Rapporto 2015 sulla sicurezza stradale’ [2015] DEKRA report, 4, explains that mobility (both in 
the transport sector and in infrastructure one) is in the midst of a huge change. In this context 
digitization and internet connection are essential engines. The digitization of the entire mobility 
involves a significant added value for each individual user of the road, with very positive reflection 
into safety issue. 
45 A Bertolini and others, ‘On Robots and Insurance’ [2016] Int J of Soc Robotics, 6; In this context, 
‘decision-making’ is referred to using information provided and rules given that, thanks to the 
machine reasoning task, allow to reach approximate or definite conclusions and decision. These AI 
technologies have the ability to replace human decision-makers, and where they do so they give rise 
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There are also economic reasons. For example, autonomous driving is a good 
way to save time in traffic; in fact, the driverless cars drive more correctly reducing 
traffic jams and consuming less fuel. Furthermore, in terms of mobility, new 
technologies would provide mobility and independence to those who would 
otherwise have serious displacement difficulties, such as the elderly, the disabled, 
and even children.46 
Last but not least, environmental reasons must be considered. As already said, 
thanks to a more efficient guide, in fact, atmospheric pollution could be 
considerably reduced, but also acoustically pollution.47 
Therefore, the purpose of ADAS is to reduce or, where possible, eliminate 
driver error and at the same time improve the efficiency of traffic and transport, as 
well as the environmental context. With this in mind, the advantages of the most 
advanced systems48 are among the most appreciable, since their use results in a 
significant decrease in human errors and a substantial reduction in economic cost 
and environmental pollution. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that, by proceeding in 
the direction of autonomous vehicles, new liability profiles of the driver and of the 
																																																																																																																																													
to liability questions. C Reed, E Kennedy, SN Silva, ‘Responsibility, Autonomy and Accountability: 
legal liability for machine learning’, Legal Studies Research Paper no. 243 [2016] Queen Mary 
University of London website 27.	
46 A Bertolini, E Palmerini, ‘Regulating robotics: A challenge for Europe’ [2014] Upcoming issues of 
EU law for the IURI Committee, EU Parliament Workshop, Bruxelles, 110. 
47 This is the c.d. smart driving, that is an intelligent, fluid and constant guide that not only reduces 
environmental pollution but also reduces traffic jams or avoids them, where they have already been 
created.. NICE draft guideline talk about smooth drive and speed reduction, see ‘Air pollution: 
outdoor air quality and health’ [2016] NICE draft guideline. 
48 K Van Wees, K Brookhuis, ‘Product Liability for ADAS: legal and human factors perspectives’ 
(2005) 5 (4) EJTIR 357 ff.:«A variety of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) has been and 
is still being developed, aiming to make car driving more comfortable and safe, while at the same 
time enhancing traffic efficiency. However, the successful implementation of ADAS is affected by a 
variety of technical and non-technical issues, one of them being possible implications in the field of 
legal liability [...]».  
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producer would appear.49 At the same times, autonomous vehicles involve new 
insurance profiles, according to the change in the liability rules.50 
In this sense, the definition of new profiles of liability cannot be separated from 
a correct classification of vehicle automation levels, which allows establishing the 
relationship between advanced driving systems and driver behaviour, in order to 
identify the liable. Automation levels have been classified by several authors 51 and 																																																								
49 N Kalra, J Anderson, M Wachs, ‘Liability and Regulation of Autonomous Vehicle Technologies’, 
Study report of Berkeley University of California [2009] California Department of Transportation 
website 11 ff., stress that the time has come for a rethinking of the legal categories that have 
represented a constant reference point and which today appear partly outdated. 
50  In this field, one of the main risks related to the introduction of autonomous vehicles concerns the 
so-called ‘complacency’, that is an excessive confidence in the infallibility of automatic devices. EL 
Wiener, RE Curry ‘Flight deck automation: promises and problems’ (1980) 23 (10) Ergonomics 995 
ff.. 
51 An interesting classification, widely shared, includes six steps: (1) ‘driver only’, (2) ‘driver warning 
systems’, (3) ‘short term driving systems’, (4) ‘conventional partial control systems vehicles’, (5) 
‘autonomous vehicles with driver in the loop’ and (6) ‘driverless cars’. 
The first step (step 1) concerns the exclusive driving of the driver. The level immediately following 
(step 2) is that of the ‘driver warning systems’ that notice pedestrians, cyclists and objects of different 
nature around the road, especially if they are in poor visibility areas of the vehicle (such as the rear 
part of the vehicle itself or a blind spot for the driver). The alert systems assist the driver in driving 
maneuvers (e.g. Lane Change Assist) but still affect the driving process only indirectly, influencing 
the driver rather than acting on the vehicle. In this context, therefore, the driver is always required to 
interpret the suggestions and warnings of the systems and to take into account other factors that may 
influence the validity of the information received (for example, weather, traffic, or road conditions). 
A further step towards the complete autonomy of the vehicle is offered by systems designed to take 
partial control of the car in the short term (step 3). Among these systems, the best known is probably 
‘Adaptive Cruise Control’ (ACC). Compared to the traditional cruise control, which sets the vehicle 
speed without regard for the external environment, the adaptive cruise control adapts precisely to the 
traffic flow: it reduces the speed when the front vehicles move slower than the desired speed and then 
increases speed again when traffic flow increase the speed. Although these technologies control the 
vehicle, they must be activated and deactivated by the driver according to the various situations to be 
faced; there are, however, systems that automatically disengage. 
There are also, although still in the experimental phase, a series of systems (step 4 and, even better, 
step 5) that autonomously drive the vehicle for short periods of time or under certain circumstances, 
at the discretion of the driver. For example, combining ACC and Lane Keeping creates a system 
capable of driving on the motorway: the ACC controls the speed and the Lane Keeping maintains the 
driving lane that is being travelled. By virtue of other technological systems it is then possible, 
although at the discretion of the driver, to change lanes automatically. 
Finally, the last step (step 6) concerns completely autonomous driving systems, which are able to 
drive the vehicle from the beginning of the journey to the destination. These are experimental 
versions in fast development in recent years. See OMJ Camsten, L Nilsson, ‘Safety assessment of 
driver assistance system’ (2001) 1 (3) EJTIR 225 ff.. 
Another very important classification divides the vehicle automation degrees into 5 levels, ranging 
from complete control of the vehicle by the driver to the complete control directly operated by the 
vehicle itself: 'driver only', 'driver assistance', 'partial automation', 'high automation 'and' full 
automation '. This classification, moreover, is in line with what was admitted by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which also envisaged five vehicle automation 
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usually all they are based on the level of on-board technologies intervention on the 
human driving. This processing is based on the human-machine relationship (so-
called Human-Machine Interface).	However, in 2014 SAE International published 
a new international standard J301652 which has defined six different automation 
levels which will be taken into account in this work to deepen the new frontiers of 
civil liability in road traffic. The automation levels identified by the SAE 
international standard are based on the degree of driver’s intervention in driving 
activities, which decreases proportionally as the vehicle's automation increases. 
They are: (L0) no automation, (L1) driver assistance, (L2) partial automation, (L3) 
conditional automation, (L4) high automation e (L5) full automation. As the same 
expression say, in the level zero (L0) there is no automation but the driver 
constantly has the control of the vehicle; however, the vehicle is equipped with 
automated system issues warnings which helps the driver53. In level one of 
automation (L1), i.e. ‘assisted automation’ also called ‘hands on’, driver perform 
longitudinal and lateral driving tasks, and the few residual skills are performed by 
the vehicle. On the contrary, ‘partial automation’ or ‘hands off’ (L2) is the first 
level where the vehicle is able to perform longitudinal and lateral driving task and 
this continues in the following level; anyway, in ‘partial automation’ the driver 																																																																																																																																													
levels: ‘no-automation’, ‘function-specific automation’, ‘combined function automation’, ‘limited 
self-driving automation’ and ‘full self-driving automation’. T Gasser, D Westhoff, ‘Definitions of 
Automation and Legal Issues in Germany’ [2012] Workshop of German Federal Highway Research 
Institute; Human Factors Evaluation of Level 2 And Level 3 Automated Driving Concepts, U.S. 
Department of Transportation of NHSTA (n 40) 2 f.. 
52 SAE standard J3016, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle 
Automated Driving Systems [2012] (revised in 2016 but the automation level are the same). On the 
connected and autonomous vehicles a study was conducted in the United Kingdom, which resumed 
the six levels of automation of the SAE standard highlighting that, by 2030, 25% of the vehicles in 
the UK will be completely autonomous. See ‘Connected and autonomous vehicles, the UK economic 
opportunity’ [2015] KPMG Study 9. 
53 Examples of ‘driver assistance’ are: Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), where the driver controls 
steering wheel and the automated system controls speed; Parking Assistance, where steering wheel is 
automated while speed is under driver’s control.; and Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) which 
automatically takes steps to ensure the vehicle stays in its lane. 
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must constantly monitor the dynamic drive task and the driving environment and is 
the most widespread automation level put on the market. 54  Level three of 
automation (L3), developed especially in USA, is the ‘conditional automation’ or 
‘eye off’ level, where in time the vehicle system requires the driver to take the 
control when it is necessary; it means that the driver does not need to monitor the 
vehicle driving task (e.g. in L3 driver can watch a movie or send a message) and 
the surrounding environment at all times but just when he is asked to do it.55 ‘High 
automation’ (L4) is the immediate development of  ‘conditional automation’ level 
and follow the same division of driving tasks between the driving system and the 
driver; the difference lies in the fact that the cases in which the driver must 
intervene are reduced to anomalous cases (i.e. in L4 driver can go to sleep). 
Finally, in ‘full automation’ level (L5) all the tasks are performed by the vehicle 
and no driver is requested. For this reason, in level five of automation the role of 
thr driver disappears. 
 
Figure no. 1 - SAE standard J3016 
																																																								
54 N Busto, ‘Carta europea sulla robotica: una proposta di roboethics per le self-driving car’ (2017) 2 
Ciberspazio e diritto 293 f..	
55 An example of ‘conditional automation’ is Audi A8 Luxury Sedan. This car is equipped with 
Traffic Jam Pilot, that takes full control of all aspects of driving in slow-moving traffic at up to 60 
kilometres per hour. This driving function works only on highways with a physical barrier separating 
one stream of traffic from oncoming traffic. 
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A few decades ago, driverless cars appeared to be only a dream delivered to a 
distant future, while today driverless vehicles56 are spreading everywhere. The 
development of self-driving cars began more than thirty years ago with the project 
PROMETHEUS57 (PROgraMme for European Traffic with Highest Efficiency and 
Unprecedented Safety), launched in 1987 by Mercedes-Benz. Result of the project 
were the two VaMP and VITA-2 twin vehicles that run across more than 1,000 
kilometres in completely autonomous mode on the Paris motorways in 1994. Then, 
																																																								
56 A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and 
Liability Rules’ (n 12) 225, assumes that the concept of autonomy should be understood as the ability 
to act without human supervision, receiving and processing data in a complex environment. This 
ability to operate independently varies according to the level of vehicle autonomy. 
57 The project was managed from 1986 to 1995 by EUREKA, a European intergovernmental 
organization, founded in 1985 to support market-oriented research and development projects, in 
collaboration with industries, research centres, and universities. Eureka, Programme for a European 
traffic system with the highest efficiency and unprecedented safety, in www.eurekanetwork.org 
(accessed 31st August 2018). 
Copyright © 2014 SAE International.  
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in 2014 the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)58 organized the 
first Grand Challenge, a race in which autonomous vehicles had to cross the 
Mojave Desert (California). Unfortunately, none of the race participants finished 
the course (142 miles) and the vehicles that went farther travelled less than 8 miles. 
In the Second Grand Challenge, that took place the following year, however, five 
vehicles successfully completed the 132 mile course in Nevada and to win was the 
team of Sebastian Thrum of Stanford University, one of the inventors of Google 
Street View that since 2009 works on the project started as Google self-driving car 
and currently called Waymo. 59 Subsequently, in the Third Grand Challenge (2007) 
six vehicles completed the race. 
Another investment in the field of autonomous vehicles was made already in 
2010 in Italy where, thanks to the project60 of University of Parma, directed by 
Professor Alberto Broggi, two vans without driver were successfully sent along a 
journey of more than 15.000 km, from Rome to Shanghai. Subsequently, in 2013 
Professor Broggi put into circulation the autonomous vehicle BRAiVE on the roads 
of Parma in a mixed suburban and urban route (Public Road Urban Driverless-Car 
Test 2013).61 
																																																								
58 ‘The DARPA Grand Challenge: Ten Years Later’ [2014] DARPA post (accessed 3rd September 
2018). 
59 The project was directed by Chris Urmson and implemented by engineer Sebastian Thrun. For 
further information on the Google project, see www.waymo.com (accessed 31st August 2018). 
Apple’s self-driving car, instead, initially suffered from delays in its autonomous vehicle project, as 
project manager Steve Zadesky left the company. However, since permission was granted by 
California DMV to Apple in April 2017, it seems that Apple has begun testing its advanced 
autonomous driving technology on the road and has started working in secret to develop Apple. iCar 
within the Titan project. However, there is no official news in this regard. 
60  VisLab is the acronym of Artificial  Vision and Intelligent Systems Laboratory at Parma 
University, Information Engineering Department. VisLab is now part of Ambarella Inc., for more 
information about the project see www.ambarella.com (accessed 3rd September 2018). 
61 ‘La sfida del VisLab conclusa con successo: i veicoli automatici hanno raggiunto l’Expo di 
Shanghai’ [2010] VisLab post (accessed 3rd September 2018); ‘Nuovo esperimento su strada della 
tecnologia VisLab: guida in città’ [2013] VisLab post (accessed 3rd September 2018). 
  	
	 36	
Finally, the Tesla automotive company has recently entered into the 
autonomous vehicle market 62, that in 2016 has already marketed the S model and 
the X model, and Uber63, the automobile transport company that in the same year 
started to use the driverless cars for the passenger transport service. The following 
year, also Ford started to invest in the artificial intelligence sector for its future 
self-driving vehicles with the acquisition of Argo AI, a start-up founded by former 
executives of Google and Uber and specialized precisely in artificial intelligence 
systems.64 
 
 
1.2. The connected vehicle in the Internet of Things, with 
particular regard to the new parties involved. 
 
Nowadays the pervasiveness of the Internet connection65  is undeniable. It 
affects the private and working life of every human being, who is constantly 
monitored through the growing number of identification and tracking technologies. 																																																								
62 ‘Tesla, Guida autonoma disponibile su tutte le auto’ [2018] Tesla post (accessed 3rd September 
2018) (accessed 3rd September 2018). 
63 ‘Self-Driving Ubers. The world’s first Self-Driving Ubers are on the road in the Steel City’[2016] 
Uber post (accessed 3rd September 2018). 
64 ‘Ford, la “parola” ai veicoli autonomi’, [2017] l’Automobile post (accessed 3rd September 2018). 
65 With the Internet, in fact, it is determined a global interconnection between computer networks of 
different nature and extension (LAN, WLAN, WAN, GAN and so on). In this context, devices 
communicate with each other through a suite of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet 
Protocol (IP), allowing the transfer from one user to another one of data that can be published or 
shared. The interconnected devices (so-called hosts) mainly follow the ‘server-client’ model which 
consists of consists of the whole of an IT data processing and management subsystem (server) that 
provides any type of service to other components called clients, allowing them to share information. 
The pear to pear (P2P) model is a valid alternative in which server and client roles can be exchanged. 
G Pascuzzi, Il diritto dell'era digitale (3ª edn, Il Mulino 2010), 23 f.. Furthermore, in the Italian legal 
system, l’art. 1, lett. dd, d. lgs. 1 August 2003, n 259, OJ 214 (Italian electronic Communication 
Code) provides an explicit definition of the electronic communications networks. In this sense also 
art. 2, co. 1, lett c, d.lgs 31 July 2005, n 177, OJ 208 (Single text of media and radio services). 
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At the same time, though, people cannot do without these technologies because 
they improve the services offered, which are extremely useful (perhaps essential) 
for most of the daily activities.66 
Internet development has been greatly enhanced by the extension of this 
network to the world of the objects, a phenomenon known as the Internet of Things 
(IoT). In particular, it is an evolution of the Internet network, thanks to which the 
objects interact each other, through sensors and without human intervention, 
exchanging data and accessing information stored in databases.67 This information 
architecture has been defined as a network which connects physical or virtual 
objects that become recognizable and acquire intelligence through the ability to 
communicate data about oneself and on the environment around them.68 For this 
reason, such objects are defined as intelligent objects. They are tagged with a 
Radio Frequency Identification tag with a single ID called Electronic Product Code 
																																																								
66  Within the Internet, the Internet of Things is revolutionizing contemporary society. It is a 
revolution that is different but parallel to that which sees robotics as the protagonist. Indeed, even the 
development of robotics and, at the same time, of artificial intelligence, is able to transform the habits 
of life and work of each of us, increasing efficiency, savings and security, as well as improving 
services, bringing significant benefits not only in the manufacturing and commercial sectors, but also 
in different sectors such as transport (European Parliament resolution of 2017 (n. 13)). In the same 
sense see also Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the council, the 
European economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions COM(2017) 288 of 19 
May 2017 on the Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy 
[2017], 1 ff.; the role of technology in the transformation of the European Union is also highlighted in 
the White Paper COM (2017) 2025 of 1 March 2017 on the Future of Europe, Reflections and 
Scenarios for the EU27 towards 2025 [2017] 4. 
67 The term database refers to the collection of information, organized in such a way as to allow the 
user to quickly find it. Technically the database structure is organized on three levels: 1) the unit of 
physical memory that contains the material, i.e. the computer; 2) the layout scheme of the material 
intended as the logical model chosen by the programmer (e.g. hierarchical model, relational model, 
etc.); 3) software for consulting stored information (database management system). Users interact 
with the database through a terminal (hardware device), using a query language (query language).See 
AM Gambino, ‘Informatica giuridica e diritto dell'informatica’ Treccani G (ed.) Enciclopedia 
Giuridica (online edn 2013). 
68 V Dr. Ovidiu, F Dr. Peter, G Patrick and others, ‘Internet of Things Strategic Research Roadmap’ 
(2nd edn. 2011) 10.: « [...] dynamic global network infrastructure with self configuring capabilities 
based on standard and interoperable communication protocols where physical and virtual “things” 
have identities, physical at- tributes, and virtual personalities, use intelligent interface, and are 
seamlessly integrated into the information network». 
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(EPC).69 Currently included in this category are incredibly disparate kinds of 
objects - traffic lights, cars, thermostats, refrigerators, alarm clocks, watches, 
surveillance cameras and many others. There are so many smart things that the 
concept has moved from ‘Internet of Things’ to ‘Internet of everything’. In 
addition, connectivity is growing steadily and it is expected that by 2020 more than 
twenty million objects will be connected to each other.70 
In this area, one of the most advanced business is undoubtedly the car industry. 
Indeed, by the end of the first twenty years of our century, there will be about 250 
million vehicles connected online 71  and the automotive market will grow 
exponentially, up to quadruple.72 Moreover, around 2025, there will be such a level 
of automation that the driver will not have to constantly monitor the vehicle, even 
if he has to be able to resume control at all times. 
To communicate with each other, the new vehicles must be connected online, 
and as a result of this connection the automotive industry too is included in the 
Internet of Things network. Autonomous vehicles are often defined as connected 
vehicles to emphasize their ability to connect to the network. There are essentially 
three types of vehicle connections. The first and most common type of 
																																																								
69 About Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) see EC Pallone, ‘Internet of Things e l’importanza 
del diritto alla privacy tra opportunità e rischi’ (2016), 17 (55) Ciberspazio e diritto 174 f. About 
Internet of Things definition see RH Weber, ‘Internet of Things, New security and privacy 
challenges’ (2010) 26 Computer law & security report, 23 f.. Finally, with regard to the introduction 
of the term Internet of Things K Ashton, ‘That “Internet of Things” Thing. In the real world, things 
matter more than ideas’ [2009] RFID, 1; S Haller, S Karnouskos, C Schiroh, ‘The Internet of Things 
in an enterprise context’ (2008) Future Internet, Lecture Notes in 5468 Computer Science, 1. 
70 ‘Leading the IoT, Gartner insight on how to lead in a connected word’ [2017] Gartner estimate 13 
(accessed 8th September 2018); E Hannon C McKerracher, I Orlandi and others, ‘An integrated 
perspective on the future of mobility’ [2016] McKinsey Post 1 ff. (8th September 2018). 
71 ‘Gartner Says By 2020, a Quarter Billion Connected Vehicles Will Enable New In-Vehicle 
Services and Automated Driving Capabilities’ [2015] Gartner Estimate (8th September 2018); 
‘Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life, business, and the global economy’ [2013] 
McKinsey Post (8th September 2018). 
72 ‘In the fast lane, the bright future of connected cars’ [2014] Price Waterhouse Cooper Estimate 5 f. 
(8th September 2018). 
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communication is between automated vehicles and different categories of devices 
(e.g. smartphones, smart watches, tablets and personal computers) known as the 
Vehicle to Device Communications (V2D). Secondly, there is Vehicle to 
Infrastructure Communications (V2I), a more specific type of communication 
between vehicles and infrastructures (such as road traffic lights or speed camera). 
Finally, the most sophisticated type of communication is Vehicle to Vehicle 
Communications (V2V), as it presupposes fully autonomous driving, or at least a 
high level of automation.73 
The level of the vehicle communication is directly proportional to the level of 
automation of the vehicles, even though connectivity is just one of the requisites 
needed to achieve complete automation of vehicles. 
The IoT is undoubtedly the most important innovation in the field of 
Information Technology (IT). However, in addition to the many advantages, there 
are a number of issues still to be resolved and the automotive sector is one that 
most urgently requires regulation.74 Among the key issues are how to allocate 
liability in case of road accidents caused by malfunctioning connection of self-
driving car. In this case, new subject could be held liable for the vehicle accident, 
such as the ISP whom the vehicle were connected at the time of the accident or the 
software developer of the program installed on the vehicle’s on-board computer. 
Furthermore, in the light of the European reform of the protection of personal 
data,75 an other current issue concerns the protection of personal data processed by 																																																								
73 Para II, lett. d., Declaration of Amsterdam (n 13 ) 
74 European Parliament Resolution of 2017 (n 13), rec 24 ff.. 
75 On May 4, 2016, they were published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ): 
Regulation 679/2016/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119, well know as General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR); Directive 2016/680/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
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autonomous vehicles and the related profiling process of the user, who daily uses 
such technologies often unaware of the risks.76 Anyway, this was already in-depth 
in other papers to which reference is made77 and it is not the topic of the current 
work. 
 
 
 
2. Artificial Intelligence such as key to achieve the highest 
automation levels. 
 
																																																																																																																																													
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L119; Directive 
2016/681/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger 
name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime [2016] OJ L119. 
76 In the field of data protection, the consent to the processing of personal data in self-driving cars 
involves several issues, which lead to wonder if consent is still an appropriate regulatory tool for the 
protection of personal data. Indeed, the consent model just does not work without causing risk to 
driver or passengers on-board, and asking for it is too impractical. Furthermore, in particular in the 
V2I and V2V communication, some of the data have to be exchanged in split seconds and the user 
could not have time to give his or her consent to the processing of personal data. Finally, the driver is 
not the only person whose data is collected. Data is also collected about passengers, and also 
potentially third parties outside the vehicle, captured while driving by self-driving car 
communication. It is obvious that the consent model does not work here and that some processing of 
personal data is always necessary. See G Alpa, preface R Pardolesi (ed.), Diritto alla riservatezza e 
circolazione dei dati personali (Giuffrè 2003).VII ff. states on the protection of personal data that it is 
a discipline difficult to articulate and translate into regulations, both for the balancing of interests that 
implies, and for the volatility of the forecasts. S Rodotà, ‘Tecnologie dell’informazione e frontiere del 
sistema sociopolitico’ (1982) 4  Pol. dir., 25 believes that legal rules must adapt to the rapid pace of 
technological change. 
77 Allow me to return to Gaeta MC, ‘The issue of data protection in the Internet of Things with 
particular regard to self-driving cars’ [2017] DIMT 1 ff.. 
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2.1. The concept of artificial intelligence and its regulation. 
 Artificial intelligence (AI) is the simulation of human intelligence processes by 
machines, especially computer systems. These processes include learning78, self-
correction,79 and decision-making80. 
The term ‘Artificial Intelligence’ was coined by John McCarthy81, in 1956 
during the ‘Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence’ 
workshop, organised at Stanford University. Today, modern dictionaries82 define 
																																																								
78 The term ‘learning’ applied to machine, means the acquisition of information, rules and algorithm 
learning from them. This concept is better known as ‘machine learning’. C Reed, E Kennedy, SN 
Silva, ‘Responsibility, Autonomy and Accountability: legal liability for machine learning’ (n 45) 2 
ff., nvestigates the question of legal liability for the consequences of decisions made by machine 
learning technology rather than by humans, explaining that one of the mot important example of 
machie learning are self-driving cars: «Self-driving, or autonomous, vehicles use technologies which 
have learnt how to operate the vehicle as an evolutionary process, and thus developed a model of the 
driving process, rather than being controlled in accordance with a model generated by the mind of a 
human programmer. Decisions about how the vehicle should be controlled are not longer made by a 
human driver, but by the technology acting autonomously». 
79 ‘Self-correction’ is the machine capability to correct itself analysing the mistakes done in the light 
of the information received but without the intervention of third parties.	
80 In this context, ‘decision-making’ is referred to using information provided and rules given that, 
thanks to the machine reasoning task, allow to reach approximate or definite conclusions and 
decision. These AI technologies have the ability to replace human decision-makers, and where they 
do so they give rise to liability questions. C Reed, E Kennedy, SN Silva, ‘Responsibility, Autonomy 
and Accountability: legal liability for machine learning (n 45) 3 f. 
81  McCarthy an American computer scientist was the first who coined the term ‘artificial 
intelligence’. In 1956, McCarthy invited a group of researchers from a variety of disciplines 
(including language simulation, neuron nets, complexity theory and more) to the workshop organised 
at Stanford University and called ‘Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence’. 
The aim of the initiative was to discuss what AI would become and in the workshop the invited 
researchers tried to clarify the concepts of ‘thinking machines’ which had been an unclear concept 
with different meanings. In the proposal for the conference McCarthy said: «The study is to proceed 
on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in 
principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it». See J McCarthy, ML 
Minsky, N Rochester, and others, ‘A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on 
Artificial Intelligence’ AI Magazine Volume (2006) 27 (4), 12 ff.. 
82 The English Oxford Living Dictionary gives this definition: «The theory and development of 
computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual 
perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages». See Oxford 
Living Dictionary, voice ‘artificial intelligence’ (accessed 15th September 2018). Italian Treccani 
Dictionary defines AI in cybernetics as the partial reproduction of man's own intellectual activity 
(with particular regard to the processes of learning, recognition and choice) achieved through the 
elaboration of ideal models or with the development of machines equipped with computers (for this 
reason electronic brains). See Italian Treccani Dictionary (online edn), voice ‘intelligenza’, sub-voice 
‘intelligenza artificiale’ (accessed 15th September 2018). 
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AI such as sub-field of computer science, emphasising  how machines can simulate 
human intelligence. 
There are different classification of AI. One of the best known classification83 
divides AI in ‘strong AI’ and ‘wake AI’. Strong AI (also known as ‘artificial 
general intelligence’) is proper of machine with consciousness, sentience, and 
mind, which allows it to decide freely. It is an AI system with generalized human 
cognitive abilities so that when presented with an unfamiliar task, it has enough 
intelligence to find a solution. Instead, the second type of AI, also called narrow 
AI,84 is based on one narrow task; it can intelligently interact without supervision, 
with the surrounding environment but it cannot make decisions independently. 
With regard to strong AI, it is appropriate to quote the Turing Test85 (developed 
by mathematician Alan Turing in 1950) which aims to determine if a computer can 
																																																								
83 There are several authors who use this classification, see S Bringsjord, B Schimanski, ‘What is 
Artificial Intelligence? Psychometric AI as an Answer’. The distinction between strong AI and wake 
AI is also recoverable in ‘Objection from Consciousness’ in Turing’s 1950 defence of Turing Test. 
The objection is famously incorporated in Professor Jefferson’s Lister Oration, delivered at the Royal 
College of Surgeons of England on 9 June 1949 from: «Not until a machine can write a sonnet or 
compose a concert because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, 
could we agree that machine equals brain — that is, not only write it, but know that it had written it. 
No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its 
successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by mistakes, be 
charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants». See G Jefferson, 'The mind 
of mechanical man', (1949) 1 British Medical Journal, 15. 
84 Siri, the apple’s virtual assistant installed on all iPhon models, is a good example of narrow 
intelligence. Siri operates within a limited pre-defined range of functions. As a matter of fact, siri 
virtual assistant has not genuine intelligence or self-awareness. Some cauthors think weak AI could 
be dangerous because of this brittleness which bring to fail in unpredictable ways. Weak AI could 
cause global economic problems or, for example, misdirect autonomous vehicles. In this sence R 
Carlo, ‘The sorcerer's apprentice, or: why weak AI is interesting enough’ 2011 Center of Internet and 
Society post, Stanford University (accessed 15th September 2018) says that software controls many 
facets of daily life but this control presents real issues. 
85 The Turing test, developed by Alan Turing in 1950, is a test of a machine’s ability to exhibit 
intelligent behaviour equivalent to human being, or indistinguishable from that of a human.  The test 
was published for the first time in AM Turing, ‘Computing machinery and intelligence (1950) 59 
Mind, 433 ff.. In the article Turing is inspired by a game, called ‘game of imitation’, composed by 
three participants: a man A, a woman B, and a third person C. The person C is kept separate from the 
other two and through a series of questions must determine which is the man and which the woman. 
For their part also A and B have tasks: A must deceive C and bring him to make an incorrect 
identification, while B must help him. In order for C to have no clue (such as spelling or voice 
analysis), the answers to C questions must be	 typescript or similarly transmitted. The Turing test is 
based on the assumption that a machine replaces A. If the percentage of times in which C guesses 
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actually think like a human or not and, in the first case, it would be proper to 
identify the machine’s artificial intelligence as strong AI. If the machine is not able 
to think like a human being, it would not strong AI but weak AI. 
An example of Strong AI is machine learning, i.e. the science of getting a 
machine to act without default programming, but learning it self on the basis of the 
algorithms already set by the programmer. Machine learning is a field of computer 
science which uses statistical techniques and algorithm to give machine the ability 
to ‘learn’, which means progressively improve performance on a specific task 
thanks to data collected, without being explicitly programmed to do it. The 
immediately following degree of machine learning is represented by so-called deep 
learning, that can be thought of as the automation of predictive analytics.86 Both, 
machine learning and even more deep leering, are characterised by the un-
foreseeability of the machine which acts on the basis of what it has learned and not 
of algorithms. It implies an increase of the unpredictable damage and the 
consequent difficulty in identifying the person responsible. 
Other AI classification87 categorizes AI into four types, from the kind of AI 
systems that already exist today to sentient systems, which do not yet exist. The 
four categories are: (1) Reactive machines, (2) Limited memory, (3) Theory of 
mind, (4) Self-awareness. ‘Reactive machines’ (1) is a type of machine make 
predictions, but it has no memory and cannot use past experiences to inform future 																																																																																																																																													
who the man is and who the woman is are similar before and after replacing A with the machine, the 
machine should be considered intelligent, since it would be indistinguishable from a human being. 
86 According to the data reported in the last Report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) on Digital Transformation, Italy is in 5th place worldwide for the production 
of the most cited scientific documents on machine learning after the United States, China, India and 
Great Britain. See ‘The Digital Transformation: Italy’ [2017] Highlights from the OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Scoreboard 1 ff.. 
87 This classification comes from Arend Hintze, assistant Professor of integrative biology, computer 
science and engineering at Michigan State University. See A Hintze, ‘Understanding the four types of 
AI, from reactive robots to self-aware beings the conversation post (accessed 15th September 2018). 
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ones.88 Second type of AI is ‘Limited memory’ (2), these AI systems, that can use 
past experiences to inform future decisions, is applied for some of the decision-
making functions in self-driving cars. Here observations inform actions, such as a 
car changing lanes. At any rate, these observations are not stored permanently. 
Than there is ‘Theory of mind’ (3), that does not yet exist. This term, which came 
from psychology, refers to the understanding of own beliefs, desires and intentions 
that impact the decisions ones make. Finally, we find ‘Self-awareness’ (4). In this 
category, AI systems have a sense of themselves, and they have consciousness. 
Machines with self-awareness understand their current state and can use the 
information to infer what others are feeling. Since there is not even the type 3 of 
AI, it is clear that there is no type 4 either. 
Nowadays, there is not a specific regulation for AI, even though this topic is the 
object of many legislative initiatives. In this context, the European Parliament has 
already moved with the resolution of 2017. In the text of the EU Resolution, 
indeed, the European Parliament request, on the basis of Article 225 TFEU, the 
Commission to submit, on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, a proposal for a directive 
on civil law rules on robotics and AI.89 This regulatory framework, moreover, 
should mainly deal with certain sectors, such as the civil liability of machines, the 
impact on the labour market, data protection and cybersecurity issue, 
environmental impact, and ethical implications. The European Parliament also ask 
to the European Commission to define robot and to establish certain criteria for the 																																																								
88 Example of reactive machine are Deep Blue and Google's AlphaGO. Anyway, they were designed 
for narrow purposes and cannot easily be applied to another situation. Deep Blue was a chess-playing 
computer developed by International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) and it is known for being 
the first computer chess-playing system to win a chess match against a different world champions. 
Instead, AlphaGo, developed by Alphabet Inc.'s Google DeepMind in London, is a computer program 
that plays the board game Go. It was the first software to defeat a professional (human) in the Go 
game. For further information, see the definitions of Wikipedia.	
89 European Parliament resolution of 2017 (n 13), rec 65.	
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classification of robots in subcategories in order to identify those to be registered,90 
and it also hypothesizes the establishment, among other possible legal solution, of 
legal personality for the most advanced robots (so-called ‘robot electronic 
personality’.91 Furthermore, the EU Parliament proposes a ‘Charter on robotics’ 
(soft law) composed by: 1) Code of ethical conduct for robotics engineers, 2) Code 
for research ethics committees (REC) for their work on reviewing robotics 
protocols, 3) licence for designers and licence users.92 At the same time EU 
Parliament ask for the creation of an European Agency for the robotics and 
artificial intelligence in order to provide the technical, ethical and regulatory skills 
necessary to support public actors at both European and national level.93 
Another EU initiative is the European Commission communication on Artificial 
Intelligence for Europe of 2018.94 EU Commission compares AI to the impact of 
steam engine or electricity in our society, explaining how AI is transforming our 
world.95  Thanks to the growth in computing power, availability of data and 
																																																								
90 A common European definition for smart autonomous robots should be established, including 
definitions of its subcategories, taking into consideration the following criteria: «the capacity to 
acquire autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with its environment (inter-
connectivity) and the analysis of those data; the capacity to learn through experience and interaction; 
the form of the robot’s physical support; the capacity to adapt its behaviour and actions to the 
environment». In addition to these criteria to be used both in the definition and in the classification of 
the robots, then, there is another, which obviously must be placed first, necessary for the definition of 
robots: «ence of life in the biological sense». 
For those robots that need to a registration, the register should be Union-wide, and could be managed 
by a designated EU Agency for Robotics and Artificial Intelligence, if an Agency is created. See 
European Parliament resolution of 2017 (n 13), Annex to the Resolution and n.1 of the Resolution. 
91 European Parliament resolution of 2017 (n 13), rec 59, lett f). The electronic personality, could be 
applicable to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties 
independently. 
92 European Parliament resolution of 2017 (n 13), Annex to the Resolution.	
93 European Parliament resolution of 2017 (n 13), rec 15, 16 and 17.	
94 European Commission Communication to the European parliament, the European council, the 
Council, the European economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions, of 25 April 
2018, on Artificial Intelligence for Europe (COM(2018) 237 final). 
95 In particular, AI will affect the industrial sector. Indeed, AI is part of the Commission’s strategy to 
digitise industry (COM(2016) 180 final) and a renewed EU Industrial Policy Strategy (COM(2017) 
479 final). 
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progress in algorithms, AI is undoubtedly one of the most strategic technologies of 
this century and the way we will approach AI will define the world we live in. 
More precisely, the EU Commission communication aims to maximise the benefits 
of AI by: boosting the technological and industrial capacity of the European Union 
and adopting AI in all economic sectors; preparing for socio-economic changes 
brought about by AI by; ensuring an appropriate ethical and legal framework, 
based on the Union’s values and in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU. 
As a matter of fact, also at national level there are legislative initiatives of soft 
law. In particular, in Italy the Agency for Digital Italy (so-called AGID), published 
in 2018 the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence at the service of the citizen. The 
White Paper identifies some main areas in which AI can improve our society: 
health, education and justice systems, public employment and security, underling 
how the development and promotion of AI must be a European project, not just a 
national one.96  
In the same direction is also moving the Italian Parliament. More precisely, in 
the motion on robotics and artificial intelligence of 2017,97 the Italian Parliament 
has emphasised how technology offers increasingly innovative solutions while 
lawmakers can not keep up with the times. In particular, Parliament makes explicit 
reference to issues relating to non-contractual civil liability in cases of damage 																																																								
96 The White Paper provides a positive look at how Governments, their Agencies and Public 
Administrations can better serve both people and businesses by improving public services and citizen 
satisfaction. A large part of the White Paper objectives, that can be achieved thanks to a good use of 
AI in Public Administration, coincides with the work that the European Commission is doing to 
promote the development of e-government and the digitization of public services as part of Digital 
Single Market project: save time and public money by providing better public services; making 
services interoperable between Member States by increasing efficiency and improving transparency; 
and bring people closer to their governments, involving them more in the decision-making process. 
Agency for Digital Italy (AGID), White book on Artificial Intelligence at the service of the citizen 
(2018). 
97 Italian Parliament, Motion on Robotics and Artificial Intelligence of 09 May 2017, n 792. 
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caused by technological devices possibly equipped with a form of artificial 
intelligence. Therefore the Italian Parliament commits the Government to favour a 
common line between the Government Authorities in the approach to the 
sustainable development of robotics, artificial intelligence and information 
security. At the same time, Parliament promotes training activities, research and 
development of such technologies in Italian schools, universities and research 
centres and supports applications related to industrial production (both in 
consolidated companies and in innovative start-ups).98 
Last but not least Italian initiatives in the field of self-driving cars is represented 
to the Ministerial Decree on smart road, which introduces the role of the 
supervisor, starting from the assumption that in the highest automation level99 there 
is not a driver on board the building but only a supervisor who must be able to 
summarize the control of the vehicle. which introduces the role of the supervisor, 
starting from the assumption that in the highest automation level there is not a 
driver on-board but only a supervisor who must be able to resume the control of the 
vehicle if requested.  The D.M. it has a dual purpose: on the one hand, to promote 
technological adaptation of the infrastructures according to the ‘Smart Roads 
rules’, in line with the European and International requirements and, on the other 
hand, to guarantee and promote the autonomous and connected vehicles tests, in 
consideration of the possibility that autonomous vehicles will soon be introduced 
into the market.  Given the inapplicability of the rules of the Italian Traffic Code, 
that does not allow self-driving cars circulation, the decree constitutes the 																																																								
98 The Italian Parliament highlights the strong impact of the AI: AI continually creates new digital 
markets; significant investments in artificial intelligence technologies are already underway over the 
next three years; the impact of digital and new technologies in the most disparate fields is constantly 
increasing: training, home automation , medicine, defence and transport (both public and private). 
Italian Parliament, Motion on Robotics and Artificial Intelligence of 09 May 2017, n 792. 
99 Also the D.M. refers to the automation level of the SAE standard J3016. 
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normative reference for the driverless car test on Italian roads and public areas, 
which can only take place in the presence of the conditions and the precautions 
foreseen therein.  
Finally, other countries are also moving towards a regulatory framework for 
artificial intelligence. These include South Chorea, Germany and Singapore,100 but 
also UK is working on this.101 
 
 
2.2. Artificial Intelligence embodied in robotics: self-driving 
car as artificial intelligent. 
AI can be can be purely software-based or embodied in hardware devices.102 A 
significant example is represented by robotics. In this sense, AI is what makes a 
robot autonomous. For example, robotic process automation (RPA) can be 
programmed to perform high volume and repeatable tasks that humans normally 
performed. In robotics field, the most relevant application of AI for this work is 
self-driving car, which is a specific development of Artificia Intelligent robotics. 
Consequently, it seems appropriate to investigate how AI affects robotics and, in 
particular, autonomous vehicles. But let’s start with defining robots. 
																																																								
100 ‘Who is ready for the coming wave of automation?’ [2018] The Economis, Intelligence Unit Study 
5 f.. 
101 UK Select Committee of 10 October 2017 on Artificial Intelligence (Uncorrected oral evidence: 
Artificial Intelligence) [2017]. 
102 AI affect different sectors of the economy and society. The main sectors were individuated and 
categorised by Stanford University in a report of 2016 on AI, with particular regard to the ways in 
which AI is already beginning to transform everyday life, and how those transformations are likely to 
quickly grow up in fifteen years. The sectors were divided in eight domains: transportation, 
home/service robotics, healthcare, education, low-resource communities, public safety and security, 
employment and workplace, and entertainment. ‘Artificial Intelligence and life in 2030. One hundred 
year study on Artificial Intelligence’ [2016] Stanford University Report 18 ff.. 
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The term robot comes from the Czech ‘robota’, which literally means work 
(forced) and was first used by Karel Apek in his science fiction drama ‘Rossum’s 
Universal Robots’ (abbreviated us RUR) of 1920. In this drama the term was used 
with reference to the automaton that worked in place of the workman. Anyway, 
from a research carried out on the main encyclopaedias and dictionaries in Europe, 
it emerged that there is no general consensus on the definition of robots,103 and it 
coul generate problems for their legal regulation.104 According to the initial idea, 
robot was a machine with human (human-like) appearance. Today, on the contrary, 
the notion of robot is not related to human appearance and is so much extended that 
even autonomous vehicles fall peacefully in this notion.105  
Thus, nowadays self-driving cars are included in the category of robots and, as 
they are equipped with AI, they are included in the category of artificial intelligent 
robots. More precisely, the semi-autonomous vehicles (i.e. level 1 from level 4 of 
automation) are characterised by different degrees of wake AI which increases with 
																																																								
103 For example, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in a quite current definition, considers robot as «any 
automatically operated machine that replaces human effort, though it may not resemble human beings 
in appearance or perform functions in humanlike ways». See Encyclopaedia Britannica (online edn), 
voice ‘robot’ (accessed 17th September 2018). The Oxford University Dictionary, which also 
introduces the aspect of programming, define robot as: «a machine capable of carrying out a complex 
series of actions automatically, especially one programmable by a computer». See Oxford University 
Dictionary (online edn), voice ‘robot’ (accessed 17th September 2018).In the same sense, the Treccani 
online Dictionary defines it as a programmable mechanical and electronic device, used in industry, to 
replace man, to automatically and autonomously perform repetitive or complex activities, heavy and 
dangerous. See Treccani dictionary (online edn), voice ‘robot’ (accessed 17th September 2018). 
104 A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and 
Liability Rules’ (n 12) 215.	
105  In this sense A Santosuosso, C Boscarato, F Caroleo, ‘Robot e diritto: una prima ricognizione’ 
[2012] Pluris 1 ff., which suggest considering the robot as a machine that performs a job 
independently. C Perlingieri, ‘L’incidenza dell’utilizzazione della tecnologia robotica nei rapporti 
civilistici’ (2015) 4 Rass. dir. civ. 1236 and 1243, on the other hand, wonders about the possibility to 
consider robots in the category of legal subjects rather than in that of the things (in Latin ‘res’), but 
concludes in a negative sense, emphasizing the value of the human person enclosed in the 
constitutional principles as well as in the norms of positive law. Then, after declaring the importance 
of developing a European definition of robots, the European Parliament considers the opportunity to 
divide robots into sub-categories, taking into account some robots’ characteristics: the capacity to 
learn through experience and interaction; the form of the robot’s physical support; the capacity to 
adapt its behaviour and actions to the environment.. See Annex to European Parliament Resolution (n 
13). 
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the increasing automation level; completely autonomous vehicle, contrariwise, are 
equipped by strong AI. 
 Driverless car uses AI, for example a combination of computer vision, image 
recognition, and deep learning, to build automated skill at piloting a vehicle while, 
the vehicle is staying in a given lane or is driving itself, avoiding unexpected 
obstructions, such as pedestrians, other vehicles or animals. 
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CHAPTER III – THE FUNCTION OF TORT LAW: HOW 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE COULD CHANGE 
TRADITIONAL LIABILITY RULES. 
 
 
Summary: 1. Legal analysis of car accident liability rules in a comparative 
perspective with particular regard to their function (‘ratio legis’). 1.1. Private 
comparative law analysis of the function of car liability: similitudes and 
differences. 1.2. The tortfeasor in the road vehicle accident under article 2054 of 
the Italian Civil Code and the other main national regulations in the European and 
American legal systems. 2. The self-driving car ingoing in this scenario: the choice 
between traditional liability rules and other body of rules such as product liability. 
2.1. German legal system: The amendment of German Road Traffic Act. 2.2. The 
other legal systems in Europe with specific reference to United Kingdom 
Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 2018. 2.3. European Union initiatives in 
the field of Robotics and AI, including autonomous vehicles. 3. Legal analysis of 
car insurance law under a comparative point of view. 3.1. The possible car 
insurance schemes: third part insurance and first party insurance.3.2. Focus on the 
Italian car insurance in relation with the other already identified legal systems. 3.3. 
Case study: Trinity Lane Driverless Car Policy. 
 
 
1. Legal analysis of car accident liability rules in a 
comparative perspective with particular regard to their 
function (‘ratio legis’). 	
1.1. Private comparative law analysis of the function of car 
liability: similitudes and differences. 	
In order to verify if and how autonomous vehicles can affect the rules of non-
contractual civil liability in road traffic, it is first of all necessary to carry out a 
comparative analysis of the rules themselves. As a matter of fact, it seems 
appropriate to analyse the essential elements of civil liability and its function in 
civil law (Italian, France and Germany) and in common law (the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America). In this way, it will be possible to check whether 
the current rules on civil liability is functional to the protection of the party injured 
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because of a driverless car. In the affirmative case, then, it will see if civil liability 
rules are sufficient for the regulation of autonomous vehicles (possibly extensively 
interpreted or applicable by analogy), or whether it is necessary to modify the 
existing legislation or introduce an ad hoc framework of rules.  
Assuming the perspective of Italian law as a starting point for the analysis of the 
phenomenon, we will start with a brief reconstruction of the Italian tort law and 
than move on to that of the other main legal systems of civil and of common law.  
In Italy, the current rules governing non-contractual civil liability, indeed, can 
be arranged around written rules, general principles106 and case law.107 The written 
rules plan is made up of the Constitution (in particular articles 2, 3 and 32),108 the 
Civil Code (articles 2043 and following) and the special laws (first of all, Private 
																																																								
106 As for the general principles, we are dealing with legal provisions of general content which 
express values to which other legal provisions, called rules are conformed. While the rules directly 
influence the behaviour or attribute regulatory powers, the general principles indirectly influence the 
behaviour, i.e. influencing the exercise of regulatory powers. Among the most important general 
principles in the field of civil liability, we must remember that of accountability, about the 
assumption of the consequences of one’s own actions towards third parties and also towards oneself. 
In this field, other fundamental principle is the principle of ‘neminem leadere’, which contains in 
itself the provisions of Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code regarding the obligation compensate 
damages, but also arises just as a general principle consisting in the prohibition of unlawful acts. See 
G Alpa, La responsabilità civile. Principi (Utet 2010), 37 ff.. 
107 Finally, case law is characterized by a series of judgments to which Courts refer in deciding the 
specific case. In our legal system, unlike what happens in the common law system (which is founded 
on the well known ‘stare decisis’ principle), the case law is not binding. However, the judicial 
decisions taken are often used by other judges who at a later date find themselves having to decide 
similar cases. We refer in particular to cases of motor vehicle accidents (including those relating to 
new automations) in which most of the time the judges attribute responsibility to the driver, thus 
constituting precedents for judges who must then decide on similar cases. See ibid, 41 ff.. 
108 The article 2 of the Italian Constitution, on the fundamental rights, which is usually applied in 
connection with article 3 of the Constitution which regulates the principle of equality in order to 
decide on the compensation for the biological damage suffered (a type of non-material damage). 
Article 32 of the Constitution, on the other hand, protects physical integrity, that is, health intended as 
an asset and, consequently, any injury to it must be compensated. An authoritative doctrine, dealing 
with the overall picture that has been outlined in the matter of non-material damage after the change 
of address of the Italian Supreme Court judgment no. 1361/2014 (which has established that, if the 
damage affects a person’s right to constitutional relief, for itself it is a cause of compensation) 
believes that non-material damage returns to being, as in the past, the instrument to compensate for 
the infringement of non-pecuniary rights. See M Franzoni, ‘Il danno risarcibile’, in Trattato della 
responsabilità civile, II, (2nd edn, Giuffrè 2010); Italian Supreme Court, civil section III, judgment 23 
January 2014, no. 1361, he recognized for the first time, explicitly, the right to compensation for the 
damage to life or the damage from death of the victim that is transmissible to his heirs. 
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insurance code and Consumer code).109 With regard to the civil code - a source of 
aw subordinated to the Constitution - article 2043, which is the basis for the 
codified extra-contractual civil liability of 1942, is very relevant.  In particular, the 
provision of article 2043 identifies the basis of non-contractual liability in «any 
fault or negligent act, which causes unjust harm to others». Given the generality of 
the expression, the aforementioned provision is considered by the literature a 
general clause of the legal system, realized through the so-called ‘atypicality’ of 
the civil tort. In fact, it will be the Judge to decide whether (given the development 
of society, with its changing scales of values and needs) a given behaviour can be 
considered unlawful act, also verifying the existence of all the structural elements 
identified by article 2043.110 
In fact, from the literal dictate of the rule, the fundamental elements emerge to 
give rise to extra-contractual liability are objective and subjective. The objective 
one are: unlawful act, unjust damage, causal link between the fact and the damage; 
instead, the subjective are the guilt of the agent (for intentional fault or 
misconduct) and the imputability of the tortfeasor (that means the lack of natural 
incapacity under article 2046 Italian Civil Code).  
																																																								
109 It is useful to highlight in this regard three important differences between the Civil Code and the 
special legislation of the Consumer Code elaborated by Professor Castronovo. Firstly, art 125 of the 
Consumer Code provides that the right to compensation for damages is prescribed in three years from 
the day on which the injured person was aware of the damage or the identity of the tortfeasor, or 
could have had it using the normal diligence; the civil code, on the other hand, provides for a five-
year prescription period in the case of non-contractual civil liability (art 2947 Civil Code) and, in the 
case of contractual civil liability, the ordinary 10-year limitation period (art 2946 Civil Code). 
Secondly, art 126 of the Consumer code prohibits the bringing of a claim ten years after the product 
has been put into circulation; this is not provided in Civil Code. Finally, Consumer Code, in art 121, 
introduces a novelty with respect to the civil code (in particular art 2055 of the civil code) regarding 
the right of claims based on joint and several liability, because Consumer Code provides that action 
against the others who are jointly and severally obliged has to be exercised only in proportion to the 
size of the risk attributable to each one. C Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile, (3rd edn, 
Giuffrè 2006), 732	
110 When resorting to any legal requirement, it will always be up to the judge to quantify the amount 
of the compensation, given that the article 2059 of the Italian Civil Code legitimates the injured to 
claim compensation for the negative consequences, including non-patrimonial ones. 
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Civil liability, in the Italian legal system, has mainly a compensative function, 
prearranged to repair the damage done, in compliance with the duties of solidarity 
imposed by the Italian Constitution. The subject that today is at the centre of the 
liability regulation is the injured party, who deserves an appropriate balance of his 
position, taking into account, in particular, the actual extent of the damage suffered 
that have to be compensated. However, the current function of non-contractual 
liability is beginning to change. In fact, currently the function of civil liability can 
be not only compensative but also sanctioning, intended as punishment for the 
unlawful act of the tortfeasor and not mere reparation for the damage suffered by 
the damaged restoring the ‘status quo ante’. 
Furthermore, the Italian legislator contemplates, alongside the traditional 
responsibility based on the fault of the agent (as per Article 2043 of the Italian 
Civil Code), other types of civil liability. Therefore, there are, on the one hand and 
as opposed to the hypothesis of direct responsibility, hypotheses of indirect liability 
(e.g. vicarious liability),111 whenever it is required to compensate who has not 
materially committed the offense and, on the other hand, a hypothesis of strict 
liability, when it is required to compensate those who do not has the fault of the 
																																																								
111 Vicarious liability is the responsibility of any third party that had the right, ability or duty to 
control the activities of someone else. A typical example is the liability of the employer for the acts of 
his employees. As he had achieved a return from employing individuals who contribute to the running 
of his business activity, he is also called to bear the costs of the damage that those persons produced 
to third parties when operating in his interest. As a matter of fact, the fault of selecting the given 
collaborator (i.e. the so-called ‘culpa in eligendo’), which imply a direct liability is a thesis outdated. 
Another example of vicarious liability could be the liability of parents or teachers for the acts of 
children or students, which came from the social risk of the role they play. However, other part of the 
literature believes that parents’ liability or teachers’ liability is a type of direct liability, as they have 
to supervise (not at any time) and educate their children/students and so influence their behaviour (i.e. 
the so-called ‘culpa in vigilando’ or ‘culpa in educando’). It is undoubtedly to be included in the 
category of vicarious liability, instead, the responsibility of the supervisor for damage caused by 
subject with lacking mental capacity, since it is not a legally responsible subject. 
See F Bocchini, E Quadri, Diritto privato (n 31) 1308 ff. 
  	
	 55	
harmful event (e.g. product liability). 112   Finally, the Italian legal system 
contemplates the hypotheses of so-called semi-objective liability in which there is 
an inversion of the burden of proof, for which the damaging person is presumed to 
be liable unless otherwise proven, but there is someone who brought about the 
harmful event, and this is the main distinction with the strict liability (e.g. driver 
liability pursuant to article 2054 of the Italian Civil Code which will be discussed 
in the next subsection). 
About French legal system, civil liability is regulated by article 1240 and 
following of French Civil Code 113  and the function of tort law is mainly 
compensative.114  The French legal system has implemented, the teachings of 
natural law (in Latin ‘ius naturale’ or ‘lex naturalis’) summarized in the general 
principle of ‘neminem laedere’,115 i.e. the thought of authors such as Grotius, who 
was the first to state the principle that any harm (both contractual and non-
contractual) must be compensated. This principle has been transpose to the Italian 
Civil Code, which it goes back the French Code civil of 1804, whit the only 
difference that in French any harm, not only unjust harm have to be compensated. 
																																																								
112 On product liability see the paraghraph 3 but for now see Recinto G, Porcelli M, ‘La responsabilità 
per danno da prodotti difettosi’, Chapter 14, in Recinto G, Mezzasoma L., Cherti S. (ed), Diritti e 
tutele dei consumatori (ESI 2014); G Alpa, M Bin, P Cendon (eds.), ‘La responsabilità del 
produttore’, in F Galgano (ed) Trattato di diritto commerciale e diritto pubblico dell’economia, vol. 
XIII, (Cedam 1989), 56 ff; R Mazzon, La responsabilità oggettiva e semioggettiva (UTET 2012), 
1063 ff.. 
113 Art 1240, French Civil Code, L. 3 August 1803 (entered in force on 21 March 1804) as amended 
by art 2, Ordinance 10 February 2016, no 131. About  the role of Napoleon in the French Civil Code 
and its main characters see B Portale, Lezioni di diritto privato comparato (2nd edn, Giappichelli 
2011), 79 ff. 
114 V Zeno –Zencovich, ‘La responsabilità civile’, in G Alpa and others, Diritto privato comparato. 
Istituti e problemi (2nd edn, Editori Laterza 2016), 373 ff. 
115 The French liability system is based on fault. In the event that, however, there is no fault, the 
injured person can take action against an ad hoc patrimonial fund, incremented in part by the 
contribution of private bodies and individuals and, in other part, by public taxation.	
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While in Italy the offense is non-typical, but it is characterized by limited non-
typicality, the French model opts for the maximum non-typicality of the unlawful 
act, innovating with respect to the Roman law.116 
From the Roman law system, revisited by the Pandectists of 1800, derives the 
German Civil Code of 1896 (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, commonly known as 
BGB).117  According to the German liability model, not the harm of any interest is 
sanctioned but only those acts that correspond to a specific case mentioned in 
article 823, par 1 BGB.118 It means that in Germany the unlawful act is typical.119  
Also in German legal system, as in the others civil law systems, the main function 
of the liability is to repair the damage occurred.  
Once the general overview of the civil law systems is concluded, attention must 
be focused (even briefly) on the common law legal systems (UK and USA). 
In the United Kingdom, liability originates from the well known ‘action of 
trespass’. Originally, it was a criminal action indicating the unlawful interference 
with the other person or property. This action gives rise, towards the middle of the 
fourteenth century, to the ‘action of trespass on the case’,120 of a civil nature with a 																																																								
116 F Ferrari, ‘I contrapposti modelli francese e tedesco’, Galgano F (ed.), Atlante di diritto privato 
comparato (5th edn, Zanichelli 2011), 156 f.. represents the typicality and non-typicality of the 
unlawful act in a table which different colour, one for every level of typicality. In light blue is 
indicated the maximum non-typicality of the unlawful act which force to compensate every kind of 
damage committed with fault. 
117 German Civil Code of 1896. To in-depth German codification see B Portale, Lezioni di diritto 
privato comparato (n 114), 104 ff.. 
118 The main criteria and requirements, according to the German law, are three: a) damage is 
unlawful, with the obligation of compensation, only what damages some of the rights of primary 
importance or contrasts with an imperative rule aimed at the protection of individuals; b) damage is 
unjust: the act or fact must be contrary to the law; c) there is the fault or the negligence of the 
tortfeasor. However, if the offense is based on fault and not only negligence and, moreover, is 
contrary to public order, the requirement of the typicality of the protected offense is ignored 
(Romanesque principle of the ‘actio generalis doli’, art. 826 BGB). 
119 The second paragraph of article 823, instead, is an exception of the typicality of the unlawful act. 
See V Zeno –Zencovich, ‘La responsabilità civile’ (n 115) 378 ff.; F Ferrari, ‘I contrapposti modelli 
francese e tedesco’ (n 108) 156 f. 120	The action of trespass on the case was consolidated in the nineteenth century. See V Zeno –
Zencovich, ‘La responsabilità civile’ (n 115) 381 ff. 
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compensatory function, for which the offended is obliged to prove, at least, the 
tortfeasor’s fault and usually also the unjust damage.  
Also the UK liability system is founded on the typicality of the unlawful act. 
More precisely, there are an intentional tort (i.e. assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel) and unintentional tort (tort of 
negligence). The tort of negligence is based on the following four requirements:121 
duty of care, breach of the duty of care, damage and remoteness of the damage. 
The duty of care122 occurs in case of the violation of an obligation by a commissive 
act or a failure to act, and only if the damage is predictable (so-called 
‘foreseeability’); in this sense, the predictability of the damage aims to perimeter 
the area of compensable damage. Furthermore, the breach of the duty of care123 
occurs only when the tortfeasor fails to comply with the standard of care 
(considering his behaviour as that of a reasonable man, in Latin ‘bonus pater 
familiae’).124 The failure to comply with mandatory behavioural criteria determines 
the existence of the offense (‘res ipsa loquitur’); it means that unless otherwise 
proven, the failure to comply with the standard of care is presumed. In fact, except 
for the express wish of the legislator, civil liability in UK is not based on the 
violation of a statute but on case-law.125 
																																																								
121 In Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 [1932] AC 562 the duty of care and the breach of 
care coincide. It means that there is a tripartition of the requirements instead of a quadripartition. 
About the constitutive elements of the tort of negligence see Galgano F (ed.), Atlante di diritto 
privato comparato (5th edn, Zanichelli 2011), 166 ff.. 
122 C Reed, E Kennedy, SN Silva, ‘Responsibility, Autonomy and Accountability: legal liability for 
machine learning (n 45) 7. 
123 Ibid. 8. 
124 It refers only to the statutes and the judge in the specific case must assess whether the standard of 
care has been respected (Judicial self-restraint). 
125 B Portale, Lezioni di diritto privato comparato (n 114), 63 ff., analyses the principle of ‘stare 
decis’ the first difference between common law and civil law systems. 
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A fundamental difference with the Italian legal system is that the UK law of 
damage is applicable to both contractual and non-contractual liability. Moreover, 
unlike the continental systems, the Anglo-Saxon model does not distinguish 
between objective and subjective elements. 
Finally, the USA legal system is the other well known common-law system. 
The primary purpose of USA tort law is to compensate individuals or entities that 
suffer personal or property damage because of another’s wrongful conduct. The 
specific causes of actions comprising tort law in the USA are too numerous to list, 
but they include, as main examples, liability arising out of: intentional misconduct; 
unreasonable conduct; defects in the design, manufacturing, or marketing of 
products sold (product liability); and one’s relationship to the tortfeasor.  
The biggest difference between the USA liability system and the other one 
resides in the function of the tort law. Indeed, the USA compensation aims to 
sanction the tortfeasor for the damage caused.126 Based on US experience, in Italy, 
the civil liability function is changing. Indeed, currently in the Italian legal system 
is admitted also a sanctioning function for damages deriving from an unlawful act, 
in addition to the compensatory one. This happened as an effect of the Italian 
Supreme Court Judgment no. 1660/2017, which admitted the so-called ‘punitive 
damages’ in Italy in the context of the exequatur of foreign judgments.127 
																																																								
126 V Zeno – Zencovich, ‘La responsabilità civile’ (n 115) 388.	
127The exequatur is the judicial procedure that serves to recognize, in a given country, a provision 
issued by the judicial authority of another country. Several Author have analysed the Italian Supreme 
Court, United sections, Judgment, 5 July 2017, no. 16601. TO in-depth the punitive damages see F 
Benatti, ‘I Danni punitivi nel panorama attuale’ [2017] Giust civ 1 ff.; N Brutti, ‘Oltre i punitive 
damages: rilievi su una funzione "espressiva" del rimedio’ (2017) 3 Contr e Impr 840 ff.; M 
Grondona, ‘Il problema dei danni punitivi e la funzione degli istituti giuridici, ovvero: il giurista e la 
politica del diritto’ [2017] Giust civ. 1 ff.; B Siciliano, ‘Le sezioni unite aprono la strada al 
riconoscimento in italia di sentenze straniere che contengano risarcimenti punitivi’ (2017) 118 Dir. & 
giust.  7 ff.; C De Menech,  ‘Verso il riconoscimento dei danni punitivi?’ (2017) 6 Juscivile 608 ff.; C 
De Menech, ‘Il problema della riconoscibilità di sentenze comminatorie di punitive damages: alcuni 
spunti ricostruttivi’ (2016) 6 Riv dir civ 1644 ff.; C Scognamiglio, ‘I danni punitivi e le funzioni della 
responsabilità civile’ (2016) 7 Corriere Giur. 909 ff.; PG Monateri, ‘I danni punitivi al vaglio delle 
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1.2. The tortfeasor in the road vehicle accident under article 2054 
of the Italian Civil Code and the other main national regulations 
in the European and American legal systems. 	
The new damage scenarios testify to the progressive transformation of the rules 
of responsibility. In this scenario is placed the article 2054 of the Italian civil code, 
which is the basic provision for non-contractual civil liability for damages resulting 
from road traffic. However, one wonders if this disposition is sufficient to regulate 
the new cases of civil liability in light of the rapid development of on-board vehicle 
technology. For this reason, it is necessary a brief de iure condendo analysis of the 
Italian legislation on motor vehicle liability starting from the driver’s liability 
regulated by 2054 as outlined below in the figure no. 2. 
 
Figure no. 2 – Driver’s liability in the Italian legal systems (article 2054, 
Italian Civil Code) 
 
																																																																																																																																													
sezioni unite’ [2017] (1) Il Foro It  2648 ff.; M Schirripa, ‘I Danni punitivi nel panorama 
internazionale e nella situazione italiana: verso il loro riconoscimento?’ [2017] Comparazione diritto 
civile 1 ff.;  PG Monateri, G Ponzanelli, ‘La delibabilità delle sentenze straniere comminatorie di 
danni punitivi finalmente al vaglio delle Sezioni Unite’ (2016) 8-9 Danno e resp. 827 ff.; A Nervi, 
‘Danni punitivi e controllo sulla circolazione della ricchezza’ (2016) 1 Res. civ. e prev. 323 ff.; GE 
Lucchini, ‘La compatibilità dei danni punitivi con l’ordine pubblico alla luce della funzione 
sanzionatoria di alcune disposizioni normative processualcivilistiche’ (2016) 5 Resp. civ. e prev. 
1474 ff.; C Granelli , ‘In tema di «danni punitivi»’ (2014) 6 Resp. civ. e prev. 1 ff.; G Ponzanelli, ‘I 
danni punitivi sempre più controllati: la decisione Philip Morris della Corte suprema americana’ 
[2008] (4) Foro It. 179 ff.; E D’Alessandro, ‘Pronunce americane di condanna al pagamento dei 
punitive damages e problemi di riconoscimento in Italia’ (2007) 1 Riv dir civ 383 ff.; P Fava, 
‘Punitive damages e ordine pubblico: la cassazione blocca lo sbarco’ (2007) 4 Corr giur 498 ff.; G 
Carbone, ‘”Punitive Damages” all’italiana’ (1992) 4 Corriere giur 416 ff.; MS Romano, ‘Danni 
punitive ed eccesso di deterrenza: gli (incerti) argini costituzionali’ [1990] (4) Foro It 175 ff.; V 
Zeno-Zencovic, ‘Il problema della pena privata nell’ordinamento giuridico italiano: un approccio 
comparatistico ai punitive damages di common law’ [1985] (4) Giur. it 12 ff.; G Ponzanelli, ‘I 
punitive damages nell’esperienza nord americana’ (1983) 1 Riv. dir. civ. 435 ff..  
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Paragraph 1 of article 2054 of the Italian Civil Code establishes that the driver 
is responsible for the damage caused by the movement of the vehicle without a rail 
guide, unless he proves that he has done everything in his power to prevent the 
occurrence of the same.128 This is a particular type of civil liability, so-called semi-
objective liability, which provides for an inversion of the burden of proof with 
respect to the ordinary regime of non-contractual civil liability established by 
Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code. In fact, pursuant to article 2054, paragraph 
1, it is a task of the damaging proving that he has done everything possible to avoid 
the damage.129 
It should be noted that the burden of proof of the driver having acted diligently 
is valid only for damages caused to things or third parties unrelated to road traffic, 
however, in the case of collision between two or more vehicles (article 2054, 
paragraph 2, Italian Civil Code) )130 Therefore, in this case, the driver must prove 																																																								
128 G Buffone (ed.), Responsabilità civile automobilistica (n 8) 95, ss. 
129 CM Bianca ‘La responsabilità’, in Diritto civile, V (2nd edn, Giuffrè 2012) 256 ss.. 
130 It is emphasized that the Italian Constitutional Court, with sentence n 205/1972, declared the 
constitutional illegitimacy of para 2 of art 2054 of Italian Civil Code, limited to the part where it 
excludes that the presumption of equal competition of drivers operates even if one of the vehicles has 
not reported damage. 
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the fault of the other driver or of the other drivers.131 Moreover, in order to 
overcome the presumption of equal co-responsibility, it is also necessary to provide 
proof of the unpredictability of the conduct of the other driver.132 
Regarding the special responsibility of the driver, it is first necessary to define 
his role. An authoritative doctrine133 considers the driver who physically controls 
the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the damage. To have control means to 
have the controls of the vehicle, even if at the moment when the damage occurred 
they were not used; therefore the driver will answer for damages caused by the 
vehicle even if this has been, for example, parked without handbrake on a sloping 
road or has been parked in the middle of a roadway.134 On the contrary, it is no 
longer considered as a driver who has given the commands to others, even if 
temporarily and under his control. Between the case in which the vehicle is 
considered under the control of the driver and the one in which it is not under 
driver control, there is the case of semi-autonomous cars where there is a driver 
driving the vehicle, but control is can be exercised by an ADAS that replaces in 
whole or in part to the driver, carrying out more or less important tasks depending 
on which it can also be limited or excluded the liability of the driver.135 In the case 
of completely autonomous vehicles,136 however, it seems logical to compare the 
person transported by the vehicle to a passenger of a train or an airplane: as for the 																																																								
131 G Buffone (ed.), ‘Dinamica del sinistro stradale e responsabilità civile’, in Circolazione stradale. 
Danni e responsabilità I (Cedam 2012)56 ss. 
132 Italian Supreme Court, section III, Judgment, 14 October 2015, no 20618. 
133 D MÁ Dios De Dios,‘Inérvalo o distancia de seguridad entre vehículos y colisión por alcance’ 
[2013] Noticias Jurídicas, 6. 
134 Italian Supreme Court, section III, Judgment, 13 January 2015, no. 281. 
135 A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and 
Liability Rules’ (n 12), 277 ff.. 
136 Ibid 235 ss.	 specifies that even fully autonomous vehicles are object and not subject of law. 
Precisely these are products created by the work of man in order to satisfy certain human needs and, 
therefore, in the event of a defect, the responsibility would be attributed to the producer of the same. 
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passenger of the train or plane there is no liability in case of an accident, so the 
passenger of the driverless car will not be held liable in the event of a claim.137 
Define within which area the liability of the driver can be circumscribed and 
beyond which limit the liability switch to the automatic system (and therefore on 
the producer of the same system) it is not a small matter. 
It should also be considered, pursuant to Article 2054, paragraph 3 of the Italian 
Civil Code, the joint and several liability with the driver of the owner of the 
vehicle, or, in his stead, of the ‘usufructuary’ (that in the common law systems 
does not exist) or purchaser with the agreement for retention of title, unless they 
give proof that the circulation took place against their will. This is a joint liability, 
strict and indirect of the owner and on the other subjects abovementioned until 
proven otherwise. In fact, these subjects respond not by virtue of a negligent 
behaviour, but on the basis of a legal imputation of a wrongdoing committed by 
others. The ‘ratio’ of this kind of liability of such subjects must be recognized in 
the fact that the damage depends on the circulation of the vehicle, which it falls 
within the sphere of freedom of action of the owner and of the other mentioned 
subjects who, moreover, are those who can bear the economic loss of the road 
accident. Anyways, the driver, the owner, and the other subjects similar to him, 
have a ritght of recourse against the producer if the vehicle accident depended on a 
vehicle defect. 																																																								
137 A Bertolini, E Palmerini, ‘Regulating robotics: A challenge for Europe’ (n 46) 112 ff., they clarify 
that the problem of liability in road traffic is perhaps the most relevant issue in relation to driverless 
cars, as it could have a strong technology-chilling effect, delaying their placing on the market. The 
authors point out that a series of factors must be taken into consideration that affect the choice of the 
person to whom responsibility should be assigned, such as road traffic regulations, other vehicles on 
the road, pedestrians and, in general, all that has to do with the complex environment in which the 
vehicle circulates. Therefore, while it is conceivable the responsibility of the producer once the 
technology is so advanced as to arrive at the commercialization of completely autonomous vehicles, 
before reaching this level of development it is not conceivable to assign the liability to the producer in 
an exclusive way, as the development of these technologies would be discouraged; during this 
transition phase, which is characterized by semi-autonomous vehicles, it is necessary to share 
responsibility between the driver and the producer on the basis of safety standards. 
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Also for the owner and and the other subjects similar to him will not be held 
liable if the circulation of the vehicle took into account their will (article 2054, 
paragraph 3, of the Italian Civil Code). According to the prevailing Italian 
jurisprudence, this circumstance would occur only in the case in which these 
subjects have concretely adopted the appropriate protections aimed at preventing 
the use of the vehicle by others. In practice, the owner or the other subjects who 
take his place can not just providing proof that the vehicle has circulated without 
their consent (without ‘invito domino’), but must be able to demonstrate that the 
circulation took place against their will (‘prohibente domino’), which must be 
expressed in a concrete behaviour specifically designed to prohibit and prevent the 
circulation of the vehicle.138 
Another hypothesis of strict responsibility is shown in paragraph 4 of the same 
article 2054 which provides, in fact, the objective responsibility of the driver and of 
the other persons indicated in the same article, in case of construction defect or 
maintenance defect. 139  The legislator defines a boundary within which the 
objective liability of the driver characterized by the risk can be identified;140 
outside of this perimeter, the principle of presumed guilt operates. The Italian 
Supreme Cassation has shown that the strict liability of the driver and of the owner 
(as well as of the other mentioned subjects) competes with the product liability 
determining, according to article 2055 of Italian Civil Code (even if the sources of 																																																								
138 G Buffone (ed.), ‘Dinamica del sinistro stradale e responsabilità civile’ (n 131) 57; G Calabresi , 
Costo degli incidenti e responsabilità civile Analisi economico-giuridica, (2nd edn, Giuffrè 2015), 
43; G Buffone (ed.), Responsabilità civile automobilistica (n. 8), 142. 
139 The Italian Supreme Court, not distinguishing between maintenance defect and construction 
defect, qualifies the liability that derives from it in terms of strict liability, while admitting that the 
causal link between the defect of construction or the lack of maintenance, on the one hand, and the 
unjust damage, on the other hand, can be interrupted if an external factor occurs that involves the 
occurrence of the damage (Italian Supreme Court, Judgment, 9 March  2004, no. 4754). For more 
information see FD Busnelli, S Patti, Danno e responsabilità civile (3rd edn, Giappichelli 2013).159 
ss., 
140 In this sense Italian Supreme Court, section III, Judgment, 29 April 2006, no. 10031. 
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liability are different)141. With regard to the burden of proof, the Supreme Court 
has made it clear that it is task of the damaged party, the burden of proving the 
existence of the construction defect or maintenance defect and the related causal 
link with the damaging event, while the driver and the owner to get free must prove 
that the damage was due to a different cause from those listed in the last paragraph 
of the article 2054.142 
Notwithstanding the provisions of article 2054, the perspective that interests us 
most here is that of the damages caused by the defects of the electronic devices of 
the vehicle and paragraph 4 regulates only a minimal part of this case. Concretely, 
the rule leaves in the shadows the problem of damage suffered by the driver 
himself due to a defect that can be as much of construction as design or even 
information defect. In such cases, a liability of the producer of the defective device 
should be established.143 On the contrary, in the opposite hypothesis, namely that 
of the damages caused by the drive to third parties, due to a defect of the on-board 
technology, a joint liability of the driver with the producer should be configured, in 
the case of semi-autonomous vehicle (if the driver should have avoid the damage 
using a normal diligence), and an exclusive liability of the producer where the 
vehicle was completely autonomous. 
A specific regulation of non-contractual civil liability from road traffic is also 
foreseen in the other legal systems already mentioned and analysed in the previous 
																																																								
141 Italian Supreme Court, secrtion III, Judgment, 9 March 2004, no. 4754; Italian Supreme Court, 
section III, 6 August 2004, Judgment, no. 15179; U Carnevali, La responsabilità del produttore 
(Giuffrè 1974), 42, specifies that, although the prediction of the responsibility of the driver, the 
owner, and of the other subject mentioned in the third paragraph of the article 2054 has the purpose of 
facilitating the injured in obtaining compensation, it is not possible to exclude any liability of the 
producer for vehicle defects.. 
142 Italian Supreme Court, section III, Judgment, 19 February 1981, no. 1019. 
143  E Al Mureden, ‘Sicurezza “ragionevole” degli autoveicoli e responsabilità del produttore 
nell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e negli Stati Uniti’ (2012) 6 Contr. impr. 1506 ff.. 
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subsection, with particular regard to the main elements and the function (ratio 
legs). More precisely, in Germany there is the Road Traffic Act (RTA),144 in 
France, on the other hand, this form of responsibility is regulated in the French 
Road Code,145 in the UK there is no organic regulation of road traffic but there are 
many normative texts of reference 146 and, finally, in the USA there are the Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)147  
These disciplines reflect the principles and the ratio already described, but what 
is relevant for identifying the tortfeasor in the event of an accident caused by an 
autonomous vehicle is that in Europe only Germany has modified the road traffic 
regulations, explicitly providing autonomous vehicles. The United Kingdom, at the 
same time, has drawn up a draft law on automation148 which however has not been 
approved and than the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 2018149 which is 
currently in force. In the USA, instead, today are more than thirty the State which 
have introduced a legislation for autonomous vehicles.150 
In the next section we will analyse the German legislation and the UK law (see 
this chapter, subsection 2.1. e 2.2.) and then we will move on to different European 
legislation and initiatives (see this chapter, subsection 2.3.) in order to verify 
whether the driver’s liability rules provided in each Member states are sufficient to 
																																																								
144 German Road Traffic Act, 3 May 1909. 
145 French Road Code, Ordonnance 22 September 2000, no 930, OJ 222. 
146 Road Traffic Act 1988; Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984; Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988; 
Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions (SRGD) 1965; Highway Code 1931 
147 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), currently codified at Title 49 (Part 571) of the 
United States Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1967. 
148 Vehicle Technology and Aviation HC Bill (2016-17) [143]. 
149 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act f 2018. 
150 The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) works to keep real-time information about 
autonomous vehicle legislations and bills that have been introduced in USA. See the link at the NCSL 
autonomous vehicle legislations database: http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-
vehicles-legislative-database.aspx (accessed 5 October 2018). 
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protect the new interests at stake or it would be appropriate to provide other 
(perhaps new) civil liability rules at European level that better protect the interests 
of the parties involved. 
 
 
 
2. The self-driving car ingoing in this scenario: the choice 
between traditional liability rules and other body of rules 
such as product liability. 	
2.1. German legal system: The amendment of German Road 
Traffic Act. 	
In 2017 the Upper House of the German Federal Parliament (‘Bundesrat’) 
approved the bill on autonomous driving which amended the Road Traffic Act 
(RTA). The framework of rules set legal requirements for automated driving and 
has been studied for an intermediate automation level.  
The revised Road Traffic Act (RTA), in German Straßenverkehrgesetz (StVG), 
does not follow the SAE standard J301, although it is commonly used in the 
international context. The reason is that the German Federal Highway Research 
Institute (in German Bundesanstalt für Strassenwesen abbreviated in ‘BASt’)151 
decided to adopt BASt Label levels of automation, which in part are different from 
those of SAE standard J3016 (see chapter II, subsection 1.1). BASt Label levels of 
automation are: ‘Driver only’ (L0), ‘Assisted’ (L1), ‘Partially automated’ (L2), 
‘Highly automated’ (L3), ‘Fully automated’ (L4) and ‘Driverless’ (L5).  
																																																								
151 BASt is a technical-scientific research institute of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital 
Infrastructure. For more details see www.bast.de. 
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The amended RTA regulates road traffic up to L3 and L4 of automation. As 
already said (and for BASt Label levels of automation is the same) in L3 of 
automation the driver does not need to monitor the vehicle’s driving task but he 
should be able to resume the control if there is a danger that the autonomous 
driving cannot face. L4 of automation follow the same division of driving tasks 
between the driving system and the driver, but the driver has to intervene only in 
anomalous cases.  
First of all in the RTA is introduced, in paragraph 1 (2), the definition of 
vehicles high or totally automated to which the law is intended to regulate. They 
are all vehicles that are able to control, at the moment of activation of the driving 
system, all (or the main) vehicles functions related to vehicle’s driving. 
Furthermore, it is states that the vehicle equipment must allow manual activation of 
the automated driving system by the driver, i.e. hand-hover system (para 1 (2), no 3 
- 6 RTA). 
The RTA states that the driver remains legally in control of the vehicle, even 
when L3 or L4 of automation is engaged. However, with those automation levels, 
the driver is free to turn away from the traffic environment and vehicle control, 
provided he maintain a sufficient level of alertness so that he can resume control 
before the system goes beyond its performance limits (Paragraph 1b RTA). All cars 
with L3 and L4 of automation will be fitted with a black box that will record the 
data of each journey (par 63a RTA). In the event of an accident, the data will be 
used to established who is liable.152 																																																								
152 This generates the issues of the unlawful processing of personal data. Indeed, under art 6 GDPR, 
the processing of personal data must be carry out in compliance with one of the lawful basis for the 
processing listed in the same article and it should be verified if this kind of processing respect one of 
the legal bases. Other similar case is that of eCall, electronic device installed on the vehicle, which 
provides a free public service that can automatically make an emergency call to alert emergency 
services in the event of a traffic accident. It is clear that the eCall, as mandatory service provided by 
art 4 of the Reg (UE) 758/2015, carries out a processing of personal data without user’s consent. 
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The law will be reviewed in or after 2019 in order to keep up with any 
technological changes, as well as to allow for a possible rethink of the liability 
rules. Currently, the Paragraph 7 of the German RTA provides strict liability on the 
keeper of the vehicle (i.e. the owner or the lessee) unless he can prove that the 
vehicle accident was caused by force majeure. In addition to owner’s strict 
liability, is established the driver’s liability on the basis of a presumption of fault 
(driver, in semi-autonomous mode, is who is able to activate and deactivate the 
autonomous driving mode).153 However, in the next years, strict liability could be 
extended to the producer of vehicles equipped with L3 and L4 as the Upper House 
of the German Parliament hypothesized.154  
The German law has been the first in Europe to provide a set of rules for the use 
of automated vehicles, even though just amending the existent legislation on road 
traffic and without modifying the criteria of the allocation of liability between the 
driver and the owner in the event of a road accident. This choice leaves a little 
dissatisfied, considering that the owner of the vehicle is playing the role of 																																																																																																																																													
However, data subject’s protection is represented by the fact that the data is used for the sole purpose 
of dealing with emergency situations and the call made only provides the minimum information for 
the rescue (such as the type of vehicle, the fuel used, the time of the accident, the exact localisation 
and the number of passengers on-board) which are deleted as soon as they are no longer needed (Art 
6, Reg (UE) 758/2015). Furthermore, according to art 6, para I, lett. d of GDPR, the processing of 
personal data is lawful, even without the data subject’s consent, when processing is necessary in order 
to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person, among which security 
may be included. Finally, it should be noted that data will not be disclosed to third parties without the 
consent of the data subject, and detailed technical regulation (including the so-called privacy by 
design) will prevent the exchange of personal data between the eCall system and third parties. 
Regulation 758/2015/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 concerning 
type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in vehicle system based on the 112 
service and amending directive 2007/46/EC [2015] OJ L123. In contrast see Art 29 WP, Working 
document of 26 September 2006 on data protection and privacy implications in eCall initiative [2006] 
5 ff., where the Art 29 WP, took into consideration two options for implementation of eCall 
(voluntary service or mandatory service) and the first option does evoked consent to the processing of 
user personal data for a eCall service. 
153 Par 12 RTA, on the other hand, specifies the threshold for compensation, which has increased due 
to the fact that there is almost a total absence of data relating to accidents caused by self-driving cars. 
More precisely, is provided a threshold of 10 million euro for damages to persons and 2 million for 
damage to property. 
154 MN Schubert, Autonomous Cars, Initial Thoughts About Reforming the Liability Regime [2015] 
GenRe Study 4 f.. 
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‘scapegoat’ in case of malfunction of a system on which he does not has no 
influence.155 
 
 
2.2. The other legal systems in Europe with specific reference to 
United Kingdom Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 2018. 	
As already highlighted, at European level only in the German legal system there 
is a regulation for driverless car accidents, even though not satisfactory at all. In 
Italy and in French, otherwise, there was no legislative intervention in order to 
regulate autonomous vehicles or at least the liability profiles related to them. The 
United Kingdom, instead, has drawn up a draft law on vehicle technology and 
aviation, which arrived in March 2017 at the Debate Committee at the House of 
Commons. However, the approval procedure of the proposed law was interrupted 
due to the dissolution of the parliamentary chambers on May 3, 2017. 
Subsequently, a new Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 2018, with the same 
structure and principles of the previous bill, has been proposed as Bill and, 
following agreement by both Houses received Royal Assent on 19 July 2018, is 
now an Act of Parliament. It is an interesting regulation that needs to be briefly 
analysed below. 
The UK Automated and Electric Vehicles would seem to appeal to the insurer’s 
liability or the owner’s liability in the event of a self-driving car accident. As a 
matter of fact, the Act provides the civil liability to the insurance company or to the 
vehicle owner in the event of a car accident while the vehicle is ‘driving itself’. 
More precisely, the section 2 states (perhaps improperly) to the liability of the 																																																								
155 A Davola, R Pardolesi, ‘In viaggio col robot: verso nuovi orizzonti della r.c. auto (“driverless”)?’ 
(n 12) 622 f.. 
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insurance company, probably considering that the damages are compensated by the 
insurance company, in the hypothesis in which the accident was brought about by 
autonomous vehicle causing damage to third parties and of course the vehicle was 
assured at the time of the event (so the owner of the vehicle is also the ‘holder’ of 
the car policy) (section 2(1)). Otherwise, in the hypothesis in which the driverless 
car was not assured, the owner is responsible (section 2 (2)). 
Furthermore, Section 3 regulates the contest of the contributory negligence of 
the injured party or of the driver with the insurer/owner of the vehicle. In the first 
case (contributory negligence of the injured with the insurer/owner), if the 
behaviour of the injured has contributed to the occurrence of the accident, the 
amount of the compensation is reduced under the Law reform Act 1945. In the 
second case (contributory negligence of the driver with the insurer/owner), on the 
contrary, the insurer or the owner of the vehicle are not liable, if the driver has 
negligently allowed the activation of the autonomous driving system ‘when it was 
not appropriate to do so’. 
Section 4, then, provides expressly two cases of exclusion of liability for the 
insurance company: (a) in the case of alteration of the vehicle operating system 
carried out directly by the insured party or when he was in any case aware, or (b) if 
the driving software has not been updated by the insured person who was 
responsible for providing it. 
Finally, under the section 5, in the event that the accident was produced by a 
third party, both the insurer and the owner of the vehicle have the right to claim 
against the third party responsible for the accident. 
Even the UK legislator seems to keep the owner’s liability of the vehicle, if the 
vehicle is uninsured, according with the logic of the ‘deep pocket’, if he does not 
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comply with the obligation to ensure the vehicle or act diligently ensuring the 
correct operation of the vehicle. In this sense, the perplexities previously raised 
regarding the German regulation are again proposed. On the one hand, because it 
does not provide the driver with incentives for diligent behaviour and on the other 
hand, it does not positively affect the reliability of automated driving technologies, 
given that the risk is not borne by the one who is responsible for the design and 
functioning of the driving software.156 		
2.3. European Union initiatives in the field of Robotics and AI, 
including autonomous vehicles. 	
The question of the immutability of the damage coming from road traffic it is 
not easy to solve, as we are trying to show. Furthermore, there is not a specific 
regulation for Robotics and AI, even though this topic is the object of many 
legislative initiatives. At national level we have already analysed the German and 
the United Kingdom legislation. About the European Context we have seen the 
European Parliament resolution of 2017, which call on the Commission to submit a 
directive proposal for civil law rules on robotics and AI.157 
The EU Parliament resolution underlines that the definition of autonomous 
transport include every kind of remotely, automated and connected road transport, 
although the vehicles are the sector that urgent need of efficient European and 																																																								
156 A Davola, R Pardolesi, ‘In viaggio col robot: verso nuovi orizzonti della r.c. auto (“driverless”)?’ 
(n 12) 621 f. , underline how the normative proposal was born already old as it provide only the role 
of the driver and not also that of the passenger, as with the achievement of the completely 
autonomous driving it will no longer be possible to speak of a driver. On the on the transition from 
the role of the driver to that of the passenger see MC Gaeta, ‘Automazione e responsabilità civile 
automobilistica’ (n 12) 169. 
157 The Resolution of the European Parliament was inspired also and above all by the Robolaw 
Project. See  E Palmerini and others, ‘Guidelines on Regulating Robotics’ (n 12) 43 ; N Busto, ‘Carta 
europea sulla robotica: una proposta di roboethics per le self-driving car (n 54).  
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International regulation to ensure cross-border (and lawful) development of 
driverless cars.158 The Parliament specifies that is crucial to regulate security and 
liability issue and so ask to the stakeholders to provide realistic about this 
aspects.159 Regarding to liability rules, EU Parliamentcalls on the Commission 
consider all possible legal solutions, without inclining for one of them.160 Below 
we report these legal solutions, applying them to autonomous vehicles that are one 
of the categories of robots which the EU Parliament is responsible for. 
The first one hypothesizes a compulsory insurance (similarly to what already 
happens with vehicles insurance) for with producer or owner of the driverless car 
would be required to take out insurance that cover for the damage caused by their 
vehicle (Legal solution A). Furthermore, is imagined the possibility to create a 
compensation fund in order to guarantee compensation if the damage caused by the 
vehicle was not covered by insurance but not only for that (Legal solution B). Than 
a limited liability is provided for producers, programmers, and owners or the user 
(depending on who is identified as tortfeasor) if they contribute to the 
compensation fund or if they jointly (but also separately whether will be establish 
that only one of them is liable)161 take out insurance to guarantee compensation 
where damage is caused by their self-driving car (Legal solution C). The next legal 
																																																								
158 EU Parliament Resolution of 2017, rec 24. 
159 About the aspect in which self-driving cars will have a strong impact, EU Palriament lists: «[...] 
civil responsibility (liability and insurance), road safety, all topics related to environment (e.g. energy 
efficiency, use of renewable technologies and energy sources), issues related to data (e.g. access to 
data, protection of data, privacy and sharing of data), issues related to ICT infrastructure (e.g. high 
density of efficient and reliable communication) and employment (e.g. creation and losses of jobs, 
training of heavy goods vehicles drivers for the use of automated vehicles) [...] ». EU Parliament 
Resolution of 2017, rec 26 and 27. 
160 EU PArliament Resolution of 2017, n. 59, and Annex to the Resolution. 
161 In fact, in the annex to the resolution, EU Parliament introduces the hypothesis that it is the 
producer, and therefore only one of the possible liable subjects, who has to take out an insurance 
policy. Precisely it is said: «An obligatory insurance scheme, which could be based on the obligation 
of the producer to take out insurance for the autonomous robots it produces, should be established». 
EU Parliament Resolution, annex to the resolution. 
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solution is closely linked with the previous because, it require to decide whether to 
create a general fund for all smart autonomous robots or an individual fund for 
each robot category (autonomous vehicle should be one of them), and whether the 
contribution should be paid as a one-off fee, when placing the robot on the market, 
or periodically during the lifetime of the robot (Legal solution D). Finally the last 
two legal solutions are related because the solution E provide a registration number 
appearing in a specific Union register, which would allow anyone interacting with 
the robot to be informed about its relevant details,162 ensuring that the link between 
the vehicle and its fund; the solution ‘F’ ask for a specific legal status for robots 
(so- called electronic persons) in the long run, so that at least the most autonomous 
vehicles could be held liable e for making damages163. Finally, EU Parliament 
highlight the need for a suitable instrument for consumers who wish to collectively 
claim compensation for damages deriving from the malfunction of a driverless car 
from the manufacturing companies responsible for that (Legal solution G). 
Other EU initiative is the European Commission communication on Artificial 
Intelligence for Europe of 2018. EU Commission highlights the importance of AI 
saying that AI is undoubtedly one of the most strategic technologies of our century 
and the way we will approach AI will define the world we live in. 
																																																								
162 In particular the interested party would be awere of « the nature of the fund, the limits of its 
liability in case of damage to property, the names and the functions of the contributors and all other 
relevant details». EU Parliament Resolution of 2017, rec 59, E. 
163 In any case it is premature to talk about robots as sobject of law, as they are still object. In this 
sense see A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications 
and Liability Rules’ (n 12) 235: «It has been shown that so long as robots do not achieve self 
consciousness they cannot be deemed moral agents or autonomous - in a strong sense - beings. Short 
of that capacity there is no logical, moral or philosophical - and thus not even legal - necessity to 
consider them subjects of law and bestow individual rights on them. Therefore, all existing robots up 
to that point are to be deemed objects - more precisely, artefacts created by human design and labour, 
for the purpose of serving identifiable human needs, otherwise known as products». On the 
controversial isssue of  robots’ personhood see L Gatt, IA Caggiano, MC Gaeta, ‘Italian Tort Law 
and Self-Driving Cars: State of the Art and Open Issues’ (n 14)  30. 
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Anyways, about driverless car, there is not a regulation, but only initiative that 
need to be concretized. In this scenario, it is discussed whether it is possible to 
apply to self-driving cars traditional liability rules or other body of rules such as 
product liability. In particular, EU Parliament, made reference to the product 
liability, regulated by Directive 85/374/CEE, and it is trying to verify if it can be 
applied (extensively or by legal analogy) to driverless cars accidents. Indeed, it is 
about checking whether, according to the current product liability framework, 
where the producer is liable for a malfunction of his product, and rules governing 
liability for harmful actions, where the user of a product is liable for a behaviour 
that leads to harm, are applicable to damages caused by robots or AI.164 Anyways 
PLD and its possible application to self-driving cars will be in-depth in the next 
chapter (see chapter IV). 
 		
3. Legal analysis of car insurance law under a comparative 
point of view. 	
3.1. The possible car insurance schemes: third part insurance and 
first party insurance. 	
Insurance law models can be divided into two main schemes, to which, as has 
been authoritatively observed,165 we can refer, even for driverless vehicles. But 
let’s proceed with order. 
																																																								
164 EU Parliament resolution, rec AE. 
165 A Bertolini, E Palmerini, ‘Regulating robotics: A challenge for Europe’ (n 46) 113 f..	
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In this section we will analyse both insurance schemes, focusing, then, on the 
Italian one that is based on the third party insurance scheme. 
In the third party insurance,	liability insurance purchased by an insured (the first 
party) from an insurer (the second party) for protection against the claims of 
another (the third party). The first party is responsible for its own damages or 
losses whether caused by itself or the third party. Therefore, the insurance company 
of the owner of the vehicle (traditional or autonomous), in the event of an accident, 
should bear the economic consequences of any damage to property or persons due 
to the accident. In this case it is clear that the obligation to purchase an insurance 
contract is of the owner of the vehicle, who must ensure his vehicle from any 
damage caused by the road circulation, both in case the accident is caused by a 
human error, both in the case the accident is due to the malfunction of the vehicle 
or a device. In this second case, the insurance company, then, can claim against the 
producer by proving its responsibility.166 
In the second type of insurance, instead, fall the first-party insurance or no-fault 
scheme, which have the same insurance scheme. In the first-party insurance (or no-
fault scheme), the victim of the accident may ask compensation for damages 
caused directly to his insurer or to an ad hoc fund, proving that he or she has 
suffered damage resulting from the circulation of the vehicle (manual or 
autonomous driving). 
In the first-party insurance the policyholder does not bother to provide cover for 
the non-pecuniary damage because it would not affect the income capacity of the 
injured party, and this implies that it has lower cost than the third party insurance. 																																																								
166 This model has been criticised by Guido Calabresi, with specific regard to road traffic, as it would 
be more burdensome for the poor and the elderly and young people who, if they were insured with a 
first party system, would pay a premium compared to the reduced life expectancy of the elderly and 
the low income of the poor and young. On the contrary, with the third party insurance they pay with 
reference to the income and life expectancy of the average citizen. 
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However, liability insurance must be concerned with non-pecuniary damage, which 
is a major component in the liquidation of damage.  
Furthermore, the first-party insurance takes into account any other sources of 
repair of damage, and correlatively reduces the insurance premium. Therefore, 
first-party policies often has excess which, by limiting compensation, imply a 
lower cost of insurance premium. However, even here we must point out a negative 
aspect: the first-party insurance will cost less in relation to the lower economic 
burden of the insurer, but the problem of compensation for further damage remains. 		
3.2. Focus on the Italian car insurance in relation with the other 
already identified legal systems. 	
With regard to the civil liability for damages deriving from the circulation of 
vehicles, the so-called compulsory insurance167 is provided at both European and 
national level. This means that vehicles can only circulate if insured. At the 
European level, the reference legislation is the Directive 2009/103/EC,168 which, in 
article 3, expressly provides that each Member State shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that civil liability relating to the circulation of vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by car insurance. In particular, the 
insurance policy must cover the damage caused in the territory of a Member States 																																																								
167 A Bertolini and others, ‘On Robots and Insurance’ (n 46) 2 ff., explains that normally, the parties 
are left free to decide whether to enter an insurance contract or not, in order to manage a risk they are 
exposed to. However, in some cases, the legislator deeming that the risk associated to a certain 
activity is too high, or that moral behaviour may negatively affect the spreading of the damages that 
arise, and for this impose a duty to purchase insurance (normally third party insurance). The traffic 
insurance, as well as the professional liability insurance, are examples of compulsory insurance. 
168 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/103/EC of 16 September 2009 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement 
of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] OJ L 263/11. 
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according to the legislation in force in those states and the damage, which may be 
suffered by the citizens of a Member States. Therefore the European legislation 
defers to the national legislation for the regulation of the concrete national case, 
even if it contains general principles that must be transposed in the Member States 
law.169 First of all, it highlights the principle that the injured party must claim for 
compensation to the insurance company undertaking of the person who caused the 
accident or to its claims representative.170	This principle is important because 
implies that the insurance scheme adopted in Europe and in the member states is 
that of the third party insurance, with the provision also of direct compensation in 
specific circumstances which will be discussed below, in reference to the Italian 
legal system but are provided at European level. Therefore, in France, in Germany, 
and in Italy, as well as in the UK171 and especially in the US,172 compulsory 
insurance follows the rules of the third party insurance. Anyways, let’s analyse the 
third party insurance in the Italian legal system, considering that Italian law is the 
starting point of this work. 
In Italy, the mandatory insurance had already been established by article 1 of 
the law 990/1969,173 for which every vehicle in public areas had to be protected by 
an insurance policy such as to cover the damages caused to third parties involved in 
																																																								
169 To this general principle of compulsory insurance there is a derogation provided for in Article 5 
Dir 2009/103 / EC in favor of certain natural or legal persons, public or private, included in a list that 
the Member State must notify to other States and to the EU Commission. However, the Member State 
must take the appropriate measures to indembnify the persons for the damage caused in their own 
state or in that of the other Member States by vehicles belonging to the aforementioned persons 
exempt from compulsory insurance. To this end, it shall also draw up a list of the authorities or bodies 
responsible for the indemnification to be communicated to the Commission. 
170 Art 22, Dir 2009/103/EC. 
171 Section 2 and ff., Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 2018. 
172 Chapter 344, Wisconsin Statutes Database of 2008, in www.wisconsindot.gov (accessed 11 
October 2019); Virginia Insurance Requirements of Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, in 
www.dmv.virginia.gov (accessed 11 October 2019) 
173 Law 24 December 1969, n. 990, civil liability insurance for road accidents (not in force). 
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a possible claim, up to a certain threshold. The compulsory insurance coverage fell 
only when the vehicle was demolished, with consequent radiation from the Public 
Automotive Registry. 
The 1969 law has undergone various updates and modifications and has been 
definitively replaced by the current Italian Private insurance code, repeatedly 
modified. The Italian Private insurance code, in confirming the compulsory 
insurance, has also introduced a series of innovations, among which one of the 
most important is the direct compensation (article 149, Italian Private insurance 
code).174 It provides that, in specific cases, the injured person can go directly to his 
insurance company to get compensation for damages in case of accident caused by 
the other party, without having to request the payment of damages to the company 
of the damaging party.175 This direct compensation procedure operates only if: (1) 
the motor vehicle accident occurred in Italy, in the Republic of San Marino or in 
the Vatican State;176 (2)	 it involved only two vehicles, both identified, insured and 
registered in Italy; (3) and if there has been damage to property and/or persons, but 
minor value.177 It seems clear, therefore, that this is an exception to the third party 
scheme, and that, when applicable, operates according to the scheme of the first-
party insurance, even if the requirements are different and far more specific for the 
direct compensation than the first-party insurance.  
In addition, can take advantage of the direct compensation only ones who are 
insured with an insurance company belonging to the Direct Compensation 
																																																								
174 Art. 18, Dir 2009/103/EC. 
175 G Buffone (ed.), Responsabilità civile automobilistica (n 8) 157 s. 
176 Art 34, par 1, CARD. 
177 Article. 149 Italian Private insurance code refers to the physical damage suffered by the non-
responsible driver if it is contained within the limit set by article 139 Italian Private insurance. 
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Agreement (DCA, in Italian CARD), pursuant to art. 13 of the D.P.R. n. 
254/2006.178 179 
For damages caused by the insured to third parties, the insurance company, after 
collecting the insurance premium,180 it replaces the insured by paying the damages 
caused by him. The damages of which the driver is liable, and possibly also the 
other subjects expressly provided for in article 2054 of the Italian civil code, are 
those caused «to people or things». In the formula adopted, no distinction is made 
between people and things transported or not, but contemporary case-law also 
includes people and things transported.181 Moreover, in the event that the damage 
derives from the collision with another vehicle, the person transported may also act 
against the other driver assuming an equal responsibility of the parties pursuant to 
article 2054, paragraph 2, Italian Civil Code. In addition, the third party is entitled, 
in the presence of a transport contract, to act against the driver for damages 
stemming from contractual civil liability, even in the absence of a tort clame.182 
There is a threshold, i.e. a minimum that insurance companies must necessarily 
guarantee as compensation. This threshold can be raised by increasing. the 
																																																								
178 D.P.R.,18 July 2006, n. 254 regulations governing the direct compensation for damages arising 
from road traffic, OJ 199. 
179 In other words, these companies must establish a specific office, Company Service Reference 
Conventions Reference (SARC), for the management of the reports relating to the CARD between the 
member companies. The SARC also manages the relationships that derive from other agreements 
related to motor vehicle dealings, such as the Third Party Transports Convention (CTT). Foreign 
insurance companies, on the other hand, must apply for membership of ANIA (Italian National 
Association of Insurance Companies) pursuant to Article 2 CARD. 
180 The insurance premium is the amount that the insured corresponds to the insurance company to 
obtain insurance coverage. 
181  In the past, on the contrary, a restrictive interpretation of the norm was preferred, for which 
people and goods transported as unrelated to vehicle circulation. 
182 In Italy, the transport contract is governed by articles 1678 ff., Italian Civil code. To in-depth the 
compensation of contractual and non-contractual obligations,see CM Bianca ‘La responsabilità’, in 
Diritto civile (n 130) 760. 
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insurance premium.183 The law also provides that the policy is no longer in force 
from the sixteenth day following its expiry.184 
Briefly stated the principles of Italian civil liability in road traffic, and the rules 
applicable in other civil law and common law States, an open question concerns the 
way in which autonomous vehicles affect compulsory insurance: Who should be 
the insured? It should be an increase or a decrease in the insurance premium?185 
In the next chapter we will try to explain the possible solutions applicable in the 
case of an accident caused by an autonomous vehicle, both in terms of liability and 
insurance system (see chapter IV). Meanwhile, however, the following subsection 
will analyse an insurance policy for driverless cars (see this chapter, subsection 
3.3.). 
 	
3.3. Case study: Trinity Lane Driverless Car Policy  	
																																																								
183 Historically, insurance companies have always been inclined to recognize the benefits of road 
safety from automotive technologies and have encouraged their policyholders to invest in them (eg. 
Black box). See art. 132 ter, lett b) Italian Private Insurance Code; see also M Caprino M,‘Sconti 
obbligatori per la scatola nera [2017] Il Sole 24 Ore online.  
184 For further information, refer to the Circular of the Italian Ministry of the Intern, Department of 
Public Security, 14 February 2013, on the tacit postponement of insurance policies. The circular, 
underline that the art. 22 of D.Lgs. no 179/2012 introduced the art. 170-bis in the Italian insurance 
code, establishing the prohibition of tacit renewal of insurance policies car; at the same time, 
however, this rule expressly provides for the extension of the insurance coverage to the annual expiry 
for a limited period of fifteen days from the expiration day. So, during that period the insured, 
pending the signing of another contract in good time, can continue to circulate using the exipred car 
policy. 
185 C Perlingieri, ‘L’incidenza dell’utilizzazione della tecnologia robotica nei rapporti civilistici’ (n 
105) 1241 ss., wonders about new forms of compulsory insurance required by the development of 
robotics, assuming the use of a criterion based on the level of learning and adaptation of the robot: a 
greater ability to learn of the robot would result in less responsibility for the producer (taking account 
of its power to give instructions to the robot), while it would entail less responsibility for the user. 
The author starts from the assumption that the robot can not be recognized civil liability as it does not 
seem necessary to completely overcome the concept of a robot as a legal good (in Latin ‘res’). This 
reconstruction reflects the legislation currently in force in the different legal system and in the 
European one, but there is a strong impulse of innovation that could also lead to the recognition of the 
legal personality to the robot. 
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At this point, it seems opportune to dwell on the analysis of a UK car policy for 
driverless vehicle to verify if this contract is sufficient to protect the new interests 
at stake. It is the Trinity Lane Driverless Car Policy, in particular the second 
version of 2015, which is the last one available to the public. 
The policy, in the definition part, defines the car as: «Car Passenger vehicle 
unladen weight higher than 450 kg but lower than 3500 kg, not designed for the 
carriage of goods (van) and is designed to carry no more than 6 passengers».186 So 
it does not mention the automation and less than that the self-driving car. 
Furthermore, in the part on risks covered,187 the policy, like al the common 
policy, provides different types of policy including, at the number 3, the coverage 
for death of or injury to third people, or damaging other people’s property, and any 
passenger in the vehicle. It suggests that the policy takes over the third-party 
scheme (see this chapter, subsection 3.1).  
Then, explaining the use cases, it is stated that: «Your vehicle will only be 
covered if you are using it in the way agreed on your certificate of motor insurance, 
or any endorsements».188 With the term ‘using’ it should be supposed that it is 
referred to the use of the vehicle in general, including the vehicle in autonomous 
mode, where there is no driver on-board but only passenger. Anyways, this is only 
a deduction that can not be proven, rather it is possible that it is just an improper 
term that does not intend to include even autonomous vehicles. 
																																																								
186 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Definition, 5. 
187 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Cover, 7. 
188 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Use, 8. 
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This policy is applicable both if it is the driver to drive the vehicle or if the 
vehicle is driven by another person with the owner’s permission,189 and it is clear 
that no mention is made to autonomous driving.  
It is also provided a quite limited part on driverless mode, which is included in 
section 1.190 More precisely, the following loss or damage brought about by the 
self-driving car are covered by the driverless car policy: «(1) loss or damage 
caused if a security patch, firewall or operating system update has not been 
successfully installed in the vehicle within 24 hours of the owner being notified by 
the manufacturer or software provider; (2) loss or damage caused if updates to 
electronic mapping and journey planning software have not been successfully 
installed within 24 hours of the owner being notified by the manufacturer or 
software provider; (3) loss or damage caused by satellite failure/outages that affect 
navigation systems; (4) loss or damage caused by manufacturer’s operating system 
failure or authorised software failure; (5) loss or damage caused by failing when 
able to use manual override to avoid a collision or accident». Here a consideration 
must be given to the role that seems to be up to the user of the vehicle. The 
operation of the insurance coverage is limited to cases of malfunctioning of the 
authorized software and of the related updates, also authorized, which is an 
extreme import aspect for the average consumer, which in fact seems to be asked to 
be able to recognize on the market which is the update to be installed, otherwise the 
insurance coverage will not be operational. 
Another important reference to the autonomous drive is made with reference to 
the valid license for a driverless vehicle, which is needed in order to benefit from 
																																																								
189 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Section 1, Liability to others, 9. 
190 Ibid. However, there is an additional excess of £250 for the first two cases mentioned in the text. 
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the policy.191 This shows that the driving license rules will change as a result of the 
change of driving, until it will arrive at the completely autonomous driving where it 
should be asked if a driving license will be still necessary. 
Moreover, in section 6, named ‘fire and other cover’,192 the policy takes into 
account the qualities of driverless vehicles by offering insurance coverage in the 
event of loss or damage to the vehicle caused, as well as by fire, theft or attempted 
theft, including the attempted hacking or hacking of the driving system, authorized 
software or of the navigation system.  
Finally, the absence of coverage for personal data, suffered by the insured 
person/driver in the event of a claim due to malfunctioning of autonomous driving 
systems, it is not a matter of little importance. By way of example, we can consider 
the possibility in which, by hacking the operating system of the vehicle, some 
personal or sensitive data (e.g. bank data) are stolen. What is founded in this 
insurance policy is that does not ensure economic damage that could result from 
the hacking, neither in terms of data protection nor in terms of cybersecurity. In 
fact, the  damages or losses that may be insured by the policy are in fact those 
suffered by third parties (referred to in section 1 on third party insurance) or by the 
vehicle, if section 6 on fire and theft is included or also death or injury of the 
insured or his spouse/partner, provided in section 9, if is a comprehensive 
insurance.193 Obviously, more damages are covered and higher is the insurance 
premium. Anyway, the policy document in question does not provide for the 
extension of insurance coverage to damage coming from the unlawful processing 
of the personal data of the insured person, which is instead reserved only for 																																																								
191 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Exceptions to section 1,10. 
192 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Section 6, Fire and theft cover, 15. 
193 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Section 9, Personal accident benefit, 21.	
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his/her personal belongings in the vehicle, if it is chosen the comprehensive 
policy.194  
In conclusion, on one hand, we look favourably at this (though early) driverless 
car policy, which is in compliance with the Road Traffic Act of 1988. However, on 
the other hand, as it is foreseeable considering that the driverless car policy is 
previous to the entered in to force of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 
2018, this car policy resumes only a small part of the Act and it needs to be 
revised. 
It appears clear that there are very good purposes and the UK is one of the 
pioneers in the field of driver policy, but the road ahead is still long. 
 
																																																								
194 Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane, Section 10, Personal belongings, 22. 
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Annex: Extract of the Driverless Car Policy of Trinity Lane. 
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CHAPTER IV – A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK OF RULES 
FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 		
Summary: 1. A de iure condendo legal proposal for driverless car. 1.1. Product 
liability directive and its legal understanding in consideration of the European 
Commission Report and Evaluation. 1.2. Imputability of damage caused by an 
autonomous vehicle. 1.3. Extensively application of existing legislation versus the 
need of an ad hoc framework of rules for self-driving cars. 2. The need of an 
effective insurance policy for autonomous vehicle. 2.1. Principles of insurance that 
guarantee a high level of protection in the ‘autonomous’ traffic flow. 2.2. What 
should concretely provide an efficient automobile insurance policy. 		
1. A de iure condendo legal proposal for driverless car. 	
1.1. Product liability directive and its legal understanding in 
consideration of the European Commission Report and 
Evaluation. 	
It is necessary to in-depth the Product liability directive (PLD) before exploring 
the possible solutions to regulate autonomous vehicles, with particular regard to the 
case of autonomous vehicle accidents (see this chapter, subsection 1.2.). 
With the development of industrial civilization, the damage from defective 
products was one of the main legal issues and was first treated by the doctrine and 
case law and, in a second time, governed by the legislator. The latter intervened 
regulating the producer’s liability with the Directive 85/374/EEC.195 The directive 
aimed to harmonize the laws of the Member States of the European Union by 
																																																								
195 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products [1985] OJ 
L 210/29. 
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introducing a rule of favor for the damaged by defective products (the so-called 
consumer). This directive was implemented in Italy by the d.P.R. n. 224/1988196 
and then transfused into the Italian Consumer Code in the articles 114 and 
following. In particular, the change in the forms of production and the structure of 
the market (now based on the subdivision of production into several phases), has 
created the need to regulate the relationship between producer and consumer. The 
EU Directive and the Italian Consumer Code has managed to regulate this 
relationship even in the cases in which there is one or more intermediary between 
the liable producer for the damage and the consumer, and he function of this 
regulation is balancing opposite interests: having safe products and distributing 
them in the market for profit. The open question concerns, instead, the defects of 
products characterized by a high level of technology and, in particular, autonomous 
vehicles. Indeed, in the contemporary era technology is developing much more 
quickly than the related legislation and, consequently, there are many cases in 
which it is difficult to identify the tortfeasor for the damage caused by the 
electronic device. But let’s proceed with order. 
The article 2 PLD 197  defines as a product every movable, even if it is 
incorporated into another movables or immovables; therefore fall within this 
category both the vehicles and the automatic devices installed on them. A product, 
as defined, is to be considered defective if the safety feature is not present.198 
																																																								
196 The d.P.R. May 24, 1988, n. 224, which governed the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States on liability for damage caused by defective products, 
was repealed by d.lgs. 6 September 2005, n 206, OJ 235. (Italian Consumer Code). 
197 Article 115, Italian Consumer Code. 
198 The general product safety regulation is contained in the Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council 2001/95/EC of 3 December 2001 on general product safety [2001] OJ L11/4, currently 
merged into articles 102 ff., Italian Consumer Code. In particular, according to the provisions of art 
104, para 1, Italian Consumer Code, producers can only place safe products on the market. 
  	
	 90	
Indeed, article 6 PLD,199 establishes that a product is defective when it does not 
offer the security that a person is entitled to expect in view of certain 
circumstances. In fact, the assessment, to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, 
will take into account certain parameters which include those indicated by the 
article: «(a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably 
be expected that the product would be put;200 (c) the time when the product was put 
into circulation». In this regard, three fundamental aspects can be identified. 
Firstly, the provision implicitly refers to the technical and scientific knowledge, 
therefore it is necessary that the affirmation of the defect is made by one or more 
experts in the sector; however, it is not necessary that this declaration is certain, but 
only sufficiently reliable. Secondly, and as a corollary of the previous point, it is 
required that the respect of the existing technical rules (written or not) in force 
when the product was introduced on the market. Thirdly, as has been argued, with 
regard to the producer’s strict liability, a product can be considered defective if this 
fact has been scientifically proven anywhere in the world and not necessarily in the 
place where the damage occurred.201 Finally, a product is defective if it does not 
offer the security normally offered by other products of the same series, even if a 
product should not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product 
is (subsequently) put into circulation.  
																																																								
199 Article 117, Italian Consumer Code. 
200 In relation to this circumstance, the Italian Suprme Court, already with the Judgment n. 4004 of 21 
October 1957, has states, in a case involving damage resulting from the abnormal use of a product, by 
declaring the liability of its producer, as he could have taken appropriate measures to avoid the 
abnormal use of the asset. 
201 G Alpa, M Bin, P Cendon (eds.), ‘La responsabilità del produttore’, in Trattato di diritto 
commerciale e diritto pubblico dell’economia, directed by Galgano F, vol. XIII, (Cedam 1989), 56 ss. 
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As can be seen from the definition of a defective product, the concept of defect 
is strictly connected to the concepts of safety 202 and of danger for the person who 
uses it and for third parties who are in contact with it. The notion of defect is based 
on the concept of safety. Therefore, it can be considered as an additional reference 
parameter, in order to assess the existence of the defect, the notion of safe product 
contained in the general product safety regulation, reported in article 2, Directive 
2001/95/EC.203 On the basis of this provision, the product is safe which, under 
normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions (including duration and, where 
appropriate, commissioning, installation and maintenance), presents no risk or 
presents only minimum risks, compatible with the use of the product and 
considered acceptable in compliance with a high level of protection of health and 
safety of persons.204 Therefore the safety of the product is defined as the general 
absence of risks even if the existence of some minimum risks is configurable. This 
is a general clause on the basis of which the scope of risks posed to the consumer is 
quantitatively determined (which in any case are minimal risks). In this context, the 
Italian legislator, on the model of European protection of health and safety, has 
																																																								
202 The concept of security is referred to, inter alia, in art. 41, paragraph 2, Italian Costitution, which 
imposes the limit on the protection of physical security to private economic initiative. The concept, 
then, has assumed particular importance in the Directive 85/374 / EEC implemented in our legal 
system. 
203 Art 2 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2001/95/EC of 3 December 
2001 on general product safety [2001] OJ L11/4, which correspond to art 103 of Italian Consumer 
Code. Other foudamental regulation it he field of safety product is the Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 2006/42/EC of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 
95/16/EC [2006] OJ L 157/24. 
204 The elements according to which the art 103, Italian Consumer Code, assesses the level of 
protection of the health and safety of the person are: the characteristics of the product, in particular its 
composition, its packaging, the modalities of its assembly and, if appropriate, its installation and 
maintenance; the effect of the product on other products, if the use of the first with the latter is 
reasonably foreseeable; the presentation of the product, its labeling, any warnings and instructions for 
its use and disposal, as well as any other indication or information related to the product; the 
categories of consumers who are at risk of using the product, in particular children and the elderly. 
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identified standards that allow only possible minimum risks or even the absence of 
any type of risk.205 
Having defined the notion of product and the on of defect, it is now necessary to 
understand what is meant by producer. About that, article 3 PDL206, defines the 
manufacturer of the finished product, that of a component part and also the 
producer of the raw material. Therefore, in the light of the existing EU legislation, 
a producer of an electronic device on-board or a vehicle is also a producer, be it a 
traditional vehicle or a self-driving car. On the contrary, it is not specified whether 
by producer it is meant anyone who produces a good and puts it on the market or 
only the person who carries out this activity as a professional activity. According to 
authoritative doctrine207 only the professional producer should be considered as a 
producer, on the basis of the fact that it is opposed to the protected consumer as a 
weak part of the relationship, which acts just like a non-professional. 
The division of the producer’s category into three sub-categories (as represented 
in the figure n 3 below) should also be considered.208 These sub-categories were 
																																																								
205 Article 105, Italian Consumer Code, then, it explicitly regulates the rules of presumption of safety 
of the product, establishing that a product is presumed to be safe in the case in which it complies with 
European legislation or, failing that, complies with the national legislation of the Member State in 
which the product is marketed. Furthermore, a product is safe if it complies with the non-binding 
national regulations that implement European legislation. To this it is necessary to add that, if the 
European (or national) legislation is absent, a product is presumed to be safe, inter alia, if it respects 
the level of safety that consumers can reasonably expect (consumer expectations). Therefore, if a 
product, and in particular an autonomous vehicle, is below consumer expectations, the producer's 
liability appears configurable. For further information on the consumer expectation, refer to E 
Palmerini and others, ‘Guidelines on Regulating Robotics’ (n 12). In this sense also A Bertolini, in 
Summer School ‘The regulation of robotics in Europe: legal, ethical and economic implications’, 
which stresses that, on the basis of the consumer expectation test, the seller of a product is responsible 
if the product is unreasonably dangerous, taking into account the expectations of the average 
consumer. 
206 Article 3, Italian Consumer Code.  
207 C Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile (n 109), 687 ss. says that the producer is only who 
carries on the activity of producer at a professional level. In this sense had suggested the history of 
producer’s liability. However, also who is engaged in a commercial activity and imports the product 
to put it into circulation is professionist. Similarly, the supplier is a profesisonist who can always be 
held responsible in the place of the producer. 
208 Restatement of the Law Third, Tort, Products Liability, American Law Institute,1998, § 2,  
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developed in US law and subsequently introduced into our legal system, though 
only at the doctrinal and non-normative level.209 They are: the designer who is 
responsible for designing the product, the manufacturer who is responsible for 
making it and the informant who is responsible for providing the consumer with 
the necessary warnings about the product. The three sub-categories reflect three 
different moments of the productive activity and can be proper of distinct subjects, 
as well as of only one. It is noted that traditionally the terms ‘producer’ and 
‘manufacturer’ are used as synonyms, implying the disappearance of the 
tripartition of the figure of the producer. 
 
Figure no. 3 – Types of product defect 
 
 
Under article 1 PLD,210 the producer is liable for damages caused by his 
defective products (so-called strict liability or no-fault liability).211 The choice for 
the producer’s strict liability is related to the possibility for the producer to transfer 
partially (or integrally) the production costs to the end user through the product’s 																																																								
209 U Carnevali, ‘Nuovi prodotti dannosi’, Treccani G (ed.) Enciclopedia Giuridica (online edn. 
2009); A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications 
and Liability Rules’ (n 12) 239. 
210 Article 114, Italian Consumer Code. 
211 In USA, strict liability rule for the producer is affirmed by section 402A of the Restatement of the 
Law, Second, Tort, American Law Institute,1965. 
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price. As a matter of fact, the product’s price is increased because the fact that the 
producer is required to buy insurance for harm arising from the normal use of its 
product. The justification to increase the product’s safety does not fully explain this 
strict liability.212  
To the same liability is subject the supplier (subject distinct from the 
producer)213 when the producer is not identified; therefore it is the supplier’s 
liability to communicate the identity of the producer to the injured party.214 
Furthermore, the Directive applies only to producers, not to service providers that 
may use products which result to be defective. However, the PLD does not prevent 
Member States from establishing strict liability for service providers, as long as 
they do not in any way limit the producers’ strict liability.215 
With regard to the burden of proof, the article 4 PLD216 provides that the same 
is on the damaged party,217 which must prove the defect, the damage and the causal 																																																								
212 R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (7th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2007) 182 f. 
213 CM Bianca ‘La responsabilità’, in Diritto civile (n 130) 746. 
214 Regarding the compensable damage, the art 123 of the Italian Consumer Code, taking over the art 
9 PLD, states that there are two categories of compensable damages: personal injury and property 
damage. The first is that caused by death or by personal injury, compensable without limitation. The 
second, on the contrary, is that deriving from damage or destruction of any items of property other 
than the defective product itself, provided that the damaged good is normally destined for private use 
or consumption (therefore not professional) and has been used by the injured party mainly for this 
purpose; furthermore, the material damage can only be refunded if it exceeds the amount of 387.00 
Euros, whereas the 9 PLD article expressly provides a lower threshold of 500 Euros for compensation 
for material damage. The normative provision solves only in part the problem of establishing the limit 
within which the damage is relevant for compensation purposes, an aspect that is discused by P 
Trimarchi, Causalità e danno (Giuffrè 1967), 19 ff., that considers necessary starting from general 
regulatory provision to be applied on a practical case, solving the question of the limit of the 
compensable damage on a case-by-case analysis. 
215 In this sense, see CJEU, Judgment 21.12.2011, Centre hospitalier universitaire de Besançon, C-
495/1, EU:C:2011: 869, where a hospital bed had burned a patient during surgery. 
216 Article 120, Italian Consumer Code. 
217 The most difficult stepping stone to receiving compensation for damages is the burden of proof on 
the injured person, who has to demonstrate the damage occured, the product defect and the causal 
relationship between the defect and the damage (under art 4 PLD). The Court of Justice of the 
European Uniono (EJEU) has made doing this considerably easier by accepting national rules that 
help the injured person to establish this proof, but this must not undermine the PLD’s placing of the 
burden of proof on the injured person. For example, the EJEU indicated that national rules, granting 
consumers the right to require the producer to provide them with information on the adverse effects of 
that product, can be accepted as they fall outside the scope of the PLD. See CJEU, Judgment 20 
  	
	 95	
link between the defect and the damage, while the producer must prove the 
exemption of liability. As a matter of fact, the article 7 PLD 218 establishes a 
catalogue of defences or circumstances that could exclude producer’s liability.219 In 
particular, the producer shall not be liable if he proves some circumstances of 
exemptions of liability, including: (a) did not put the product into the market, (b) 
that did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation,220 (c) the 
product was not manufactured for the sale, (d) the defect is due to compliance of 
the product with mandatory regulations, 221 (e) the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge at the time when the product was put into the market do not allow to 
classify the product as defective, 222  (f) if the defect is attributable to the 
																																																																																																																																													
November 2014, Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH, C-310/13, EU:C:2014:2385. Moreover, the EJEU 
accepted national rules under which a national court may consider certain factual evidence to 
constitute serious, specific and consistent evidence of a defect of a product and to constitute the 
causal relationship with the damage, even if there is no conclusive scientific evidence on this. In this 
sense CJEU, Judgment 21 June 2017, Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, C-621/15, EU:C:2017:484. Finally, 
the EJEU indicated that products of one group or of the same production series with a potential defect 
may be considered as defective without the need to establish the actual defect of the individual 
product (CJEU, Judgment 5 March 2015, Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH, C-503/13 e C-
504/13, EU:C:2015:148). 
218 Article 118, Italian Consumer Code. 
219 In the United States of America, four product liability defenses have been developed for the 
producer’s exemption of liability: (1) comparative negligence, (2) misuse, (3) state of the art and (4) 
assumption of risk by the driver. See JK Gurney, ‘Sue My Car Not Me. Products Liability and 
Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles’ (n 11) 266 ss.. About the comparative negligence theory 
is concerned, the producer could defend himself by claiming that he was not fully responsible or not 
at all, as the driver’s negligence. In our view, comparative negligence also includes the hypotheses in 
which the responsibility is not to be attributed to the driver through negligence, but rather to 
unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure. These are the hypotheses of fortuitous event or force 
majeure that exclude the fault of the producer by not realizing the provision of art. 1 PLD. For a more 
in-depth analysis, see Fagnant DJ, Kockelman K, ‘Preparing a nation for autonomous vehicles: 
Opportunities, barriers and policy recommendations’ (2015) 77 Transportation Research, Part A: 
Policy and Practice 167-181. 
220 Regarding the case where the defect did not exist when the product was put into circulation, it is 
sufficient for the producer to provide proof of the propability of the non-existence of the defect, as 
well as, by par condicio, it is sufficient for the injured to provide proof of the probability of its 
existence. 
221 The hypothesis in which the product defect depends on compliance with binding rules, occurs only 
in very exceptional cases since, as a rule, the legislator’s intervention takes place not with mandatory 
rules but with standards. 
222 In relation to the case in which the state of scientific and technical knowledge does not allow the 
product to be considered as defective, it is necessary to clarify that this is referred to a so-called ‘risk 
of development’, that is a compromise between the need to boost innovative business activities and to 
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manufacturer of a part of the product, he has to prove the liability of the 
manufacturer of the finished product or of the informant.223 
The ratio of this rule limiting the liability of the producer is probably the 
indefectible need to protect also the strong party of the relationship, as it depends 
on him the innovation in the industrial sector and in particular that of new 
technologies. In fact, if the responsibility of the producer was even greater of that 
provided by the EU regulation, he would not choose to introduce new technologies 
into the market as the same could result in excessive responsibility for the 
producer. 
Taking up again the abovementioned tripartition of the producer types, it is 
worth highlighting that producer’s liability can be objective liability (also known as 
strict liability) or semi-objective liability.224 There is an objective liability for 
damages resulting from manufacturing defects.225 In fact, the producer will be 
considered responsible for the manufacturing defect independently of the fault, for 
the mere fact of having put in circulation a defective product, unless he proves the 
non-imputability.226 This hypothesis, as the majority doctrine maintains,227 does not 
																																																																																																																																													
protect the interests of consumers. Therefore, in cases where the product has not yet been considered 
defective, since technological innovation is extremely important for the development of contemporary 
society, it is preferable to place the device on the market rather than wait to evaluate in more detail 
that it can not be dangerous. C Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile (n 109) 701 ss. 
223 See R Mazzon, La responsabilità oggettiva e semioggettiva (n 107) 1063 ss. The introduction of 
the above mentioned hypothesis of exemptions of liability implies that producer’s liability is not an 
absolute liability (P Trimarchi, La responsabilità civile: atti illeciti, rischio, danno (Giuffrè 2017), 
453 ff. 
224 G Alpa, ‘La responsabilità oggettiva’ (2005) Contr. impr, 959 ff., it deals with the problems 
related to the criteria of imputation of liability, both civil and criminal, with particular reference to the 
strict responsibility of the producer, opposing it to that based on the fault. 
225 Directive 85/374/CEE. In this sense F Bocchini, E Quadri, Diritto privato (n 31) 1263 s. 
226 It is therefore a matter of proving the existence of one of the cases referred to in Art 118 Italian 
Consumer Code. 
227 G Calabresi, Costo degli incidenti e responsabilità civile Analisi economico-giuridica (n 138), 32, 
highlights how all the subject matter of the torts, and mainly that of. product liability, is based on 
strict liability. P Sirena (Sirena P (ed.), La funzione deterrente della responsabilità civile. Alla luce 
delle riforme straniere e dei Principles of European Tort Law (Giuffrè 2011), 155 ff., says that the 
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take into account the element of guilt, since it does be an element of the objective 
liability, but that of the causal link between the behaviour of the damaging subject 
and the damage occurred. The introduction of this form of strict liability for 
defective products is essentially based on the usefulness that the producer derives 
from their marketing, which justifies, with a view to the efficient allocation of risk, 
the attribution to him of the risk that the products themselves can cause damage to 
things or people.228  
Despite the PLD statement on producer’s responsibility, many issues arise on 
the producer’s strict liability. More precisely, the European Group of Tort Law 
project provides as a general rule liability with fault229, providing a form of strict 
liability only in relation to the exercise of dangerous activities, 230 and establishing, 
however, that such liability remains excluded in case of unforeseeable cause of 
force majeure or conduct of a third party.231 Likewise, the project by the Von Bar 
group, founded by the German Professor Christian Von Bar,232 argues that civil 
liability is founded on fault and introduces an injunctive protection (i.e. ‘right to 
prevention’) which strongly contradicts the strict liability, since it is a preventive 
protection that can not be experienced outside the hypotheses of fault. 
																																																																																																																																													
case-laws affirming the objective character of responsibility related to things, takes for granted that 
our code has sanctioned this liability as liability without fault and explains that the proof of the 
unforeseeable circumstances granted to the injuring party by art 2051 of the Italian Civil Code, it 
would not be possible to exclude fault but the causal link. 
228 FD Busnelli, S Patti, Danno e responsabilità civile (n 139) 152, starting from the economic theory 
of the distribution of costs and profits, the authors foresee an autonomous system of strict liability 
that involves the allocation of the risk to the party who obtains more profits and, therefore, can bear 
it. In this sense also G Calabresi, Costo degli incidenti e responsabilità civile Analisi economico-
giuridica (n 138) 38 f.; A Bertolini, ‘Insurance and Risk Management for Robotic Devices: 
Identifying the Problems’ [2016] GJ, 34 ff.. 
229 Principles of European Group on Tort Law, art 4:101. 
230 Principles of European Group on Tort Law, art 5:101. 
231 Principles of European Group on Tort Law, art 7:102. 
232 C Von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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The other type of producer’s liability is the aggravated one,233 provided for 
damages resulting from a design defect or a lack of information.234 Thus, the 
producer will be liable until proven otherwise, due to the defect of design or 
information.235 In particular, in the case of the designer, the starting point are the 
expectations of the user (the so-called consumer expectations), i.e. the absence of 
design defects that make the product unreasonably dangerous, as it is presumed 
that the product has been designed in compliance with the safety standards that will 
be discussed below. Furthermore, about the informer, it is necessary that he has 
correctly informed236 the user about the risks associated with the use of the 
product.237 238 																																																								
233 Italian Supreme Court, civil section III, Judgment, 25 May 1964, no. 1270, starting from the 
liability with fault, recognizes the semi-objective liability after a careful assessment of the 
circumstances and in the absence of clear evidence of the negligence of the producer. 
234 CM Bianca ‘La responsabilità’, in Diritto civile (n 130) 753, considers that the law established a 
differentiated rule that imposes a strict liability on the producer in relation to damage caused by 
manufacturing defects and an semi-objective liability in relation to damage caused by design defects 
or warning defect. In the same sense also F Bocchini, E Quadri, Diritto privato (n 31) 1264. 
235 Therefore, in this case a reversal of the burden of proof can be configured, as in the case of strict 
liability due to manufacturing defects. 
236 The duties of information are foreseen by art 5, Dir 2001/95/CE, and after art 104 Italian 
Consumer Code, regulate the information obligations of the informant. 
237 With regard to the relations between producer and supplier, it should also be noted that the 
supplier is liable jointly with the producr in case of manufacturing defect. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, the supplier will be liable in place of the producer if the latter is not identifiable. As far as the 
internal relations between the producers of the different production phases are concerned, however, 
the final producer also is held liable when the producer of a component part of the defective product 
is the real tortfeasor. On the other hand, the producer of a single component or of the raw material, 
identified as liable, can excuse himself by proving that the defect is caused by the incorporation of the 
component in the finished product or by incorrect instructions given by the final producer. C 
Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile (n 109) 657 ff.. In this regard, the national legislator, in 
article 121 Italian Consumer Code has expressly established the joint and several liability of persons, 
who for various reason intervene during the production phase (whether they belong to the same 
production phase or to different production phases). For this reason it is expected that, if several 
people are liable for the same damage, they are all jointly and severally liable for compensation. 
Obviously, there is a right of claim against in favor of the person who has compensated the whole 
damage for all the other tortfeasor, to the extent determined by the size of the risk to each one of 
them, by the seriousness of the behavior and by the extent of the consequences that come from it. In 
case of doubt, the distribution takes place in equal parts. 
238 Finally, the last hypothesis of producer’s liability is the professional liability with fault, that 
derives from negligent design, manufacture or warnings, as well as from the inertia of the producer 
who does not immediately remove a defective product from the market after having ascertained the 
dangerousness of the same. In this case the Latin brocardo ‘onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit’ is 
applied, and, therefore, the damaged party will have to provide proof of the producer’s fault. This is 
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As widely reiterated, the responsibility of the producer is closely connected to 
the concept of safety.239 Taking into account the public regulations of vehicle 
safety standards, two questions may be asked: (1) how to integrate the public 
regulations of vehicle safety standards with civil law rules on product liability? (2) 
The safety standards represent a minimum or a maximum threshold of producer’s 
liability? 
First of all it, is necessary to specify that the safety elements that vehicles and 
their component parts must have in order to be considered ‘reasonably safe’ are 
legally defined.240 In particular, with regard to vehicles, in the European Union, the 
adoption of safety standards has been a consequence of the entry into force of 
Council Directive 70/157/EEC on the permissible sound level and the exhaust 
system of motor vehicles,241 then amended by Commission Directive 96/20/EC.242  
																																																																																																																																													
the traditional principle of burden of proof that in the Italian legal system is governed by the art 2697 
Italian Civil Code. 
239 Dari-Mattiacci G, Franzoni L, ‘Innovative Negligence Rules’ [2013] Amsterdam Law School 
Research Paper, 1: «We study how due-care standards can be conditioned on the technology adopted 
by the parties. We demonstrate that standards should be biased up or downwards, depending on the 
impact of the new technology on expected harm. Strict liability should be applied if new technologies 
that are able to reduce expected harm are available to the injurer; negligence should be selected if 
they are available to the victim. Finally, the negligence standard should be primarily based on safety 
(outcome) rather than precautionary expenditures (effort), so as to allow the benefits of innovation to 
be appropriated by the party bearing its cost». 
240  E Al Mureden, ‘Sicurezza “ragionevole” degli autoveicoli e responsabilità del produttore 
nell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e negli Stati Uniti’ (n. 143) 1508 ff.: The complex regulatory 
systems set up in the various systems to guarantee the safety of motor vehicles are the result of an 
extremely complex process. At first, at least up to the years 40, the problem of the safety of vehicles 
and their components was not considered exhaustively by the public legislation, which, in principle, 
did not provide particular quality standards, nor specific provisions regarding the characteristics of 
products and their safety. Only between the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s emerged the 
requirements that still underlie the legislation on the safety of motor vehicles, that is to impose 
structural features suitable to ensure a reasonable level of safety and to identify quality standards 
uniform functionalities to allow producers to easily market motor vehicles in different government 
systems. 
241 Council Directive 70/157/EEC of 6 February 1970 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the permissible sound level and the exhaust system of motor vehicles 
[1970] OJ L 42/16. 
242  Commission Directive 96/20/EC of 27 March 1996 adapting to technical progress Council 
Directive 70/157/EEC relating to the permissible sound level and the exhaust system of motor 
vehicles [1996] OJ L 92/23. 
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Suddenly, the European Union, with the Council Decision 97/836/EC243 has joined 
the agreement of United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)244 
and, subsequently, the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
46/2007, 245  outlined the general framework within which are provided more 
detailed technical rules elaborated by the UNECE. Thanks to harmonization, the 
UNECE Member States have conventionally adopted mutually recognized uniform 
standards, allowing producers to operate in a homogeneous context. 
About the first question, i.e. the relationship between safety standards and civil 
law regulation on producer’s liability, it is important that the public safety 
standards are established for each specific subcategory of producer (designer, 
manufacturer, and informant). According to this, producer’s liability has a relative 
character. It means that the responsibility must be evaluated concretely on the basis 
of the applicable standards.  
The second issue is to establish whether compliance with safety standards 
represents only a minimum or maximum producer’s liability threshold. In general, 
safety standards are intended as minimal requirements, which merely allow the 
distribution of the product on the market. Indeed, as settled in the article 7, letter d) 
of the PLD, the liability is exclude only if the damage occurred because of the 
specific feature set by a legal rule.246 Furthermore, the existence of a higher level of 																																																								
243 Council Decision 97/836/EC of 27 November 1997 with a view to accession by the European 
Community to the Agreement of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe concerning 
the adoption of uniform technical prescriptions for wheeled vehicles, equipment and parts which can 
be fitted to and/or be used on wheeled vehicles and the conditions for reciprocal recognition of 
approvals granted on the basis of these prescriptions [1997] OJ L 346/78. 
244 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) ratified in Geneva in 1958. 
245 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2007/46/EC of 5 September 2007 
establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, 
components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles [2007] OJ L 263/1. 
246  E Al Mureden, ‘Sicurezza “ragionevole” degli autoveicoli e responsabilità del produttore 
nell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e negli Stati Uniti’ (n. 135)1524 f., believes that, if the producer’s 
liability is configured only in case of non-compliance with the legal standards, his responsibility 
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safety standard, which has actually been achieved by other producers (c.d. 
alternative design),247 may be suitable for configuring producer’s liability even 
though he had respected the safety standards.248 
After analysing the PLD, we now need to specify how the European 
Commission intervenes and what it has foreseen with the last quinquennial report 
(the fifth for precision) on the PLD 249 which is complemented by an evaluation of 
the directive.250 																																																																																																																																													
should be excluded in the hypothesis of failure to pass the much stricter tests carried out by consumer 
associations or independent bodies, such as the European New Car Assessment Program (Euro 
NCAP), which deals with defining the methods for assessing the passive safety of new vehicles by 
means of specific test protocols. A Bertolini, E Palmerini, ‘Regulating robotics: A challenge for 
Europe’ (n 46) 107 ss., instead, they underline that the most appropriate approach is to carry out an 
analysis on a case-by-case basis, verifying compliance with the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the applicable principles. The 
authors also examine the ESOS (Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme) and ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization) standards to evaluate the existence of producer’s liability. 
Furthermore, for the analysis of the concrete case, many other factors must be taken into account and, 
as example, in addition to the technical aspects, the competitive market and its trend, the impact of 
technology on the production system and so on. 
247 In the United States of America, compliance with legal standards is only a necessary condition for 
obtaining vehicle type approval, but not sufficient to exclude producer responsibility, which would 
persist if so-called alternative design could be configured. However, in order to avoid excessive 
producer responsibility, the legislator has introduced explicit or implicit preemption clauses for which 
the producer’s liability for damages resulting from the defective product that complies with legal 
standards is excluded. 
248 U Carnevali, ‘Il difetto di progettazione negli autoveicoli’ (2011) 10 Resp. civ. e prev, 2110, 
comments the decision of the Italian Court of Pisa, Judgment, 16 March 2011 concerning the case of 
a moped that, burning after the impact with a wall, had caused serious damage to the driver of the 
same. The author states that the Judge had found that in other vehicles of the same category there was 
no such defect. He points out how the comparison with similar vehicles is of particular importance as 
it can be deduced from the fact that the judjment did not attribute to the producer the fact that he had 
not adopted merely theoretical design choices, but the fact that he had not adapted to design choices 
concretely adopted by from competitors. 
249  European Commission Report to the European parliament, the Council and the European 
economic and social committee, of 7 May 2018, on the application of the Council Directive on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC) (COM(2018)246 final). The reporting perod 
is 2011- 2017 during which the EU Commission declares that did not receive any complaints or 
launch any infringement proceedings. At the same time, though, the EU Commission mean PLD does 
not cover all aspects of product liability. Indeed, there is spase for different national approaches (e.g. 
on systems to settle claims for damages, or on how to bring proof of damage). Member State may 
also introduce or maintain other national instruments for the product liability based on fault and not 
on sctrict liability. 
250 European Commission Staff Working Document, of 7 May 2018, on the evaluation of Council 
Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products 
SWD(2018) 157 final. The evaluation aims to assess the «functioning and the performance» of the 
PLD for the period 2000-2016 and it covers the EU-28 Member States. 
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In the Report, EU Commission highlight that the PLD was one of the first 
pieces of EU legislation that explicitly aimed to protect consumers and that 
introduced the concept of strict liability which has been already explained. The 
PLD complements EU product safety legislation and the so-called ‘New Approach’ 
to product safety, that aims to prevent damages by setting common safety rules. 
Those safety rules cover the majority of products available on EU markets. What is 
observed by the EU Commission, and this is the most important point for the 
interpretation of the PLD, is that from 1985 many years have passed. Many 
products available today on the market have characteristics that were considered 
science fiction in the past century and our society has to face new challenges 
related to digitisation, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence (included 
Robotics) and cybersecurity.251 Which specific reference to AI, the Communication 
of the European Commission, as already said, defined it as one of the most 
important technologies of the 21st century and focused in maximising the benefits 
of AI.252 In this context, product safety and liability is a fundamental aspect in 
finding of a policy response that enables European societies, businesses, and 
consumers to benefit from artificial intelligence and also to addresses legal 
challenges. 
Respecting the EU Commission evaluation of the PLD, it has been carried out 
an evaluation of the PLD to assess its performance, as the directive has never been 
evaluated since its entry into force. The Commission started from the ‘intervention 
																																																								
251 European Commission Report on the application of the Council Directive concerning liability for 
defective products (COM(2018) 246 final, 1 f. 
252 European Commission Communication on Artificial Intelligence for Europe (COM(2018) 237 
final), 18 f.. 
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logic of the Directive’, that is summarised below in the figure no 4.253 The figure 
represents three main needs which the PLD should satisfy: consumer protection 
against damage caused by a defective product, producer’s liability for the damage 
caused by a defective product, and the free movement of good in the single market 
without distortion of competition. These needs led to the definition of three 
strategic objectives, namely the free movement of goods, the protection of 
consumer’s health and property, and an undistorted competition among market 
operators in the single market. Finally, the three strategic objectives are translated 
into two specific objectives: common rules on strict liability for producers and the 
right for consumers to claim damages, which represents the operational 
orientations of the PLD. These strategic and specific objectives are achieved 
through the set of rules listed in the figure. Applying the text of the PLD to date, in 
the intervention logic are also considered external factors which may influence the 
performance of the Directive: Widespread mass-market production and new 
technological developments. This second factor is the one on which we will focus. 
 
Figure no. 4 – Intervention logic of the directive 
																																																								
253  Commission Staff Working Document, Evaluation of Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 
(SWD(2018)157), 7. 
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In the light of the latest technological developments, EU Commission has 
considered necessary to verify the following aspects. First of all, (1) the 
effectiveness of the PLD in achieving its original objectives, i.e. product liability in 
the double sense of protection of competition in the single market and protection of 
the damaged party.254 In this perspective, on one hand, the industry seems to be 
dissatisfied with the Directive criteria on product liability. On the other hand, 
consumer organisations criticise that it is difficult for injured persons to prove the 
link between damage and defect, particularly because they have to advance any 
cost related to bringing this proof and because they have not sufficient technical 
information about the product. Anyways, with specific reference to new 
technologies, the lack of information about specific case-law or consumer 
compliant it does not allow to make a final decision on the effectiveness of the 
PLD. 																																																								
254 Ibid, 21 ff.. 
Copyright © European Union Commission 
Study for the evaluation of the Directive.  	
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The second aspect is (2) the efficiency of the PLD in protecting the interests of 
the producers and of the consumers, which are direct trade-off: what is to the 
benefit of the injured persons (i.e. the burden of proof, the 500,00 euro threshold 
and time limitation) is the producers’ cost (strict liability) and vice versa.255 Down 
this point of view, the balance between these mentioned costs and benefits is not 
uniform across Member States, sectors or product types; so it is not easy to decide 
about the efficiency of the directive. However, the EU Commission believes that 
the Directive is efficient in delivering a stable legal framework for the single 
market and for harmonising consumer protection. Then, it is essential to ensure (3) 
the coherence of the PLD with the EU relevant rules which regulates the single 
market, promotes the innovation, with specific regard to new technology and 
protect the consumer’s interests (safety and well-being).256 On the base of the 
evaluation, the PLD seems to be consistent with the overall EU mentioned rules. In 
fact, it appears that there are no problems concerning the collocation of the PLD in 
the context of the existing European regulation (the one relating to safety above all) 
but the issues are related to (4) the PLD relevance by	 embracing recent 
technological changes, which have a considerable impact on the legal terms used257 
(e.g. the definition of producer, product, defect or damage)258. Thirty years have 
passed since the PLD came into force and so it seems logical that, in light of the 																																																								
255 Ibid, 37 ff.. 
256 Ibid, 43 ff.. 
257 Ibid, 49 ff.. 
258  European Commission Report on the application of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC 
(COM(2018)246 final), 10: «Some of the concepts that were clear-cut in 1985, such as ‘product’ and 
‘producer’ or ‘defect’ and ‘damage’ are less so today. Industry is increasingly integrated into 
dispersed multi-actor and global value chains with strong service components28. Products can 
increasingly be changed, adapted and refurbished beyond the producer’s control. They will also have 
increasing degrees of autonomy. Emerging business models disrupt traditional markets. The impact of 
these developments on product liability needs further reflection. At the end of the day, a producer is 
and needs to be responsible for the product it puts into circulation, while injured persons need to be 
able to prove that damage has been caused by a defect. Both producers and consumers need to know 
what to expect from products in terms of safety through a clear safety framework». 
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rapid development of new technologies, at least the legal interpretation of some 
concepts and terms therein must be reviewed in order to include new product such 
as self-driving cars. Last but not least, is (5) the EU added value to businesses and 
injured persons.259 About this last point EU Commission’s goal is to ensure that the 
EU continues to have a product liability regulation that promotes innovation, safe 
products placed on the EU market, and injured party because of defective products 
are able to claim compensation. It is not clear how the EU Commission states that 
the PLD provides uniform consumer protection, as it does not consider new 
product characterised by AI and the consequent consumer safety. Contemporary, 
though, we agree with the affirmation that repealing the Directive would lead to 
fragmentation of consumer protection, as would be in force only apply national 
rules on contract or tort law.  
In conclusion, it is important to underline that, with the advent of the emerging 
digital technologies, the Commission will open a public consultation with all 
stakeholders 260  and will reach a common understanding and to draw up 
comprehensive guidance on how to apply the PLD today. This guidance should 
help to provide a product liability framework fit for the digital technologies 
industrial revolution. In mid-2019 the EU Commission will issue this guidance on 
the PLD and, at the same time, will issue a report on the broader implications for, 
and potential gaps in the liability and safety frameworks for AI, Internet of Things 
and robotics.261 If necessary, the Commission will also update certain concept and 
terms of the Directive in order to adapt the Directive to the digital age.262 
																																																								
259  Commission Staff Working Document, Evaluation of Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 
(SWD(2018)157), 57 ff.. 
260 Ibid., 2. 
261 Already in 2016, in the Digitising Industry Communication and in the related SWD, the EU 
Commission indicated that it would be examined the emerging issues of data ownership, access, and 
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1.2. Imputability of damage caused by an autonomous vehicle. 	
The question of the imputability of the damage deriving from road traffic, as has 
been shown, is not easy to solve at all. In this sub-section, we will try to identify 
the hypotheses in which driver’s liability is configurable and those in which the 
liability is to be attributed to the producer. 
As demonstrated by the DEKRA study as early as 2011,263 more than ninety 
percept of road accidents are due to incorrect driver behaviour, while less than ten 
percept is a consequence of defects in semi-autonomous vehicles. The DEKRA 
scholars have pointed out that the main causes of motor accidents caused by the 
driver’s fault are due to failure to comply with speed limits, immediately followed 
by cases of alcohol intake, overtaking and incorrect use of the road (motor racing 
in urban streets, cars parked on second and third row, etc.). 
Furthermore, technology is at the service of man and, as the DEKRA study of 2015 
demonstrates,264  increases the level of road safety. However, incorrect use of 
technological devices can negatively affect it. This is the case of distractions due, 
																																																																																																																																													
processing of personal data, as well as safety and liability related to IoT, robotics and automated 
systems (e.g. driverless cars). See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, of 19 
April 2016, on Digitising European Industry Reaping the full benefits of a Digital Single Market 
(COM(2016) 180 final); European Commission Staff Working Document, of 19 April 2016, on the 
advancing the Internet of Things in Europe, accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on the Digitising European Industry Reaping the full benefits of a Digital 
Single Market (SWD(2016) 110/2). 
262  European Commission Report on the application of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC 
(COM(2018)246 final), 11. 
263 DEKRA study 2011 (n 41) 2010. 
264 DEKRA, study 2015 (n 42) 2015. 
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for example, to the use of the navigator to set a place to be reached or the radio to 
select a music channel, while the driver is already on the march, or, again, of 
distractions due to the use of mobile phone in direct mode, instead of using voice 
commands after connecting the mobile phone to the vehicle via Bluetooth 
(technology that owns all new generations of cars). In the same way, the excessive 
amount of attention signals of the technological devices on-board the vehicle could 
cause confusion in the driver, who would not know how to intervene. Finally, the 
more a vehicle drives autonomously, the more the driver’s attention to the driving 
environment tends to decrease (the driver could, in fact, be induced to take care of 
other things and not be able to promptly resume the vehicle controls in case of 
emergency). 
In this regard, it has been found that the attentive driver should be held in 
autonomous vehicles accident.265 This conclusion was reached after analysing the 
profiles of four different types of drivers: (1) the distracted driver, (2) the 
diminished capabilities driver, (3) the disabled driver and (4) the attentive driver. 
The distracted driver (1) is that subject who does not pay attention to the road or to 
the surrounding environment. In the case of vehicles equipped with a low level of 
																																																								
265 JK Gurney, ‘Sue My Car Not Me. Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous 
Vehicles’ (n 11) 255 ff.: «The Distracted Driver is the autonomous car user who is not paying 
attention; it could be someone reading a book like Sarah, using a cell phone, eating a snack, or any 
other situation. Essentially, the Distracted Driver purposefully engages in a task other than driving, 
thus relying on the autonmous vehicle completely. [...] The Diminished Capabilities Driver is the 
person whose driving capabilities are diminished for some reason; it could be an elderly person like 
Richard, an intoxicated person, or a minor. This person typically would not be driving because of his 
or her diminished capabilities and would have to rely on others. Thus, the Diminished Capabilities 
Driver could benefit greatly from the convenience and independence an autonomous vehicle provides. 
[...] The Disabled Driver is the person who cannot drive a traditional vehicle because of a physical 
disability, such as blindness or an amputated limb. Thus, the Disabled Driver relies entirely on the 
autonomous nature of the car in that he or she can take control - just not safely - of the autonomous 
car in the event of a computer malfunction. [...] The Attentive Driver, like Tucker, is the user who 
watches the road and surroundings in the same way he or she would while driving a traditional 
vehicle. The Attentive Driver may not trust the autonomous ability of the vehicle such that he or she 
constantly checks that the car is driving correctly, or the Attentive Driver may simply not have any 
other tasks to address while in the vehicle. The key is that the Attentive Driver has the potential to 
foresee and prevent accidents, unlike the Distracted, Diminished Capabilities, and Disabled Drivers». 
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automation266 where the driver is driving (i.e. until level 2 of automation of the 
SAE J3016 standard), the driver is considered distracted if, while driving the 
vehicle, performs other activities which are not compatible with the driving tasks. 
In the case of vehicles with a high level of automation, but on completely 
autonomous, (i.e. levels 3 and 4 of automation of the SAE J3016 standard) the 
distracted driver is the one who performs activities totally incompatible with the 
driving tasks not being able to resume vehicle control when necessary. 
The distracted driver is held liable for most car accidents caused by a vehicle with 
a lower or higher level of automation. On the contrary, when the vehicle is 
completely autonomous, the driver is not required to take any driving activity, 
neither in the event of a malfunction of one of the technological devices, and the 
producer of the same will be responsible. 
For diminished capabilities drivers (2) it is referred, for example, to the elderly, 
minors and individuals who use alcohol or drugs. Instead, the expression disabled 
driver (3) concerns, as indicated by the same term, subjects with disabilities. For 
these two categories of subjects (the diminished capabilities driver and the disabled 
driver) there will be the obligation to compensate the damage to the injured party 
in case they drive the vehicle equipped with ADAS in a distracted or negligent 
manner, but these categories of subjects are expected to have higher protections, 
required precisely for their particular physical and/or psychic conditions. Indeed, 
an elderly person or a disabled person can not have the same alertness and capacity 
for action as a driver of average age and without health or mental problem. Finally, 
there is the attentive driver (4), that is the driver who drives the vehicle and 
supervises the ADAS, paying attention to the road and everything related to it 																																																								
266 At a low level of automation corresponds to a moderate level of AI, with the increase of 
automation, the level of AI also clearly increases. 
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(automotive signals, weather conditions, information provided by other the 
automatic devices, etc.). In this regard, it was considered that the attentive driver 
has the possibility to prevent or even avoid the vehicle accident, unlike the other 
types of driver examined above and, therefore, should be held liable in case of 
failure to intervene, if the vehicle it was not completely autonomous. 
The percentage of cases in which the semiautonomous vehicle producer is liable, as 
we have said, would appear to be considerably lower than that in which the driver 
or the owner of the vehicle are responsible, even if the joint and several liability of 
the producer with the driver or the exclusive liability of the producer can be 
configurable in the event of a vehicle defect (cases that increase proportionally as 
the level of automation increases). However, the producer of a completely 
autonomous vehicle appears to be the only one responsible for collisions, as these 
would be caused by a malfunction of the vehicle’s operating system or a 
component part. 
The aforementioned article 1 of the PLD provides that ‘The producer shall be liable 
for damage caused by a defect in his product’, in any case, the exception is the 
hypothesis in which the producer is acting respecting the product safety standards 
(which, as repeatedly said, delimits the minimum threshold of producer’s liability 
which also the limit of the alternative design).267 Moreover, the rules that the 
producer must comply with regard to the design phase, the manufacturing phase, 
and information phase; for each phase, different rules are set. Failure to comply 
with these rules entails the obligation, on one or more producer types, to 
compensate the damage suffered as a result of a defective product; a product that, 
																																																								
267 N Kalra, J Anderson, M Wachs, ‘Liability and Regulation of Autonomous Vehicle Technologies’ 
(n 49) 22 ff. 
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in the cases we deal with, will be an ADAS or the on-board computer of the 
autonomous vehicle.268  
On the basis of the legislation examined (in particular the PLD) there are some 
fundamental aspects that the designer should take into consideration, in order to not 
be held liable of the damage caused by the defective vehicle. First of all the 
designer should evaluate the actual need for information provided to the driver by 
the ADAS, inserting only those necessary to make the driver understand what to do 
and not the extra ones that would only risk confusing him.269 	Secondly, the 
designer should conduct an ergonomic analysis of the same electronic devices, i.e. 
a study on the interaction between the ADAS and the function for which they are 
designed, in order to improve the overall performance of the system and the 
driver’s satisfaction. The analysis of the acceptance by the driver of the automatic 
systems, based on the Human-Machine Interface analysis (HMI), is also extremely 
important, with particular regard to the behavioural changes of the driver who 
interacts with these new technologies. In addition, assistance systems must be 
included in vehicle approvals and therefore the designer who designed the 																																																								
268 In this regard, the so-called Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC intervened to harmonize the health 
and safety requirements that machinery must have and to allow the free circulation of products 
conforming to it within the European market. Autonomous vehicles would fall under the category of 
‘machines’ provided by article 1, letter a) of the Directive and explained in its art 2. It regulates the 
obligations that producers must respect in order to be able to place the product on the market (Article 
5, Directive 2006/42/EC). In particular, the producer must ensure that the machinery meets the 
essential health and safety requirements and, in addition, must provide the consumer with all the 
necessary warnings. Before being placed on the market, the product must positively pass the 
procedures for assessing the conformity of machinery provided in article 12 of the Directive. At the 
end of these procedures, according to Article 16 of the Directive, the manufacturer can issue the EC 
marking as declaration of conformity. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
765/2008/EC of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance 
relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 [2008] OJ L 218/30, 
regulates the marking procedure, by which the producer assumes responsibility for the conformity of 
the product with the EU rules. Further obligations on producers are provided  by the Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 1999/44/EC of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12. 
269  With regard to the drive of an autonomous vehicle, it should also change the requirements of the 
driving license, including the understanding and interaction with the ADAS and the on-board 
computer, characterised by a more or less high level of AI. 
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automatic devices approved together with the approval of the vehicle on which 
they are installed can not be held responsible for any damage caused by the same 
product. With respect to the instructions, on the other hand, it is essential that they 
are clear and easily understood by the category of the average consumer, that is, by 
subjects who are not professionals in the automotive sector but who have, in any 
case, a minimum level of general knowledge. 
According to an economic analysis of the principles of non-contractual civil 
liability, the risk of the accident and of the consequent damages compensation 
should weigh on the person who can economically bear it.270 In a logic of the 
correct allocation of risk, it is evident that the owner of the vehicle, that is the 
person who purchased it, is economically stronger than the driver of the vehicle. 
With the achieving of a high level of automation, then, the responsibility 
progressively passes to the producer,271 but the driver’s liability remains if the 
accident is due to his negligent behaviour. In this scenario, it is clear that the 
producer can bear the economic risk of damage, even better than the owner of the 
vehicle, in particular by providing an ad hoc professional insurance.272  
 
 
 
																																																								
270 G Calabresi and DA Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review, 1096 f., state that the ability of the tortfeasor to 
prevent a given damage is taken into account, together with other conditions such as the ability of the 
same party to lower transaction costs.  
271 The choice of producer’s liability could be justified based on the ability of the producer to (better) 
insure himself and therefore handle costs associated with the production and distribution of the 
product (including transaction costs). C Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile (n 109), 687. 
272 According to an authoritative literature we could even talk about ‘absolute liability’ (which came 
from the common law legal system) that is even stricter than the objective liability, as there is the 
only proof that the fact was not unlawful.  
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1.3. Extensively application of existing legislation versus the need 
of an ad hoc framework of rules for self-driving cars. 	
This work started from a de jure condito analisis and has tried to demonstrate that 
current civil liability regulation in road traffic (in-depth in chapter III) is not a 
functional regulatory tool for to the protection of the injured person in the event of 
a self-driving car accident. More precisely, the liability rules in road traffic 
regulates the liability of the driver or of the owner (and the subject similar to him) 
in the circulation of traditional vehicles, and could be applied only to human-driven 
vehicles and, at most, to semi-autonomous vehicle until the most important driving 
commands are in the power of the human driver, who have to monitor the 
environment (i.e. until level 2 of automation of the SAE J3016 standard). 
Undoubtedly, also in these cases, if the accident was caused by a product defect the 
driver/owner of vehicle, condemned to the compensation for damages, has the right 
of recourse against the producer of the vehicle or of its defective component part. 
Alternatively, in the litigation phase (and therefore before the condemnation) the 
examination of the specific case will allow to ascertaining whether it is a 
hypothesis of joint and several liability of the driver/owner and the producer or 
whether it can instead be considered exclusively liable one of them. In this light, 
the importance, supported by many parties, of the introduction of Data Sharing or 
Data Record systems, which make it possible to check whether at the time of the 
accident the vehicle was in autonomous or manual driving mode, emerges. 
With higher automation (i.e. levels 3, 4 and 5 of automation of the SAE J3016 
standard), instead, the role of the driver is progressively lost because the vehicle 
drives itself and all the on-board users are considered passengers, to whom the 
liability in road traffic is not applicable. In this case, as the vehicle was concluded 
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by a person, who is the owner of the vehicle, for the mere fact of having purchased 
the vehicle it is on the owner that bears the risk of a possible accident and the 
consequent compensation for the damage. At the same time, however, the 
autonomous vehicle is a product and as a product falls within the scope of the PLD 
which, it seems to be the more functional regulation to protect the interests of the 
parties.273 Nevertheless a few doubts also arise regarding the PLD because it does 
not take into account the impact that new technology had in terms of new damages 
and the new party involved, since the directive came into force more than thirty 
years ago, as already highlight, and so is not keep up with times. For this reason, 
PLD does not appear sufficient for a complete and systematic regulation of 
autonomous vehicles and it is necessary to carry out a de iure condedno analysis in 
order to verify: (1) if the PLD could be applicable by legal analogy or extensively 
or (2) whether it is necessary to modify the existing regulation or introduce an ad 
hoc one. 
The EU Commission reported the PLD seems to be an adequate regulatory tool, 
even though today products are much more complex. However, the same 
Commission observed that it is necessary to clarify the legal understanding of 
certain concepts applied to new technologies (such as product, producer, defect, 
and damage) and look closely at certain products such as autonomous vehicle, 
which may pose a challenge to the performance of the Directive. 
As explained in chapter II, the autonomous vehicle is a robot, precisely an artificial 
intelligent robot. It falls within the product category but the problem concerns the 
																																																								
273 C Reed, E Kennedy, SN Silva, ‘Responsibility, Autonomy and Accountability: legal liability for 
machine learning (n 45) 5 explain that the product liabiltiy could be a good option for regulating 
machine learning damage (included that coming from self-driving cars) but, because it is a new 
technologies no laws have yet in force. 
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link between the product and the autonomous vehicle, as the latter is a product that 
has considerable peculiarities, first and foremost that of the AI. 
One wonders, therefore: Can the producer be liable for an accident brought about 
by a self-driving car? The answer is yes and the PLD could be applied, as the EU 
Commission states. As a matter of fact, even the abilities to intelligently interact 
with the surrounding environment and, in the higher automation level, the ability to 
learn, it is not enough to identify the robot (and so the self-driving car) as a subject 
whose actions could be considered the consequence of self-determination and 
awareness. Even if the robot can, in some cases, be autonomous and not 
predetermined in its interaction, from a legal point of view it is an object and, more 
precisely, a product.274 
 It remains to be determined whether to apply the PLD by legal analogy or 
extensively. 
Every national legal system is endowed with the character of completeness:275 it 
can not admit to have a regulatory gap, but it must be able to give a solution to 
every possible conflict that is generated among those who are subjected to that 
legal system. However, the legislator can not foresee all possible conflicts, 
establishing as a rule for every possible case. Therefore, to fill the inevitable gaps 
the art. 12, section 2, of the preliminary provision to the Italian Civil Code, 
																																																								
274 See A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications 
and Liability Rules’ (n 12) 235 ff., who also affirm that the issues of liability involving robotic 
applications fall within the product liability rules. 
275 The only binding interpretation is the so-called authentic one, which is the interpretation that 
comes from the same organ that issued the rule. This interpretation has the function of clarifying the 
doubts raised by the relative application, through the preceptive indication of the meaning to be 
attributed to the standard retroactively (through the so-called interpretative rules). When this does not 
occur, the method of interpretation referred to in the first paragraph of article 12 of the preliminary 
provisions of the Italian Civil Code, which makes express reference to the literal interpretation and to 
the logical-systematic one. Even if not expressly foreseen, it is common ground that a third criterion 
of interpretation is that of the extensive interpretation. Finally, when neither type of these 
intepretations is suitabe, the analogical iterpetation is applied. 
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requires to provide for the analogical application of the law. If a dispute can not be 
decided by a specific provision, the provisions regulating similar cases or similar 
matters have to be applied (so-called ‘analogia legis’).276 
It may happen that the judge not only does not find a law that provides for the case 
to be solved but also does not find rules relating to similar cases to similar matters, 
of which to make analogical application. In this case, he will have to decide 
according to the general principles of the legal system (so-called ‘analogia iuris’, 
provided by same article 12, section 2).277 
In the case under our investigation, i.e. the case of the law applicable to 
autonomous vehicles, a regulation already exists. In particular, there are two 
regulations: that of the law on road traffic (applicable up to level 2 of automation 
and then less and less with the increase of automation) and that of product liability 
(fully applicable from level 3 of automation). Already existing a normative 
regulation of the product liability and re-entering the autonomous vehicles in the 
concept of product, one does not see why has been applicable the PLD by analogy. 
On the contrary, the issue of the application of the PLD to the driverless cars is a 
question of adequacy of the product liability rules.278 The PLD, under for some 
concepts and certain terms already individuated, it is ineffective to regulate 
autonomous vehicles organically. In this context, the possible solution could be the 
																																																								
276  The analogical application, however, encounters a double limit, that are two cases where 
interpretation by analogy can no be applied, and are regulated under art 14, preliminary provision to 
the Italian Civil Code: the criminal rules (as also provided by art 1 of the Italian Criminal Code) and 
the exceptional norms, i.e. those that make exceptions to the general rules. 
277 These are not principles enshrined in textual laws (otherwise the judge would have a legal 
provision to be applied directly), but they are unwritten principles that are derived by induction from 
a plurality of rules and which represent the basic principles that appear to have been inspired by the 
legislator. 
278 See A Bertolini, ‘Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications 
and Liability Rules’ (n 12) 235 ff.. 
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extensively interpretation279 of the existing legislation on product liability in order 
to fully re-enter in the scope also the driverless car. 
At the same time, however, in a scenario characterized by legislation that does not 
keep up with the technological era, it seems extremely important the intervention 
of the European legislator, in order to regulate the new liability profiles deriving 
from accidents caused by an autonomous vehicle. For this reason, we need sector-
specific laws for self-driving cars: the differences between the different robotics 
applications are too significant to allow for a single ‘law of robotics’.280 As there is 
a specific normative discipline for traditional vehicles, so is needed one for 
autonomous vehicles, which will favour the development and diffusion of full 
autonomous vehicles. This desirable legislative reform should be composed by 
hard law, i.e. a specific binding legislation such as a directive (which is 
immediately applicable in all the European Member States), soft law as, for 
example, Ethical code, and techno-regulation, which is the ability of the 
technology to make law and not only to be the object of law.281 
In order to develop an effective approach for the automotive industry, the European 
Commission established the High Level Group (HLG) GEAR 2030 in October 
2015. The group brought together European Member States’ authorities and 
stakeholders who represent the industry, services and consumers. The HLG 
stresses that Europe needs a strong strategy on automated and connected vehicles 																																																								
279 The interpretation according to the intention of the legislator can give rise to the so-called 
extensive interpretation of the law, with which the words of the law are given a broader meaning than 
the literal one. 
280 U Pagallo, The Law of Robots: Crimini, Contratti e Tors (Springer 2013), inaugura il campo della 
legge dei robot, dal punto di vista dei filosofi legali e degli esperti di diritto positivo. In particolare, i 
filosofi legali sottolineano tre livelli di robot responsabili, cioè persone giuridiche, agenti appropriati 
e fonti di responsabilità per altri agenti sistemici; l'esperto di diritto positivo, invece, approfondisce i 
tre campi legali del diritto, cioè le leggi penali, contrattuali e illecite. 
281 A typical example of techno-regulation is raprsented by the data protection by design, introduced 
by the art 25 of the GDPR, which expressly provide that the product itself, thanks to the way it has 
been designed, has to guarantee the protection of the personal data of the data subject.	
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in the run-up to 2030 and beyond, as already underlined in the Amsterdam 
Declaration of 2016. These technologies are already coming to the EU single 
market in line with a global trend and represent challenges and opportunities for 
the EU policies and competitiveness. In the report, the HLG affirmed that there is a 
need to develop rules on data recording (i.e. trough black boxes) and associated 
data access rules, as well as traffic rules and vehicle rules in a coherent manner 
within the respective responsibilities at European and national levels. This also 
calls for an EU legal framework, which should encourage the necessary investment 
in autonomous vehicles and in connected infrastructure.282 
 
  
 
2. The need of an effective insurance policy for autonomous 
vehicle. 
 
2.1. Principles of insurance that guarantee a high level of 
protection in the ‘autonomous’ traffic flow. 
 
The convergence between technology and automotive innovation is 
revolutionizing the way we drive and move, and this will certainly have a 
significant impact on the insurance market. A white paper published by KPMG, in 
2015,283 already affirmed that the transition to autonomous vehicles could lead to 
one of the most significant changes ever in car insurance. The white paper analysed 
the feedback from senior insurance managers, whose companies provide a total of 																																																								
282 ‘Ensuring that Europe has the most competitive, innovative and sustainable automotive industry of 
the 2030s and beyond [2017] GEAR 2030, High Level Group on the Competitiveness and 
Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in the European Union final report. 
283 ‘Marketplace of change: automobile insurance in the era of autonomous vehicle [2015] KPMG 
white paper. 
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85 billion of dollars in insurance policies for commercial and private vehicles. 
Specifically, the KPMG document outlines eight key elements that will give rise to 
a new standard for the insurance industry: (1) Integrity of technology, (2) 
Capability accessibility, (3) infrastructure availability, (4) regulatory permission, 
(5) legal responsibility, (6) Consumer adoption, (7) Mobility service, (8) Data 
management.284 
The paper also highlights a significant point: only 29% of the insurance 
managers interviewed believe they possess the necessary understanding and 
knowledge related to autonomous vehicles and only 10% said they have already 
started to develop a strategic plan to deal with the impact of the innovation in the 
transport sector.285 
This gradual adoption of increasingly intelligent and autonomous vehicles, 
implies that there will be an evident car accidents reduction, especially considering 
that 90% of them are the result of human errors.286 At the same time, however, 
eliminating human error from the equation could lead to a scenario in which the 
insurance market would lose 40% of incomes in 2040, compared to those of 
2013.287  This, in turn, will strongly influence the car market, modifying its 
business models.  
																																																								
284 Ibid, 3 ff. In particular, as exposed in the KPMG white paper: (1) the integrity of technology for 
the autonomy in part already exist, and in the next future there will be an exponential development of 
it; (2) the capability accessibility is the vehicles connection through the Internet; (3) infrastructure 
availability is the initial technology embodied in the vehicles which will be developed in the 
infrastructure too, expected to become increasingly smart; (4) regulatory permission for test and drive 
autonomous vehicles; (5) legal responsibility and insurance policy, (6) consumer willing use self-
driving cars, one have understood its benefit;, (7) Mobility service, as convenience and reduced cost 
for the user; (8) management of the data required and generated by the mobility. 
285 Ibid, 23. 
286 Ibid, 25. 
287 Ibid 27. 
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Nonetheless, the evaluation of a risk management placed at the basis of the 
definition of the insurance premium, is based on the definition of its frequency and 
its severity. These aspect are difficult to analyse due to (a) the technical complexity 
of robotic devices (included driverless cars), (b) the lack of sufficient data with 
respect to the potential risks and the accidents they may cause, (c) the uncertainties 
with respect to liabilities that producers and users may face (as already 
explained).288 
However, despite the difficulties of the case and considering the strong impact 
that autonomous vehicles will have on the insurance system, it is necessary trying 
to focus the principles that can ensure a high level of protection for the parties 
involved.  
In the case of autonomous vehicles, the aspect that in practice really affects the 
injured party is to obtain compensation for damage. Therefore, even more than 
identifying the tortfeasor, it is important to establish who should compensate the 
damage, given that the tortfeasor and the other subjects called to compensate the 
damage may not coincide. This happens in all cases of a car accident in which 
compensation is paid not by the person held liable (driver and/or owner of the 
vehicle), but by the insurance company of the injured party, if the direct 
compensation scheme is applied, otherwise from t insurance company of the 
tortfeasor. 
Secondly, it is necessary that the injured person can always obtain 
compensation for the damage suffered. For this reason it is essential to maintain the 
current system of compulsory insurance, in the sense that, in the case in which the 
duty of mandatory insurance bears on the owner, the vehicle can not be put into 																																																								
288 A Bertolini and others, ‘On Robots and Insurance’ (n 45) 6.	
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circulation if the owner is not insured or, on the contrary, the case in which the 
duty of mandatory insurance bears on the producer, the vehicle can not be placed 
on the market if the producer is not insured. At the same time, an ad hoc fund 
should be provided for cases in which the injured party does not have an insurance 
company to claim. It happens, for example, when the owner or producer of the 
vehicle is not insured or the owner of the vehicle that caused the accident is 
unknown. 
Finally, an assessment should be made on the amount of the insurance 
premium, evaluating its variations based on the development of artificial 
intelligence in vehicles. A possible solution could be to evaluate the increase or 
decrease of the insurance premium in relation to the percentage of car accidents 
involving vehicles equipped with ADAS and, in an evolutionary way, autonomous 
vehicles. In our opinion, the new on-board technologies imply a reduction in 
accidents and therefore a consequent reduction in the insurance premium.289 This 
solution would seem to be consistent with the two cornerstones on compulsory 
insurance. The first point290 concerns the exceeding of the limit of fault as the sole 
criterion for imputation of liability, as already widely analysed, both in the 
responsibility of the driver and in that of the producer.291 The second point, instead, 
																																																								
289 In this context, in Italy the art 132 ter, letter b), Italian Private Insurance Code, provides the duty 
for the insurer to apply a compulsory discount in the event that on-board the vehicle are installed or 
are already preexisting electronic mechanisms that record the activity of the vehicle, called 'black box' 
or equivalent. After this first phase, as the vehicles become more and more autonomous and, at the 
same time, the driver will be denied the possibility of intervention during the driving phase, the 
responsibility will pass entirely to the producer, since there is no longer any subject qualifying as a 
driver. This will correspond to a new allocation of risk, which will probably result in an insurance 
system parametrised no longer on the driver but on the characteristics of the vehicle itself. 
290 M Franzoni, ‘Il danno risarcibile’, in Trattato della responsabilità civile, 1 ff.. 
291 In fact, as already explained, there is the semi-objective liability of the designer or the informer, 
and the strict liability of the manufacturer. Likewise, to the semi-objective liability of the driver is 
added the strict liability in certain cases expressly provided by the law. 
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concerns the development of a formula that always guarantees compensation for 
the damage occurred. 
Those mentioned above are only some of the possible problems related to the 
insurance of assisted and autonomous vehicles. The insurance challenge imposed 
by the phenomenon of self-driving cars is precisely that of relating to a broader and 
series of insurance scheme, which requires the rethinking of the current automobile 
insurance model. 
 
 
2.2. What should concretely provide an efficient automobile 
insurance policy. 	
Having analysed the evolution of civil responsibility in the light of new 
technologies, and autonomous vehicles in particular, the objective of this 
subsection is to verify how the insurance profiles of the compulsory insurance 
change with the modification of those relating to civil liability. The logical choice 
is to make sure that the insurance duties fall on the subject who is identified as 
tortfeasor. However, since there is not a legislation which has solved the problem 
of establishing who should be held liable when damage arises from the use of a 
driverless car, it is not even plausible to conceive a one fits all solution. We will try 
to formulate a rational solution, starting from the state of the art, as it was done for 
the identification of the tortfeasor. 
In figure no. 5, shown below, the levels of automation of the SAE standard have 
been taken up, identifying the tortfeasor for the accident produced by the vehicle 
with a more or less high level of automation and, consequently, the person who 
bears the duty of purchase the mandatory insurance contract. Nonetheless, the real 
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issue of the identification of the tortfeasor and of the policy holder will only exist 
once driverless vehicles achieve a high level of automation, and even more, the full 
automation, becoming completely independent from human control. Otherwise, for 
the moment, existing liability (driver/owner’s liability or producer’s liability) and 
insurance schemes (first of all third-party insurance) may be rather adequate.292 
However, we will try to rebuild below the possible scenarios. 
Up to level 3 of automation, would operate the traditional insurance scheme, 
which foresees the insurance policy of the owner of the vehicle. Obviously, all 
producers have their own professional insurance that is used to compensate the 
damage, if this derives from a defect of an ADAS or the software of the vehicle (as 
already happens for the defects of traditional vehicles). With the increasing of 
automation level and, therefore, of artificial intelligence, liability is transferred to 
the producer. This is the case of automation level 4, where, however, the joint and 
several liability or the exclusive liability of the owner of the vehicle, called to 
compensate the damage with his own insurance, can be invoked. 
Finally, in level 5 of automation, which is that of fully autonomous vehicles, the 
driver’s liability is not configurable because, as repeatedly stated, a driver no 
longer exists. On the contrary, the responsibility should be of the producer, called 
to compensate the damage with his professional insurance.293 Both in the case of 																																																								
292 L Gatt, IA Caggiano, MC Gaeta, ‘Italian Tort Law and Self-Driving Cars: State of the Art and 
Open Issues’ (n 14) 25. 
293 In this sense A Bertolini and others, ‘On Robots and Insurance’ (n 45) 5 f.: Finally, in case the 
device is autonomous - like a driverless vehicle - the current legal duty to acquire insurance - as 
currently is the case for the owners of cars under EU Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103/EC - may 
be plainly unjustified. Indeed, once the device is truly autonomous and the human being cannot 
interfere with its functioning (not even by supervising and eventually intervening to avoid collision or 
take over control in some cases), the only party responsible for the functioning of the device will be 
the producer or designer. […] Nonetheless, such a problem will only exist once driverless vehicles 
become completely independent from human control and supervision, while for the moment existing 
liability schemes and insurance products may prove adequate. In the same sense see L Gatt, IA 
Caggiano, MC Gaeta, ‘Italian Tort Law and Self-Driving Cars: State of the Art and Open Issues’ (n 
14) 29. 
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the liability of the driver/owner, which in that of the producer’s liability, the best 
solution would seem to be that of a third party mandatory insurance, with the 
possibility for the insured to include other types of damages, such as his personal 
or patrimonial damage or vehicle damage. 
In order to always guarantee damages to the injured person, then, it is necessary 
to provide for an ad hoc fund294 on which he or she can have recourse in a residual 
way, when it is not possible to identify the tortfeasor and/or his insurance. This 
fund should be European, since most vehicle accidents involve subjects or objects 
belonging to different Member States and are therefore cross-border. Moreover, the 
fund, so determined, could be increased by a government tax on autonomous 
vehicles and entrusted to the management of a specific insurance company, as 
already done for the so-called Guarantee Fund for Victims of the Road.295 
  
																																																								
294 To deepen the requirements of the see fund see E Quadri, ‘Considerazioni in tema di responsabilità 
medica e di relativa assicurazione nella prospettiva dell’intervento legislativo’ (2017) 1 Resp. civ. e 
prev. 27 ff. 
295  The Guarantee Fund for Victims of the Road is a compensation body established in 
implementation of the Strasbourg Convention of 1959 and regulated by the Italian Private Insurance 
Code in order to compensate: (a) damage caused by an unidentified vehicle or boat; (b) damage 
caused by a vehicle or a boat identified but not covered by insurance; (c) damage caused by a vehicle 
or a boat that is insured with an insurance company that at the time of the accident is in a state of 
compulsory winding up; (d) damage caused by a vehicle placed in circulation against the owner’s will 
(e.g. theft); (e) claims caused by vehicles sent to the territory of the Italian Republic by another State 
of the European Economic Area; (f) accidents caused by foreign vehicles with a licence plate that 
does not correspond or no longer corresponds to the same vehicle. 
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Figure no 5– Liability and insurance policy in relation with the automation 
level 
 
SAE 
level  
Name of the 
automation level Liability Applicable law 
Insurance 
Policy 
0 No Automation 
Driver/Owner of the 
vehicle (his similar 
subjects), with the 
right of recourse 
against the producer 
of the vehicle or of its 
defective component 
part. 
National rules of car 
accident liability (if 
necessary identified 
according to the rules of 
Private International Law) 
and eventually European 
and national Product 
liability regulation. 
Car Insurance 
policy of the 
vehicle 
owner. 
1 Driver Assistance 
Driver/Owner of the 
vehicle (his similar 
subjects), with the 
right of recourse 
against the producer 
of the vehicle or of its 
defective component 
part. 
National rules of car 
accident liability (if 
necessary identified 
according to the rules of 
Private International Law) 
and eventually European 
and national Product 
liability regulation. 
Car Insurance 
policy of the 
vehicle 
owner. 
2 Partial Automation 
Driver/Owner of the 
vehicle (his similar 
subjects), with the 
right of recourse 
against the producer 
of the vehicle or of its 
defective component 
part. 
National rules of car 
accident liability (if 
necessary identified 
according to the rules of 
Private International Law) 
and eventually European 
and national Product 
liability regulation. 
Car Insurance 
policy of the 
vehicle 
owner. 
3 Conditional Automation 
Owner of the vehicle 
(his similar subjects) 
and the driver of the 
vehicle if he had a 
behaviour that does 
not comply with his 
driving tasks. 
National rules of car 
accident liability (if 
necessary identified 
according to the rules of 
Private International Law) 
and eventually European 
and national Product 
liability regulation. 
Car Insurance 
policy of the 
vehicle 
owner. 
4 High Automation 
Owner (his similar 
subjects) and/or 
producer of the 
vehicle 
National rules of car 
accident liability (if 
necessary identified 
according to the rules of 
Private International Law) 
and/or European and 
national Product liability 
regulation. 
Car Insurance 
policy of the 
vehicle owner 
and/or 
Professional 
insurance of 
the producer 
and a 
compensation 
fund for 
autonomous 
vehicles 
5 Full Automation 
Producer of the 
vehicle. 
New framework or rules 
for autonomous vehicles 
Professional 
insurance of 
the producer 
and a 
compensation 
fund for 
autonomous 
vehicles 
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Conclusions 	
This work started from a de jure condito analysis of the state of the art and has 
tried to demonstrate that current civil liability regulation in road traffic is not a 
functional regulatory tool for to the protection of the injured person in the event of 
a self-driving car accident. More precisely, the liability rules in road traffic 
regulates the liability of the driver and/or of the owner of the vehicles (and the 
subjects similar to him) in the circulation of the traditional vehicles, and could be 
applied only to human-driven vehicles or, at most, to semi-autonomous vehicle 
until the most important driving tasks are controlled by a human driver, who have 
to monitor the environment (i.e. until level 2 of automation of the SAE J3016 
standard).  Undoubtedly, also in these cases, if the accident is caused by a vehicle 
defect, the driver/owner of vehicle has the right of recourse against the producer of 
the vehicle or of the defective component part. Alternatively, in the litigation 
phase, the examination of the specific case will allow to ascertaining whether it is 
an hypothesis of joint and several liability of the driver/owner and the producer or 
whether it can instead be considered exclusively liable one of them. 
With higher automation (i.e. levels 3, 4 and 5 of automation of the SAE J3016 
standard), instead, the role of the common driver fails, being replaced at most by 
that of the user or passenger on-board. So, the vehicle owner can be held liable for 
having purchased an autonomous vehicle but, with the disappearance of the 
driver’s role, the gradual overcoming of the owner system for vehicles is 
unavoidable. In this scenario, remains only the vehicle producer (or the one of the 
component part) who is considered liable for placing an autonomous vehicle on the 
market.  
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Regarding this last aspect, the autonomous vehicle is a product and as product 
falls within the scope of the PLD which, it seems to be the more functional 
regulation to protect the interests of the parties. Nevertheless, a few doubts also 
arise regarding the PLD, because it does not take into account the impact that new 
technology had in terms of new damages and new party involved, since the 
directive came into force more than thirty years ago and so is not keep up with 
times. For this reason, the PLD does not appear sufficient for a complete and 
systematic regulation of autonomous vehicles.  
Carrying out a de iure condendo analysis, the possible solution should be that to 
apply extensively PLD to high automated car. As a matter of fact, already existing 
a normative regulation of product liability and re-entering the driverless car in the 
concept of product, it is clear that it is not necessary to apply the PLD by analogy. 
Lastly, in an evolutionary way, for the fully autonomous vehicle (level 5 of the 
SAE J3016) it could be necessary to introduce an ad hoc framework of rules for 
self-driving cars, with particular regard to liability and insurance issue. In 
particular, is needed a sector-specific laws for robotics, and in particular a sector-
specific law for driverless cars. The differences between robotics applications are 
too significant to allow for a single ‘Law of Robotics’.  
With regard to the insurance profiles, the functional solution could be to 
continue to apply the compulsory third-party insurance imposed on the vehicle 
owner, who may be asked to compensate the damage, whether or not he was 
personally using the vehicle. It may then be discussed if the cost of the insurances 
should be bear by the producer, with his professional insurance (always following 
the third party scheme), when the damage derives from the malfunctioning of the 
vehicle or its component part. Furthermore, in order to always guarantee damages 
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to the injured person, it is necessary to provide for an ad hoc fund which the victim 
has a right of recourse, when it is not possible to identify the tortfeasor and/or the 
tortfeasor has no insurance. 
Anyway, the real problem of the identification of the tortfeasor and of the 
policyholder will only exist once driverless vehicles achieve a high level of 
automation, and even more, the full automation. Currently, the existing liability 
(driver/owner’s liability or producer’s liability) and insurance schemes (first of all 
third-party insurance) may be rather adequate. 
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Sintesi in italiano. 
Lo sviluppo dei sistemi di automazione dei veicoli ha raggiunto livelli elevati e 
si proietta, grazie all’evoluzione tecnologica, verso progressi sempre più rapidi. Le 
tecnologie attualmente utilizzate nel traffico stradale includono gli Advanced 
Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) e i veicoli dotati di un crescente livello di 
automazione e intelligenza artificiale, che sono l’oggetto della tesi di dottorato 
della dott.ssa Gaeta. 
I veicoli autonomi mirano a migliorare il comfort del conducente e minimizzare 
l’errore umano. Ciò implica, da un lato, un minore coinvolgimento del conducente 
nelle attività di guida e, dall'altro, un probabile miglioramento della sicurezza 
stradale. Tuttavia, è stato rilevato che l’immissione dei veicoli autonomi sul 
mercato comporta notevoli vantaggi ma, allo stesso tempo, induce a chiedersi se le 
attuali norme sulla responsabilità civile siano ancora adeguate. 
In effetti, le norme sulla responsabilità civile non affrontano direttamente il 
problema degl incidenti che coinvolgono almeno un veicolo autonomo e, anche se 
le norme sulla circolazione stradale prevedono alcuni casi che possono essere 
applicati a veicoli autonomi, non esiste una legislazione completa che permetta di 
identificare pienamente il responsabile in questo nuovo scenario. In particolare, le 
auto senza conducente potrebbero comportare il superamento della responsabilità 
del conducente e/o del proprietario del veicolo, nonché dei soggetti ad esso 
equiparati imputabili negli incidenti stradali. Ciò comporta la necessità di 
analizzare il tradizionale schema della responsabilità civile extracontrattuale da 
circolazione stradale, al fine di verificare se sia necessario coinvolgere altri 
soggetti come ad esempio il produttore, il fornitore di servizi Internet e altre parti 
(ad esempio gli hacker che possono manomettere il software di guida del veicolo). 
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In questo modo, deve essere effettuata un’analisi relativa alla corretta 
allocazione del rischio tra le diverse parti coinvolte nel settore automobilistico e, di 
conseguenza, anche una valutazione dei principi del diritto assicurativo che 
potrebbe garantire un elevato livello di protezione nel traffico “autonomo”. 
Nell’individuazione del soggetto responsabile, la ricerca, in primo luogo, ha 
preso in considerazione la prospettiva della legge italiana con particolare 
attenzione all’identificazione dei principi e della funzione della responsabilità 
civile in Italia. Le soluzioni che possono essere previste dalla legge italiana, poi, 
sono state confrontate con quelle in vigore negli ordinamenti giuridici francese, 
tedesco, inglese e americano, tenendo conto non solo della legislazione ma anche 
della giurisprudenza e della dottrina. Inoltre, il confronto è stato esteso anche alla 
normativa dell'Unione Europea, con particolare riguardo a quella sulla 
responsabilità da prodotto difettoso (in alternativa alla responsabilità da sinistro 
stradale) e alla recente soft-law sul tema della robotica e dell’intelligenza 
artificiale. 
Partendo da un’analisi de iure condito dello stato dell’arte, si è tentato di 
raggiungere un duplice obiettivo. Prima di tutto, valutare se esista una normativa 
sulla responsabilità civile che sia funzionale alla protezione del soggetto leso, 
anche in caso di incidente stradale causato da un’auto a guida autonoma. In 
secondo luogo, valutare se tale legislazione sia sufficiente per una 
regolamentazione completa e sistematica dei veicoli autonomi, oppure se sia 
necessario modificarla ovvero introdurre un quadro di regole ad hoc per le auto a 
guida autonoma. 
A tal proposito, nella tesi si cerca di dimostrare che l’attuale regolamentazione 
della responsabilità civile da circolazione stradale non è uno strumento normativo 
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funzionale per la protezione della persona lesa in caso di incidente causato da un 
veicolo autonomo. Più precisamente, le regole di responsabilità nel traffico stradale 
prevedono la responsabilità del conducente e/o del proprietario del veicolo (e dei 
soggetti a esso equiparati) nella circolazione dei veicoli tradizionali (cioè a guida 
umana) e potrebbero essere applicate al massimo al veicoli semi-autonomi, fino a 
quando i compiti di guida più importanti siano controllati da un conducente umano, 
che deve monitorare l’ambiente circostante (cioè fino al livello 2 di automazione 
dello standard SAE J3016). Indubbiamente, anche in questi casi, qualora 
l’incidente sia causato da un difetto del veicolo, il conducente/proprietario dello 
stesso avrebbe il diritto di regresso nei confronti del produttore del veicolo. In 
alternativa, in fase giudiziale, l’esame del caso specifico consentirebbe di accertare 
se si tratti di un’ipotesi di responsabilità solidale del conducente/proprietario con il 
produttore o se invece possa essere considerato esclusivamente responsabile uno 
solo di essi. 
Con una maggiore automazione (ovvero con i livelli 3, 4 e 5 di automazione 
dello standard SAE J3016), invece, il ruolo del driver assume sempre meno 
rilevanza fino ad essere sostituito da quello dell’utente o del passeggero di bordo. 
In questo caso il proprietario del veicolo può essere ritenuto responsabile per aver 
acquistato un veicolo autonomo anche se, anche a seguito della scomparsa del 
ruolo del guidatore, il superamento graduale del sistema proprietario per i veicoli è 
inevitabile. In questo scenario, rimane solo il produttore del veicolo, che può essere 
considerato responsabile per l’immissione sul mercato di un veicolo 
completamente autonomo. 
Riguardo a quest’ultimo aspetto, il veicolo autonomo è un prodotto e come 
prodotto rientra nel campo di applicazione della Direttiva n. 85/374/CEE sul danno 
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da prodotti difettosi, che sembra essere la normativa più efficace per proteggere gli 
interessi delle parti coinvolte. Tuttavia, sorgono alcuni dubbi riguardo tale 
Direttiva CEE, perché non tiene conto dell’impatto che la nuova tecnologia ha 
avuto in termini di nuovi danni e nuovi soggetti coinvolti, dal momento che è 
entrata in vigore più di trenta anni fa. Per questo motivo, la Direttiva non sembra 
sufficiente per una regolamentazione completa e sistematica dei veicoli autonomi. 
Giungendo a un’analisi de iure condendo, la soluzione possibile potrebbe essere 
quella di applicare estensivamente la Direttiva anche alle auto ad alta automazione. 
Infatti, essendo già esistente una regolamentazione normativa della responsabilità 
da prodotto difettoso e rientrando le auto senza conducente nel concetto di 
prodotto, è chiaro che possa essere applicata la Direttiva europea di riferimento. 
Invece, in via evolutiva, per il veicolo completamente autonomo (livello 5 dello 
standard SAE J3016) potrebbe essere necessario introdurre un quadro di regole ad 
hoc, con particolare riguardo alla responsabilità e alla questione assicurativa. 
Appare necessaria una legge specifica per la robotica, e in particolare una legge 
settoriale per le auto senza conducente, in quanto le differenze tra le applicazioni 
robotiche sono troppo significative per consentire un’unica “Law of Robotics”. 
Per quanto riguarda i profili assicurativi, una soluzione funzionale potrebbe 
essere quella di continuare ad applicare l’assicurazione obbligatoria secondo lo 
schema della R.C. auto imposta al proprietario del veicolo, al quale sarebbe 
richiesto di risarcire il danno, indipendentemente dal fatto che stesse utilizzando o 
meno il veicolo. Con il raggiungimento dell’automazione totale, poi, può essere 
previsto che il costo dell’assicurazione venga sostenuto dal produttore, con la sua 
assicurazione professionale (sempre seguendo lo schema della third-party 
insurance). Inoltre, al fine di garantire sempre il risarcimento dei danni alla 
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persona lesa, risulta necessario prevedere anche un fondo ad hoc sul quale la 
vittima possa rivalersi in via residuale, quando non sia possibile identificare il 
colpevole dell’incidente o lo stesso non sia assicurato. 
Ad ogni modo, il vero problema dell’identificazione del responsabile e del 
titolare della polizza sussisterà solo quando i veicoli senza conducente 
raggiungeranno un elevato livello di automazione e, ancora di più, l’automazione 
completa. Attualmente, la responsabilità esistente (responsabilità del 
conducente/proprietario o responsabilità del produttore) e i regimi assicurativi 
previsti possono essere strumenti adeguati per la tutela dei soggetti coinvolti. 		 	
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